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Chapter 1.
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Abstract
While, most of the literature, studying the Mexico’s drug related violence, focus either on explaining the causes
behind the dramatic increase in the homicide rate or analyzing the effect of crime on aggregated economic variables.
This paper studies the effect of increasing violence over individual’s labor market outcomes in Mexico, by combining
rich individual-level data that enables to compare the labor market outcomes for the same worker before and during
high levels of violence in Mexico. This study finds an heterogenous effect of incresing violence over the labor outcomes
of individuals in high and low income groups, rather than by gender. The surge in the Mexico homicide rate, represent
a negative shock for low-income individuals, since they are affected in a greater extent by violence than individuals
in the high-income group, sharpening problems of inequality and poverty for people living in municipalities where
the violence have escalated. Moreover, we find evidence to argue that there is a dispropornitated effect of incresing
violence between blue-collar, unskilled and white-collar, skilled workers. Whereas, for workers performing in high-
skill occupations the effect of higthened violence have caused a slight increase on their labor outcomes. For workers
in low-skill occupations as agriculture and personal services, caused a decline in their income. Excepting for workers
in occupation related to safety and security, where the probability of beign employed and the number of hours
worked weekly have increased. These finding are robust to taking into account the endogeneity of violence, by using
geographical and drug supply in Mexico as identifying instruments and after controlling for endogenous migration
within our sample.
JEL Classification: J01 J30, O54, R23
Keywords: Homicide Rate, Labor Market Outcomes, Labor Market Participation, Monthly Income, Annual
Income, Municipality, Drug Trafficking Organizations.
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I. Introduction
Violence and crime involve high economic costs on affected populations. In devel-oping countries, these acts sharpens latent problems of poverty, unemployment, low
economic grow, low investment and low educational attainment rate. The literature study-
ing the impact of violence on socio-economic outcomes at the individual and household
level, has grown in the last decade, since violence is a persistent social issue in many
developing economies (Kondylis, 2010; Bozzoli et al., 2013; Shemyakina, 2011). Specially,
in Latin American countries, one of the main sources of violence historically have been
related to the drug trafficking.
In the last 20 years, the drug trafficking activity in Mexico have evolved to become
in one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated drug networks. In Mexico, drug-
related organized crime groups, in order to increase their profits and influence, have
been fighting one another for territorial control and traffic routes, even in some areas
of the country, they might possess greater coercive force and governance capabilities
than the legit local governments. In 2006, the former Mexican President Felipe Calderon
launched an initiative to decisively combat the cartels using military force. These actions
significantly unfolded an unprecedented escalation of violence, claiming thousands of
lives, including many civilians. Living under such dramatic high levels of violence, surely
has an impact on people’s economic outcomes.
The recent crime increase in Mexico has motived a growing research on this topic
and its impact on many aspects of Mexican population, such as: education attainment,
migration, physical and mental health conditions, among others. However, there are
relatively few papers that have looked at the effect of crime derived from the increasing
drug-related violence on the main individual-level labor market outcomes in detail, as is
the aim of this paper.
The contribution of this paper can be expressed in following three aspects.
First, it investigates the effect on labor market outcomes of individuals living in
a environment of relative normal levels of violence and the subsequent exponential
increasing in the violence intensity. While, most of the recent literature, studying the
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Mexico’s drug related violence surge, as the works of (Dell, 2015; Dıaz-Cayeros et al.,
2011; Castillo et al., 2014), are studies either focusing on explaining the causes behind the
dramatic increase in Mexico’s homicide rate or analyzing the effect of crime on aggregate
economic variables for cities and the whole country, rather than its economic impact on
individuals’ economic conditions. Moreover, previous papers by Velásquez (2010) and
BenYishay and Pearlman (2013), only present one part of the story, the first one, shows
that increasing homicides rate in Mexico are negatively correlated with the earnings
and labor market participation of self-employed men. Whereas the latter one, assesses
the impact of violence in Mexico just in the amount of worked hours among the all
working-age population.
Second, in the empirical analysis we acknowledge the possible endogeneity explained
by the correlation between the level and evolution of violence over time and the individual
labor market outcomes obtain from a local labor market as the municipality of residence.
Such reverse causality problem emerges directly due fact that, municipalities with better
economic opportunities attract higher levels of crime and municipalities located closer to
U.S border might suffer higher levels of violence because confrontations between Drug
Trafficking Organizations (DTO’s) can be more noticeable and persistent in the border
area. To accurately identify causal effects of increasing crime in individual labor market
outcomes and to adequately control for these issues, we incorporate into the analysis
an instrumental variables approach. By exploiting the temporal variation of cocaine
supply in Mexico and the geographical location variations of municipalities, we define an
instrument, which considers the interaction between seizures of cocaine in Colombia and
the nearest distance to the U.S. border for each municipality. Using this approach we will
able to separate the variation of violence from factors that could affect homicide rates and
the economic activity, as well as, from the economic variations that could affect homicides
rates. Getting as results unbiased estimations of the effect of violence at individual-level
labor outcomes.
Third, by using the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a longitudinal survey
containing 8,440 households across 150 communities in Mexico, being both nationally and
regionally representative, containing extensive economic and demographic information at
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the household and individual level. Given that, the information was collected in 2005 and
2009, coinciding with the period when the homicide rate in Mexico sharply increased, we
are able to compare the labor market outcomes for each single person at MxFLS before
and during high levels of violence. Moreover, exploiting the richnesses at MxFLS, we
explore the heterogeneity of the results obtained, by defining different subgroups within
population, this allows us to provide a complete and revealing evidence regarding how
the effect of violence is spread among population.
Our findings suggest that, the labor market participation, the probability of being
employed, monthly wage income and the total monthly income, for an average person
had been negatively affected by the increasing levels of violence in Mexico. Moreover,
comparing our results among individuals in high and low income groups, we find that the
surge in the Mexico homicide rate, represent a negative shock for low-income individuals,
since they are affected in a greater extent by violence than individuals in the high-
income group, sharpening the problems of inequality and poverty for people living in
municipalities where the violence have escalated. Moreover, we find a disproportionated
impact of crime between different types of workers. While, increasing violence in Mexico,
represents a negative shock among blue-collar, unskilled workers. Labor market outcomes
among white-collar, skilled workers have increased.
This paper continues as follows: next section provides a description of the increase in
the homicide rate observed in Mexico since 2007, as well as, the potential explanations
given by the related literature. Section III, describes the data used in this study, specially
we analyzed whether migration is a important issue driving the results, this analysis
indeed, allow us to rule out that possibility. Section IV, explains the methodological
approach used to identify causal effects of crime on individual labor market outcomes.
Section V, presents the results and its heterogeneity for different groups of individuals
and workers in different occupations. Finally, in section VI, we give the conclusions and
policy recommendations.
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II. Drug Related Violence in Mexico an Overhaul.
During the last 10 years Mexico have experienced an increasing incidence of drug related
crime and conflict between organized crime groups, spreading across its all territory,
attracting a great deal of government, international and public attention. It is estimated
that around 170.000 drug-trafficking-related deaths have been registered since 2006 in
Mexico. The vast majority of these deaths were caused by confrontations between Drug
Trafficking Organizations competing for control of routes and strategic locations for the
traffic of drugs on the way to U.S.
Figure 1: Monthly National and Drug-related Homicide Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) in Mexico
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from INEGI and Mexican Government
Based on the current literature studying the causes and consequences of higher crime
rate in Mexico, we can argue that violence in Mexico has dramatically intensified due to
three main factors. First, the militarized fight against drugs and drug trafficking cartels.
President Calderon introduced a leadership strategy focus on targeting to arrest the
highest levels or core leadership of criminal networks. (Calderón et al., 2015; Dell, 2015;
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Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011). Second, the increased fragmentation of drug cartels. President
Calderon’s policies showed not only that were unable to neutralize the DTOs but also that
its effects stemming from arresting or killing the leaders of many drug cartels triggered
the sharp increase in the number of homicides caused by the increasing confrontation
among cartels, fighting to secure the drug trafficking routes towards U.S territory. Third,
by the exogenous changes in the international narcotics market. Castillo et al. (2014),
argue that, the surge in the drug-related violence in Mexico since 2006 was a consequence
of the scarcity in cocaine supply resulting from the increasing drug seizures in Colombia.
As figure 1 shows, we suggests that the increased incidence of organized crime
has a direct effect on overall violence and crime, as long as the DTOs diversify their
financial source committing others crimes that directly affected the civil population, such
as extortions, kidnappings and executions, in fact executions became more frequently
targeted at civilians, particularly at authorities, journalist, public employees, and all those
that refuse to pay extortion fees. In consequence, drug-related violence became embedded
in society and triggered fear among the population in Mexico (Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011).
In this sense, high incidence of organized crime in a particular area not only affects those
involved in these activities but also the population living in these areas.
It is important to mention that while violence has risen consistently over time, there is
a great deal of variation in the changes in homicide rates across municipalities. Between
2005 and 2009, on average there was a 0.8 per 10,000 increase in the municipality homicide
rates, but some areas suffered a 13 per 10,000 increase while others had a 14 per 10,000
decline. We exploit both temporal and spatial variation to identify the effect of exposure
to violent crime on individuals labor outcomes.
III. Data
The dataset that we used in this paper, was built by matching the INEGI monthly
homicides reports at municipality level, with the Mexican Family Life Survey. The INEGI
data, contains all the officials reports of intentional homicides by occurrence date at
municipality level. Then we use the number of homicides to construct the homicide
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rate per 100.000 inhabitants for each Mexican municipality as a measure of violence at
the municipality level. We acknowledge that, others types of crime have also increased
as a results of the Mexican drug war. The reason why, this paper and many others
conflict studies focus on homicides as a measure of violence is because are less sensitive
to systemic misreporting and represent the most accurate proxy to measure the overall
crime environment.
In order to study the impact of crime on economic outcomes at individual level, we
match the homicides rate data with the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), which is
a longitudinal, multi-thematic survey representative of the Mexican population at the
national, urban, rural and regional level. The advantages of use this rich data for the
purpose of this study are the followings: First, the MxFLS traces most of households
for three periods: 2002, 2005-06 and 2009-10. Which coincides with the prior and after
stages of the violence shock in Mexico. Moreover, The MxFLS 1, includes information on
8,440 households and 35,600 individuals among 150 communities in 16 states throughout
Mexico. Third, The MxFLS 2, has kept low levels of attrition. Over 89% of the panel
respondents were re-interviewed in MxFLS II. Four, The MxFLS 3 was largely conducted
in 2009 and 2010, during the dramatic escalation of violence, for this round 87% of the
panel respondents were recontacted.
Second, the MxFLS has a rich set of characteristics about the surveyed individuals,
including information about the economic, social and health status of each member of a
surveyed household. The questionnaire for adults includes sections on education, labor
supply, earnings, migration history, marriage history, fertility history and health status.
We focus on the MxFLS 2 and MxFLS 3 because we are interested in the sample of
individual of working age and we do not want to exclude the youngest cohort from
our study, as their labor market information would not be available in 2002, by doing
so, we can look at the impact of crime including the youngest working age individuals.
Furthermore, by combining the last two MxFLS waves, we will be able to compare the
outcomes of the same individual under different levels of violence, which will allow us
to control for all unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that might be correlated with
exposure to violence and household income.
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Third, in MxFLS 3 there has been a particular effort on following migrants within
Mexico and to the U.S. This is particularly important for this study because migration may
be a behavioral response to crime. If individuals, particularly affected by high levels of
violence, migrate away from their original municipalities as a response to the increasing
crime and they are not tracked, the estimations of the impact of crime on labor outcomes
would be biased. Moreover, if migration is due to unobserved characteristics correlated
with labor market outcomes and related to violence, this fact may represent a problem for
the validity of our results.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of the increased incidence of crime on
various labor market outcomes in Mexico, such as labor market participation, probability
of being employed, number of working hours. The employment status was define based
on the question "What was your main activity last week" on MxFLS, which ask for the
labor status at the interview time. The labor market participation variable is a dummy
variable indicating 1 whether the individual answered "worked" or "looking for a Job" or
were in "Vacations" but have a job and 0 otherwise. The variable Employed, is a dummy
variable indicating 1, whether the individual answered "worked" and 0 otherwise. It
does not refer to any specific type of employment. Moreover we consider as well several
income related variables, mainly split in Labor-wage income as: Monthly and Annual
wage Income and total monthly income accounting for any source of income, regardless
the earnings are coming from a payroll or are obtained by their own means .
The main challenge to estimating the impact of crime on labor outcomes is the problem
of identification associated with potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
The level of violence and its change over time are not random across municipalities
or independent of other factors that may affect labor outcomes. The reverse causality
problem comes out from the fact that, municipalities with better economic opportunities
attract higher crime. Since, violence has a negative effect on economic activities and
unemployment, causing poor economic performance or high unemployment rates, it
might also generate more violence. One strength of our empirical approach is to solve
these concerns and be capable to get unbiased estimations identifying the casual effects of
crime on individuals labor outcomes.
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Moreover, to shield our results from the bias derived from endogenous migration
patterns, we estimated the relationship between migration and the exposure to crime. We
examine whether individuals living in a certain municipality in 2005 that have experienced
an increase in the homicide rate by 2009 are more likely to migrate to safer cities. We
also need to included some controls accounting for the individuals and households
characteristics reported in MxFLS 2, to identify whether the characteristics of these
movers are significantly different from non-movers. To address the endogenous migration
analysis, we use the following specification.
Migij = α+ ρ∆Crj + β′Xi + θSt05 + uij (1)
Where Migij is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual i living in the
municipality j at the time of MxFLS 2, moved to a different municipality in MxFLS 3,
∆Crj is the homicide rate change between 2005 and 2009 in municipality j , Xi is the
vector of individuals and household characteristics measured in MxFLS 2, (marital status,
age, school attainment, household seize, work experience, number of children, number of
kids, babies) and the St05 represent the state fixed effects for the initial state of resident.
Specifically, exposure intensity to crime for individual i will be assigned based on the
municipality j where she or he was living in 2005, rather than their current municipality
of residence. By fixing the respondent to their 2005 municipality of residence prior to
the sharp increase in the homicide rate, any migration caused or correlated with change
in the crime level will not impact their assigned violence exposure level, this reduces
concerns about the potential situation in which migration behavior is driving the results.
The results obtained from estimating the equation (1), are presented in table 1, the
results suggest the following: First, for our example the migration decision was not driven
by the change in the homicide rate, which mean that migration is not endogenous. Second,
it support the assumption that an individuals followed in 2005 and 2009 remained in the
same local labor market. Third, the amount of those individuals who eventually moved is
not statistically significant to undermine the results validity for the labor market outcomes.
In addition, the low magnitude of those individual and household characteristics that
seems to exert an impact on the migration decision allows us to argue that there is not
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difference between the individuals characteristic among the responders that migrated and
those who remained living in the same municipality.
IV. Empirical Strategy, Identifying causal effects
To reduce concerns about the omitted bias problem that naturally arises in studies about
crime and labor market outcomes, first we employ a within individuals analysis and
then we will introduce a new instrumental variable that will allow us to identify real
causal effects on how crime expansions might affect the adults labor opportunities and
their income outcomes. Consistent results using the IV method will indicate that neither
endogeneity nor unobserved variables drive our results. Furthermore, by making compar-
isons for the same individual over time, we can control time-invariant characteristics and
given the data availability at MxFLS, we can also control for time variant household and
individuals characteristics . Our empirical strategy can be generalized in the following
regression framework:
yijt = αCrjt + βlXit + γl Mjt + θi + uijt (2)
Where y is the outcome of interest of individual i living in municipality j in year t, Cr
is the homicides rates at the municipality level in time t, X is a vector of individual
characteristics (age, education level, marital status, household size, working experience,
number of children), θi captures individual fixed effects, the term Mjt refers the set of
time-variant municipalities features, such as the number of economic units, percentage
of houses with energy connection and the municipality gross output per-worker, that
are taken into account to capture the economic and social development extent of each
municipality.
One of the main difficulties to estimating the impact of crime on labor market out-
comes is the potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Identifying the effect
of crime on labor outcomes, present an reverse causality problem because the level of
violence and its change over time are not random across municipalities nor independent
of other factors that may affect labor outcomes, meaning that municipalities with better
economic opportunities may attract higher crime. Implying that homicides rates might
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not be orthogonal to unobserved factors that influence the municipality economic perfor-
mance. Moreover, since we are interesting in analyze individual-level labor outcomes, the
correlation between the independent variables with unobserved characteristics could be
explained by self-selection. E[θi, X] 6= 0
Therefore, is reasonable to consider that uijt is correlated with Crjt, because crime
might be higher in municipalities with a better economic performance, where the labor
market outcomes may be larger. As we know, a simple fixed effect transformation of
equation (2) generally results in inconsistent estimations of all coefficients, because in this
case we have that Cov[Crjt, uijt] 6= 0
To identify causal effects, we need to address the potential reverse causality, to do
so, we exploit the following facts: First, large seizures of cocaine in Colombia since 2002,
brought a drop in the supply and an increase in the international price for drugs, as
consequence, violence among Mexican cartels increased as a response to the drugs scarcity,
Castillo et al. (2014)1. Specifically, this effect follows, holding the assumption that cocaine
shortages increase revenue for drug dealers, which is theoretically the case, so long as
the demand for cocaine is inelastic, as the existing evidence suggests. At the same time,
increasing revenue to drug trafficking motives armed confrontations among drug cartels,
unfolding a heightened violence, see figure 3.
Second, municipalities closer to the US border increased their market value to drug
trafficking organizations and precisely has been in these municipalities where violence
have increased the most, as competing DTOs fight to gain control over smuggling routes,
see figure 4. By exploiting both facts, temporal variation of cocaine supply and geo-
graphical location variations of municipalities, we can to construct an instrument, which
considers the interaction between seizures of cocaine in Colombia and the nearest distance
to the U.S. border for each municipality. Using this approach we will able to separate
the variation of violence from factors that could affect homicide rates and the economic
activity, as well as, from the economic variations that could affect homicides rates.
1According to this study, cocaine production in Colombia went down from about 520 MT per year in 2006 to about
200 MT in 2009, the average price per pure gram of cocaine on US cities streets went up from about $114 in 2006 to about
$180 in 2009, and the wholesale price went from $40 to $68 during the same period
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Distance to the nearest U.S. entry point is computed as the distance from the centroid
of each municipality to the closest U.S. entry point. The centroids are obtained from
INEGI and the entry points from Google Earth. Our variation in scarcity comes from the
changes in the supply of Colombian cocaine induced by interdiction efforts. Specifically,
monthly cocaine seizures within Colombia. Seizures data comes from the Colombian
Ministry of Defense covering the period from 01/1999 to 04/2012.
To be valid our instrument must satisfy two requirements: first, the instrument must
be uncorrelated with the error term, Cov[z, u] = 0, in other words the instrument must be
exogenous, we assume here that, the monthly variation of cocaine seizures in Colombia,
cause supply contractions in drug trade-chain markets as Mexico, specially in short
periods of time when for DTOs is hard to fill this gap, such variation is exogenous to
Mexico, because it only depends on interdiction and funding efforts in Colombia against
the locals drug producers and exporting organizations. Second the instrumental variable
must be relevant, it must explain our endogenous variable, in our application this requires
that our measure of municipality crime rate will partially correlated with the cocaine
seizures and distance to U.S border term, but do not lead to change in the labor market
outcomes. Formally, if the excludability and relevance conditions are met, then the
instrumental variable estimator is a consistent estimator to identify the effect of increasing
violence on the individuals labor market outcomes in Mexico.
One additional potential concern to truly identify the effect of crime on labor market
outcomes is the Financial Crisis in 2008, which coincides with the MxFLS2 and MxFLS3
waves. If, in the case that, differential municipality experience of the global financial crisis
were correlated with the geographic heterogeneity in crime patterns. In the sense that,
the economic downturn reduced (heterogeneously across Mexican municipalities) the
employment opportunities and the income among adults, leading to an increase in the
crime levels within these municipalities. These effects would be hard to split. However, the
papers by (Ajzenman et al., 2015; Velásquez, 2010) have explored the relationship between
the temporal and geographic variation in violence in Mexico and the heterogeneity in the
economic impact of the Financial Crisis directly and found no evidence of a connection.
Furthermore including controls for the local economic environment contained in the Mjt
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and carrying out our estimations including time fixed effects, we address these worries.2
V. Results
We begin by examining the first-stage relationship between our instrument and the
endogenous variable, the homicide rate. The first stage regression are reduced form
regression of the endogenous variables on set of instruments, the relevant test statistic
in this procedure is relate to the explanatory power of the excluded instrument. Table 2
contains the result from three models, the first one, a model with the completed controls
set that we used to get our main results, the second model including a less substantive
control set and the third one which include just municipality and state controls.3 The
results indicate that the interaction term between the cocaine seizures in Colombia and
the distance to the US border is a good instrument for the homicide rate in Mexico.
All two coefficients measuring the relationship between these two variables are sig-
nificant at p < 0.01 level. Regarding to the relevance and validity of instruments, the
underidentification test, Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, testing whether the excluded in-
strument is relevant and the equation is identified, rejected the null hypothesis, indicating
that the matrix is full column rank and the model is identified. The weak identification
test provide by the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, in both models was larger enough to
suggest that the instrument performs well. Moreover, the weak-instrument test 4 checking
the significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural
equation are jointly equal to zero, and, additionally, the orthogonality conditions are
valid.
All the followings tables presents the second-stage results for the IV model in equation
2We were cautious in the amount of variables that we considered as local economic controls, since these economic
controls might be potentially endogenous in a way that would bias our estimations
3We consider the following three groups of controls. Individual characteristics: Education attainment, age, age
squared, work experience and marital status. Household characteristics: Household size, number of sons, number of
kids (younger than 17 years old), number of babies (children up to 3 years old). municipality characteristics: Number of
economic units, share of households with drinkable water access and GDP per-worker.
4The Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S statistic.
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(2) as well as some extensions that explore the heterogeneity effect of heightened violence
on the adults labor outcomes. Such heterogeneity analysis include interactions between
the homicide rate and dummy variables that takes value 1 whether the individual belongs
to the followings groups: the first one, young adults group for individuals between 17
and 35 years old. The second one, is the group for age between 36 and 60 years old. Third,
for individuals who answered being working as Self-employed.
Furthermore, we complete the heterogeneity analysis considering different income
groups and different workers’ skill level. In the case of the income groups (High and low
income), we estimate quintiles for the total monthly income distribution and based on it,
we define the High income group for those individuals at the fifth quintile of the income
distribution, in others words, the top 20% of the income distribution. Likewise we define
the low income group for those individuals at the first and second quintile of the income
distribution. On the other hand, the richness of MxFLS give us to opportunity to categorize
the individuals by blue-collar, production and white-collar non-production workers, also
distinguished as unskilled and skilled workers respectively, because throughout the
three waves it reports the worker position according to the Mexican classification of
Occupations.5 We define two groups, white-collar and blue-collar workers based on their
position at work, we consider as white-collar, skilled, worker those individuals belonging
to the categories 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 51, 61, 62, 71.6 The blue-collar, unskilled, worker group
comprise those individuals working in positions classified as 41, 52, 53, 54, 55, 72, 81, 82.7
The estimations were clustered by the municipality residence in 2005. The crime
measure that we are using here is the average homicide rate over the two years, prior to
the month and year of interview.
5Full list of Mexican classification of Occupations - INEGI
611.Professionals, 12.Technicians, 13.Educators, 14.Workers in Art, Shows, and Sports, 21.Officials and Directors in the
Public, Private, and Social Sectors, 51.Bosses, Supervisors, etc. in Artistic and Industrial Production and in Repair and
Maintenance Activities, 61.Department Heads, Coordinators, and Supervisors in Administrative and Service Activities.
62.Administrative Support Staff, 71.Merchants and Sales Representatives,
741.Workers in Agriculture, Live stock, Forestry, and Fishing, 52.Artisans and Workers in Production, Repair, and
Maintenance, 53.Operators of Fixed Machinery and Equipment for Industrial Production, 54.Assistants, Laborers, etc. in
Industrial Production, Repair, and Maintenance, 55.Drivers and Assistant Drivers of Mobile Machinery and Transport
Vehicles, 72.Traveling Salespeople and Traveling Salespeople of Services, 81.Workers in the Service Industry, 82.Domestic
Workers
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i. Labor Market Status Effects
We start analyzing the effects of violent crime on the followings labor market outcomes:
labor market participation, employment status and number of working hours.
i.1 Labor Market Participation
The estimation results contained on table 3 (column 1), suggest that, for an average
individual, an increased in the local homicide rate lead to a reduction in the likelihood of
being participating in the labor market. Specifically, the result suggest that, an individual
living in a municipality that had relative low level of homicide rate at the time when he
or she was interviewed by MxFLS-2 survey and then experienced the average homicide
rate rise over the 24 months prior to the interview by the MxFLS-3, the probability of
being participating in the labor market have decreased by 6 percentage points. The results
predicts that, an individual who experience one standard deviation increase in the 24
months average homicide rate (13 in 100,000 inhabitants) was 9.6 percentage points less
likely to participate in the labor market. Moreover, comparing the results among males
and females, we find out, that the increasing violence in Mexico, affected negatively the
males probability of being participating in the labor market, such effect might be derive
either from victimization threats or because some males quit to work or stop looking for
a job; to get involved in criminal activities by joining to drug-related groups. Womens,
however, as response are more likely to participate in the labor market, compensating the
male absence.
Table 4 shows the analysis of these results among different population groups, specif-
ically, the results are suggesting that, within the females group, those working as self-
employed and those females at the first and second quantile of the income distribution,
the labor market participation decision is more likely to be negative affected by local
crime, due to the fact that these groups of females might be more vulnerable to DTOs
confrontations and many others crime expressions, resulting in a high probability of
potential victimization while are, working on the streets as self-employed and living in
poorer areas.
15
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
i.2 Employment
The stream of literature studying the effects of conflicts on firms performance, which
usually uses firm-level data for a single country as (Collier and Duponchel, 2013; Pshisva
and Suarez, 2010) for instance, argued that armed conflicts affects negatively firms perfor-
mance, through channels such as transaction costs, investment, expansion opportunities,
and firm sales, causing a reduction in the number of employees that a firm hires, this
fact would have a negative impact on the probability of being working as employed in
a violent environment. Specifically in the case of Mexico, Utar (2018) find a significant
negative impact of the surge in violence on plants’ output, product scope, employment
and capacity utilization. In that sense, we expect a negative impact of increasing violence
on workers’ employment opportunities, through the negative impact of violence on firms
outcomes.
To assess the impact of the Mexican drug war on this labor market outcome, table
5 presents the estimation result based on the IV strategy explained in section IV. The
estimate for the non-interacted homicide rate suggest that, for an average individual the
likelihood of being employed have been negatively affected by the increasing level of
violence in Mexico. Specifically, this estimation suggest that, for an adult person living in
a municipality that had suffer a marginal increase in the homicide rate of 1 in 100.000
homicides per habitants, is 3.6 percentage points less likely to currently being employed.
The estimation results showed in columns 9 and 10, describe the effect of Homicide
rate over the employed status interacting whether the individual is female or male. The
findings suggest an important relationship among females and males employed status, for
an average male the increasing violence in Mexico had negatively impacted the likelihood
of being working by 2.6 percentage points, whereas for an average female the estimate
result is suggesting that such effect is positive, meaning that the likelihood of being
employed among females that keep participating in the labor market is increasing a
higher violence levels. The combination of these two results, suggest a sort of substitution
effect among males and females labor force, in the sense that, in times of heightened
violence firms might prefer hire females over males, as a way to keep peaceful and
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stable workplace environments, moreover, as drug-related violence increases due to
cartels confrontations and drug trafficking expansions, males are more likely to enter in
cartels groups and get involved in criminal activities, leaving aside the chance of get an
employment.
Furthermore, the result in table 6 (column 5), indicate that the effect of violent crime
tend to be more significant for individuals located at low levels of the income distributions
regardless their gender, the magnitude of such effect is larger for females compared to
males, an unit increase (1 in 100.000 inhabitants) in the average homicide rate will reduce
the likelihood of being employed for females at the low income group by 1.9 percentage
points, while mens belonging to the same group of individuals are 0.6 percentage points
less likely to be working as an employee. Additionally, the results suggest that for a
blue-collar, unskilled, male worker, a ten unit increase (10 in 100.000 inhabitants) in the
average homicide rate will reduce the probability to get a formal job by 4 percentage
points, meaning that the drug-related violence in Mexico represents a negative shock on
the employment status for those unskilled and low-income male workers.
i.3 Working Hours
A more sensitive measure of how violent crime might affect the local labor market in those
municipalities that had suffer sharp increase in the homicide rate, is the total number of
hours worked a week, we just considered the logarithm transformation of the number
of hours worked weekly in primary jobs. We expect a negative impact of increasing
homicide rates on the number of working hours among workers. Specially, intuitively we
think that such negative impact might be larger for self-employed individuals relating to
other types of workers.
Since, self-employed workers are considered as individuals, who are not remunerated
by a salary rather they obtain their income by working on their own business, under their
own risk. In developing economies and specially in violent areas within these countries
usually, the vast majority of individuals work as self-employment as a survival strategy
after being unable to find a formal job. Additionally, due to the fact that, this type of
worker develops its daily economy activities mainly on the street, where are more likely to
17
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
be affected by local criminality. As long as they face victimization threats, self-employers
sensitively adjust the amount of working hours by fleeing for their lives or staying at
home.
Table 7 provides evidence that homicides negatively impact the amount of hours
people work. Such negative effect is predominant among self-employed workers and
people located in the low quintiles of the income distribution. Specifically, we find that an
increase in 1 per 100.000 inhabitants in the homicide rate, lead to an average decrease in
work hours of approximately 6 percentage points, for low-income workers, whereas, the
same one 1 unit increase in the homicide rate, will translate in a average decrease of 3
percentage points in the amount of hours worked weekly for self-employed workers.
Moreover, the results contained in table 8 indicate a difference in the heterogeneous
respond to homicides between males and females. We find that, for an self-employed
woman, an increase in the homicide rate of 1 homicide per 100.000, lead a decrease of
6.3 percentage points in the total number of her working hours. Whereas, for an men
who works as self-employed, these effect did not result significant, though it suggested
a negative impact. However, column (5) shows, that increasing violence had negatively
affected the total number of working hours for low-income males and females, but the
magnitude of such negative effect is uneven distributed among females and males, being
the former ones who end up more affected. The results are suggesting, for instance, that
an increase of 1 per 100.000 in the homicide rate, will reduce the number of total working
hours of low-income males by 4.6 percentage points, while for low-income females the
negate effect almost doubles going up to 8.5 percentage points. These results suggest that
increasing violence can be consider as a negative shock for the number of working hours
for low-income individuals and self-employed females. Furthermore, we can imply that
low-income females are more sensitive to adjust the number of hours that they work, in
environments where violence is rapidly increasing.
ii. Individual Income Effects
Contrary to the large existing literature that assess the economic cost of crime on national
income, where (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Pinotti, 2015; Robles et al., 2013) are
18
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
prominent examples, in this section we explore the economic impact of violence on
Individual-level income variables. The income level of an individual could be affected by
increasing levels of violence, if individuals are working less hours during violent times as
a mechanism to protect their lives. Moreover, under these violent conditions, workers and
business owners might face robberies, extortions, might need to invest in private security
and in safety technology, actions that undermine the monthly and annual income, and in
other cases businessmen and businesswoman will reach a situation where they have to
decide to close their operations.
ii.1 Monthly Wage Income
The results table 9 contained the estimation coefficients of the impact of homicide rate
on individuals monthly wage income. The results are suggesting that the increasing
violence in Mexico over the 2005-06 to 2009, period does not have a significant impact on
the wage income for an average individual, such results comes from the wage rigidity
that is naturally embodied in the wage composition. The interesting results comes from
comparing the results obtained for low and high income individuals. The coefficient in
column 5, suggest that, whereas for an individual located in the quintiles 1 and 2 of the
income distribution, the one unit increase in the average homicide rate over the last 24
months prior to the interview date, reduce the log of wage income, by 31.8 percentage
points. A very different effect was found for the group of high income individuals, where
the logarithm of monthly wage income increased by 7.2 percentage points. Such result
for the low-income group, lays out a concordance with those results found for this same
population group regarding to the lower probability of being employed and the reduction
in the total among of worked hours, the combination of these two effects explain the
decrease in the monthly wage income among low-income individuals.
The fact that the effect of crime on the wage income for low and high income groups
individuals, goes in opposites directions, means that the drug-related violence in Mexico
extended the inequality gap between low and high income communities.
The results in table 10 are confirming the previous results, in this case for both females
and males the direction of the effect of violence takes opposites paths regarding the income
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group, being positive for high income females and males. Specifically, the coefficients
in column 4 and 5, suggest that, one unit increase in the homicide rate (1 per 100.000 ),
will reduce the log wage income for females at the low-income group by 23.8 percentage
points, whereas the same change in the homicide rate, will increase the logarithm wage
income for womens at the high income group by 12.4 percentage points. Moreover, among
males, the results indicates that one unit increase in the homicide rate (1 per 100.000 ),
translate in 3 percentage points increase for males in the high income group, and around
34 percentage points decline in low monthly wage income for low-income males workers.
These results, also show that within the low-income group, males have been negatively
affected in greater extent by drug-related violence than their peers females.
ii.2 Annual Wage Income
The effect of violent crime on individuals annual wage income, presented in table 11, are
similar to those found for the monthly wage income case. The estimates results suggest
that, the annual wage income has been negatively impacted by the increasing violence in
Mexico, among poorer workers and adults at the 36 to 60 years old group. Specifically,
the result predicts that for an average worker located at the first and second quantile of
the income distribution, an increase of 1 unit in the homicide rate, will cause a reduction
of around 30 percentage points in the logarithm of annual wage income. Whereas for an
average worker classified at the 36 to 60 years old group, the results indicate that the same
change in the homicide rate will reduce the log of annual wage income by 4.5 percentage
points.
Moreover, the results by genders, showed at table 12 in column 4 and 5, for mens and
womens, we notice that when comparing the results by income level, the finding that,
the impact of the wave violence in Mexico during this period have been heterogeneous
among different income levels rather than by gender, in the sense that, individuals with
low income has been affected by the most, unlike to individuals in the high income group
that seems to be increasing their income during violent times.
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ii.3 Total Monthly Income
This section studies additional effects of crime on individual labor outcomes during the
Mexico drug war expansion. The variable total monthly income here is the logarithm
transformation of monthly income for those individuals who are working as a dependent
employees and for those who income is derived from their business activity. It was
obtained by combining the monthly business income and the monthly earnings at main
work, contained at MXFLS database. This variable accounts for any source of income for
an specific individual, either from owning a business, working as an employed or the
aggregated income obtained from both activities. Although, the estimation results for
total monthly income does not distinguish between business owners or salaried workers,
by doing so, we are able to extent the analysis of the effects of crime on monetary labor
outcomes variables, regardless of the employed status.
The hypothesis follows the one stated in the previous section. The level of earnings
might decrease if individuals are working less hours as a mechanism to protect themselves
from violence or if the labor demand and private consumption shrinks because firms
and families modify their corresponding decisions due to violence or as a response to
potential threats, extortions and victimization.
The results in table 13 for all Individuals shows that the differentiated effect of violence
among individuals in the low and high income groups persist. While a 1 unit increase in
the homicide rate (1 per 100.00) is associated with a 11.6 percentage points increase in
the total monthly income for the high income group, the same change in the homicide
rate will reduce by around 26 percentage points the total monthly income for an average
individual at the low income group.
Furthermore, we find that the increasing violence has a negative effect on monthly
total income for blue-collar, unskilled workers and self-employed workers. In particular
a one standard deviation increase in the homicide rate (13 per 100.000 inhabitants) will
decrease the total monthly income of an average, unskilled worker by 3.12 percentage
points and the same change in the homicide rate will decrease by 4.3 percentage points
the monthly total income in the case of an average self-employed worker, although the
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latter one is only at the 10% level of significance.
On the other hand, table 14 presents the analysis of the heterogeneous effects of
drug related violence on the total monthly income, by gender within the different socio-
economic categories that we have defined previously. The magnitude and direction of the
effect of violence on total monthly income, for high and low income groups are similar to
those previously described, regardless of gender. Among low income females and males,
increasing violence represents a negative impact on their income, contrary to their females
and males peers at the high income group, such regularity suggest that an heterogeneous
impact of crime over total monthly income is found when comparing different income
levels -rich vs poor individuals- rather than among females and males. On the other hand,
column 3, suggest that self-employed females have been negative affected by the homicide
hike. Since, these type of females might being developing their activity on the streets,
or in easily vulnerable working places, without further protection from potential threats.
Specifically, one unit increase in the average homicide rate over the last 24 months prior
to the interview date, will reduce the total monthly income for self-employed females by
10 percentage points.
iii. Labor Market Outcomes by Occupation
In this section we analyze the heterogeneous effect of heightened violence in Mexico
on the labor outcomes of individuals performing in different occupations. The results
contained in table 15, show the estimations result of the municipality homicide rate
over the last 24 months prior to the date of interview, interacted with an indicating
variable that is one if the individuals belong to specific occupation or zero otherwise. We
have a total of 17 different occupations sorted following to the Mexican Classification
of Occupations (MCO). Such analysis will allows to identify and compare the effects
of crime on individual labor outcomes in Mexico among different types of workers, as
skilled-unskilled and white-blue collar worker. Moreover, we would be able to distinguish
and measure the violence impact between different economic sector, since the MCO,
accounts for specific occupations in the Agriculture, manufacturing and service economic
sectors.
22
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
The results suggest that individual performing occupations related to Agriculture
and service sector, has been by far more negative affected by the increasing drug-related
violence across Mexico. In the case of workers in Agriculture, the estimation predicts
that an increase of one unit in the homicide rate is associated with a decline of 4.5
and 6.3 percentage points in their monthly wage income and monthly total income. In
addition we find that, the same change in the homicide rate will reduce the number of
total hours worked a week by 2.2 percentage points. These negative effect of violence
over monthly income and hours worked for agriculture workers in Mexico, might be
explained by considering the fact that, in Latin America, violence has significantly affected
the efficiency of farm holdings due to the disruption of rural labor markets and limits
imposed on the operation of larger farms. In addition, Farms are vulnerable to crime
because their expansiveness and relative openness makes it difficult and very expensive
to secure them.
Moreover, according to Bozzoli and Brück (2009) and Verpoorten (2009) farmers react
to conflict shocks by changing production decisions, preferring to invest in seasonal
crops when facing more negative violent shocks, because this kind of crops represent
less victimization risk, although are also less profitable, thus farmers are driven to a
low-income equilibrium. The other channel through which violence negatively might
impact the farmer’s income, is related to the decrease in access to exchange markets. In
particular, increasing violence becomes rural routes and tertiary roads more dangerous,
due to criminals groups presence, increasing transaction costs for agriculture workers
involved in market exchanges and, in extreme cases, resulting in return to subsistence
activities. Fernández et al. (2011).
From the experience of other Latin American countries, the decrease in agricultural
worker’s income might led to farmers allocate an increasing proportion of their land to
the production of illicit crops such as coca leaf. Increasing coca production and thus
cocaine exports in turn, further fueled and prolong the violence spiral by providing cartels
with important financial resources from drug-trafficking to continue and expand their
activities.
According to the MCO, in the personal service occupation group, are included those
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workers providing personal services to the public, such as: customer service in restaurants,
coffee shops, hotels, cleaning services. Moreover, workers dedicated to personal care, as is
the haircut and beauty treatments. As well workers in rental services of personal property,
such as vehicles, costumes, videos, machinery and other objects. Likewise, workers that
provide auxiliary services in the shows, tourism and sports.
The estimation results indicate that for workers in occupations relate to personal
service, the violence represents a negative shock for their monthly wage income and
total monthly income. In particular, the results suggest that an one unit increase of 1 per
100.000 in the homicide rate, will reduce the monthly wage income and the total monthly
income by 3 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively. Increasing violent crime, generates
a real and perceive sensation of insecurity while people is doing outdoors activities,
such insecurity feeling and the possibility of being target by crime, can be higher at
night. Decreasing the incentives and willingness to perform outdoor activities, such as
visit restaurants, bars, assist to public shows, demand personal services without security
measures, or even traveling to those areas. Decreasing in turn, the demand for hotels
rooms, restaurants, tourism and personal care services. Affecting the workers’ income in
these occupations. For instance in the recent years, the situation in some Mexico’s most
touristic areas, have escalated to one of the most violent areas in the country. Where,
while the big cartels are fighting over the drug trade, small drug-related groups extort
and kidnap the population, merchants, owners of bars and clubs.
Regarding to the results obtained for worker in safety staff occupations. The workers
classified in this main group are dedicated to the protection and safety of people and their
assets, specially against criminal acts. They also dedicate to maintaining public order
and law enforcement. As it might expected, the demand for these sort of occupations
have rise with the increasing violence in Mexico. Specifically, we find that for workers
in this occupation category, the number of hours worked a week and the probability of
being employed have increased. For instance, a one unit increase in the average homicide
rate over the last 24 months prior to the interview date (1 per 100.000), will increase the
number of hours worked a week by 6.6 percentage points, while the same change in the
homicide rate, will cause an increase the probability of being employ by 1.4 percentage
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points, for an average worker with a safety staff occupation. Demand for guards is
especially strong in developing countries, where hiring guards is more affordable than
investing in technology-related services due to low labor costs.
On the other hand, in the case of professional workers category, accounting for those
holding a College, Master or PhD degree, in several knowledge areas as: engineering,
social sciences, Health sciences, among others. We find a positive effect of increasing
violence on their labor market outcomes. The results this group, are suggesting a slight
increase on the probability of being employed and participating in the labor market,
as well as, the number of hours worked a week. Moreover, workers with professional
occupations, exhibit increases in their monthly wage and total income. The estimation
results predict, that a increase in the homicide rate of 1 per 100.000 inhabitants, translate
in an increase of 5.3 and 4.9 percentage points in the monthly wage and total income for
this type of occupations. Since more educated workers earn more, the are able to invest
in security measures that undermine the risk of assets loses in violent times. Moreover,
professionals usually perform occupations and live, in more safer areas and municipalities,
where the public and private infrastructure against the crime might be more developed.
The interaction of these effects among blue-collar, unskilled and white-collar, skilled
workers, present evidence to argued that violence in Mexico have a disproportionated
impact of different types of workers. While, increasing violence in Mexico, represents
a negative shock among blue-collar, unskilled workers. Labor market outcomes among
white-collar, skilled workers have increased. These evidence is in tune, we recently
findings of the effects of crime at the firm-level in Mexico, arguing that violence acts as a
negative blue-collar labor supply shock, leading to significant increase in skill-intensity
within firms Utar (2018).
Finally for workers with occupations relate to arts, shows and sport, we find that
the number of hours worked a week have been significantly affected by drug related
violence. In that sense, an increase of 1 per 100.000 in the homicide rate, is associated
with a 20 percentage points decline in the weekly hours worked by workers in these
occupations. Furthermore, as it might expected, we did not find significants effects of
increasing crime for workers performing occupations in indoor places, as Educators,
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administrative activities. Specially, we find not significants effects, of violence on labor
market outcomes for workers in occupations in the manufacturing sector.8
8For instance, occupations as: operators of fixed Machinery and equipment for industrial production and Assistants,
peons and similar in manufacturing process and in repair and maintenance activities.
26
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
VI. Concluding Remarks
An improved understanding of the effects of violence on individuals economy is an
important prerequisite for the definition of appropriate policies of prevention, assistance,
and protection. This article contributes to such an understanding through the development
of a empirical analysis of the effects of violent crime, expressed in the homicide rate rise
in Mexico, over the labor market outcomes at the individuals level.
Focusing on the case of Mexico, the empirical framework has permitted us to provide a
more rigorous assessment of the specific impact of increasing violence on individual labor
outcomes. The econometric results suggests the negative effect of drug related homicide
and akin violence over the labor market participation probability, employed status and
income variables. The findings indicate that the effect of violent crime tend to be more
significant for workers located at low levels of skill and the income distribution, compared
with their peers at the high skill and income group, these results holds regardless of
gender. Moreover, we find evidence to suggest that homicides negatively impact the
amount of hours people work, such negative effect is predominant among self-employed,
blue-collar, unskilled workers and people located in the low quintiles of the income
distribution.
These finding are robust to taking into account the endogeneity of violence, by using
geographical and cocaine supply in Mexico as identifying instruments. Moreover, the
results expressed in this study are also robust to controlling for endogenous migration
within our sample.
The presence of government security forces may help to reduce insecurity in areas
of high violence. Given that direct threats are negative affecting individuals working
activities, government protection should also concentrate on low income and unskilled
group that have been identified as most affected.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Checking for Endogenous Migration within the MxFLS
(1) (2)
Variables Migration 05-09 Migration 05-09
∆ Homicide Rate 05-09 0.127%
(0.002)
Homicide rate Interacted with Household and Individuals Characteristics
Household Size 0.026%**
(0.001)
Education Level -5.6e-05
(0.001)
Total Number of Children 0.022%*
(0.001)
Number Children under 18 years old 0.017%***
(0.001)
Number Babies (Children under 3 years old) 0.013%
(0.0001)
Individual is Female 0.032%
(0.003)
Individual is Male 0.305%
(0.004)
Individual is Married 0.136%
(0.002)
Individual is Not Married 0.105%
(0.002)
Household Head Individuals 0.14%
(0.002)
Observations 39199 39199
Number of Individuals 26796 26796
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All estimations include as Individual Characteristics as controls
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Table 2: First Stage IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Homicide rate Homicide rate Homicide rate Homicide rate
Instrument -0.0599** -0.0609** -0.0581** -0.0587**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025)
Individual Characteristics !
Household Characteristics ! !
Municipality Features ! ! !
Time Fixed Effects ! ! ! !
Individual Fixed Effects ! ! ! !
LM statistic (p-value) 5.14 (0.023) 4.92 (0.026) 5.55 (0.018) 5.46 (0.019)
Wald F statistic 32.85 33.62 32.25 27.6
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Impact of Homicide Rate on Individuals labor Market Participation
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.060** -0.060* -0.061** -0.018 -0.023* -0.021* -0.018* -0.018 -0.091*** -0.039
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.030) (0.029)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.001
(0.004)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) 0.002
(0.003)
Homicide rate*I(Self Employed) -0.007
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0.001
(0.001)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.005**
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) 0.008
(0.001)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) -0.007
(0.001)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) 0.052***
(0.012)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) -0.051***
(0.012)
Number of Observations 23802 23802 23802 9568 6870 6870 9510 9510 23802 23802
Number of Individuals 11900 11900 11900 4784 3435 3435 4755 4755 11900 11900
Wald F statistic 206.1*** 102.9*** 103.1*** 60.9*** 60.2*** 60*** 67.9*** 68.2*** 103.1*** 103.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
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Table 5: Impact of Homicide rate on Individuals likelihood of being Employed
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.036* -0.038* -0.035 -0.011 -0.024** -0.018 -0.012 -0.010 -0.052** -0.026
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.005
(0.003)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) -0.001
(0.002)
Homicide rate*I(Self Employed) -0.007**
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0 .004*
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.009**
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) 0.003
(0.002)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) -0.002
(0.001)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) 0.026**
(0.010)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) -0.026**
(0.011)
Number of Observations 23802 23802 23802 9568 6870 6870 9510 9510 23802 23802
Number of Individuals 11900 11900 11900 4784 3435 3435 4755 4755 11900 11900
Wald F statistic 206.1*** 102.9*** 103.1*** 60.9*** 60.2*** 60*** 67.9*** 68.2*** 103.1*** 103.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
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Table 7: Impact of Homicide rate on Individuals Total Number of Working Hours
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.043 -0.047 -0.039 -0.040 -0.049 -0.019 -0.046 -0.050 -0.049 0.028
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.059) (0.058) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.069)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.010
(0.011)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) -0.007
(0.009)
Homicide rate*I(Self Employed) -0.029***
(0.009)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0.023**
(0.009)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.058***
(0.010)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) -0.016*
(0.009)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) 0.002
(0.008)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) 0.021
(0.028)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) 0.023
(0.028)
Number of Observations 9864 9864 9864 9864 7092 7092 9784 9784 23802 23802
Number of Individuals 4932 4932 4932 4932 3546 3546 4892 4892 11900 11900
Wald F statistic 84.7*** 42.1*** 42.3*** 42.3*** 45.5*** 45.5*** 45.9*** 46.2*** 103.1*** 103.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
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Table 9: Impact of Homicide rate on Individuals Monthly Wage Income
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.044 -0.054 -0.028 -0.205** 0.012 -0.066 -0.057 0 .029 -0.027
(0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.092) (0.060) (0.066) (0.072) (0.038) (0.068)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.029*
(0.014)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) -0.020
(0.013)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0.273***
(0.024)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.328***
(0.029)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) 0.004
(0.014)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) -0.010
(0.014)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) -0.057
(0.070)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) -0.029
(0.038)
Number of Observations 5014 5014 5014 5014 5014 4962 4962 5014 5014
Number of Individuals 2507 2507 2507 2507 2507 2481 2481 2507 2507
Wald F statistic 58.8*** 29.7*** 29.9*** 29.6*** 29.8*** 34.0*** 34.5*** 29.1*** 29.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
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Table 11: Impact of Homicide Rate on Individuals Annual Wage Income
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.2377 -0.264* -0.210 -0.350* -0.204 -0.311 -0.223 -0.239 -0.236
(0.153) (0.160) (0.1504) (0.187) (0.1679) (0.257) (0.189) (0.156) (0.159)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.057*
(0.032)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) -0.045*
(0.026)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0.167***
(0.021)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.297***
(0.034)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) -0.151
(0.204)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) -0.033
(0.132)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) 0.003
(0.075)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) -0.003
(0.038)
Number of Observations 4734 4734 4734 4706 4706 4690 4690 4734 4734
Number of Individuals 2367 2367 2367 2353 2353 4690 4690 2367 2367
Wald F statistic 54.9*** 27.3*** 27.5*** 26.1*** 26.5*** 10.87*** 24.5*** 27.1*** 27.2***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
40
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
Ta
bl
e
12
:I
m
pa
ct
of
H
om
ic
id
e
R
at
e
on
In
di
vi
du
al
s
A
nn
ua
lW
ag
e
Ea
rn
in
gs
by
G
en
de
r
Fe
m
al
es
M
al
es
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
A
vg
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
-0
.3
38
-0
.3
09
-0
.4
49
*
-0
.2
96
-0
.2
58
-0
.4
17
-0
.2
16
-0
.1
49
-0
.2
93
-0
.1
55
-0
.2
27
-0
.0
74
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.2
32
)
(0
.2
60
)
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.3
34
)
(0
.1
97
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.2
23
)
(0
.2
07
)
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.2
17
)
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(1
7-
35
ag
e
gr
ou
p)
0.
03
1
0.
07
3*
*
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
30
)
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(3
6-
60
ag
e
gr
ou
p)
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
54
**
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
24
)
A
vg
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
in
te
ra
ct
ed
by
In
co
m
e
le
ve
l
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(H
ig
h
In
co
m
e
to
p
20
%
)
0.
21
5*
**
0.
15
1*
**
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
22
)
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(L
ow
In
co
m
e)
-0
.2
98
**
*
-0
.2
97
**
*
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
41
)
A
vg
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
Sk
il
l
le
ve
l
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(H
ig
h
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
r)
0.
04
8
0.
27
8
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.2
63
)
H
om
ic
id
e
ra
te
*I
(L
ow
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
r)
0.
07
5
-0
.1
26
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
99
)
N
um
be
r
of
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
14
84
14
84
14
74
14
74
14
70
14
70
32
50
32
50
32
32
32
32
32
20
32
20
N
um
be
r
of
In
di
vi
du
al
s
74
2
74
2
73
7
73
7
73
5
73
5
16
25
16
25
16
16
16
16
16
10
16
10
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
12
.0
8*
**
12
.1
5*
**
11
.8
**
*
11
.8
7*
**
10
.8
7*
**
9.
5*
**
14
.8
**
*
14
.9
3*
**
13
.9
**
*
14
.1
**
*
15
.1
**
*
12
.7
**
*
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
by
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y
le
ve
l.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
A
ll
M
od
el
s
in
cl
ud
ed
ti
m
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
r
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
in
di
vi
du
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
Fo
r
th
e
W
al
d
St
at
is
ti
c:
**
*
=
p
<
.0
5
le
ss
th
an
10
%
IV
bi
as
,*
*
=
p
<
.0
5
le
ss
th
an
15
%
IV
bi
as
,*
=
p
<
.0
5
le
ss
th
an
20
%
IV
bi
as
41
Chapter 1 • The Effects of Violence on Labor Market Outcomes
Table 13: Impact of Homicide Rate on Individual Total Monthly Income
All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Avg Homicide rate -0.039 -0.047 -0.038 -0.040 -0.165** 0.057 -0.052 -0.031 -0.0493 -0.0208
(0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.068) (0.074) (0.058) (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.072)
Avg Homicide rate*I(17-35 age group) 0.021
(0.014)
Avg Homicide rate*I(36-60 age group) -0.001
(0.013)
Homicide rate*I(Self Employed) -0.033*
(0.018)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Income level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Income top 20%) 0.281***
(0.024)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Income) -0.272***
(0.024)
Avg Homicide rate interacted with Skill level
Avg Homicide rate*I(High Skilled worker) 0.019
(0.012)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Low Skilled worker) -0.024**
(0.012)
Avg Homicide rate interacted by Gender
Avg Homicide rate*I(Female) 0.028
(0.038)
Avg Homicide rate*I(Male) -0.028
(0.038)
Number of Observations 7204 7204 7204 7204 6888 6888 7136 7136 7204 7204
Number of Individuals 3602 3602 3602 3602 3344 3344 3568 3568 3602 3602
Wald F statistic 89.9*** 44.8*** 45.1*** 44.8*** 42.3*** 42.5*** 50.2*** 50.3*** 44.7*** 44.7***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Models included time fixed effects and controls for
household and individual characteristics. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV
bias
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Table 15: Impact of Homicide Rate on Individual Labor Market Outcomes by Occupation
Labor Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Occupation/Outcome Participating Employed Hours Worked Monthly Income Annual Income Total Income
Professionals 0.007** 0.010** 0.021* 0.053*** 0.041* 0.049***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015)
Technicians -0.007** -0.008** -0.016 -0.030 -0.005 -0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.022) (0.032) (0.016)
Educators 0.012* 0.0045 -0.038 -0.021 -0.032 0.058
(0.006) (0.010) (0.028) (0.027) (0.040) (0.036)
Workers in Art, Shows, and Sports 0.0153 0.006 -0.204*** 0.033 -0.021 0.076
(0.016) (0.014) (0.054) (0.113) (0.170) (0.055)
Directors in Public and Private sectors 0.007 0.007 -0.040 -0.031 0.119* 0.087
(0.015) (0.014) (0.046) (0.057) (0.071) (0.055)
Workers in Agriculture -0.004 0.003 -0.022* -0.045** -0.044 -0.063***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.018) (0.028) (0.019)
Bosses and Supervisors -0.014 0.001 -0.058 0.056 -0.269** -0.014
(0.016) (0.023) (0.059) (0.064) (0.105) (0.016)
Workers in Production, Repair and Maintenance -0.0012 -0.008* 0.007 0.029* 0.035 -0.017
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.017) (0.031) (0.049)
Operators of Machinery and Equipment 0.001 -0.0002 0.018 -0.007 -0.006 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.014)
Assistants in Production, Repair and Maintenance 0.004 0.008* 0.013 -0.002 -0.016 0.012
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.018) (0.038) (0.017)
Drivers and Assistants Drivers -0.007** -0.005 0.020 0.042 0.023 0.018
(0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.028) (0.035) (0.017)
Coordinators and Supervisors in Administrative Activities -0.005 -0.006 0.010 -0.046 0.045 0.024
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.051) (0.054) (0.026)
Merchants and Sales Representatives -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.004 -0.038
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.042) (0.048)
Traveling Sales People 0.0102 0.00512 -0.0198 -0.0364 -0.153 0.00380
(0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0344) (0.0336) (0.102) (0.0137)
Workers in the Service Sector 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.030** 0.010 -0.039**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.032) (0.017)
Domestic Workers -0.008 -0.015 -0.016 0.019 -0.017 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.037) (0.017)
Safety and Security Staff 0.009 0.014** 0.066*** 0.013 0.023 0.023
(0.006) (0.008) (0.019) (0.027) (0.043) (0.022)
Observations 9,966 9,966 9,784 9,966 4,690 7,136
Number of ind_ID 4,983 4,983 4,892 4,983 2,345 3,568
All Models included time fixed effects and controls for household and individual characteristics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A. Appendix
i. Data
Individual-level Data
Data on individuals socieconomic-conditions comes from Mexican Family Life Survey MxFLS. On an individual level,
MxFLS collected detailed information on each household member including: level of education, retrospective migration
background, marriage, fertility and any victimization occurring in the household (robbery, theft, kidnaps); work force
participation; adult work earnings; money transfers and in kind; time allocation for adults and children; credit and
loans; investments in human capital and the decision making process; health status perceptions, objective measures
pertaining to their state of health (weight, size, waist and hip measurements, blood pressure levels, standard blood lab
tests); reproductive health of all women within fertile age range and contraceptive methods and usage.
The survey’s panel design allows a continuous tracking of those individuals and those families interviewed at the
base line, regardless of their geographic location or economic mobility. Continuing with the MxFLS panel form consid-
erably enrich the information available and allows to fully the effect of increasing Violent crime on individual’s labor
outcomes and especially to control for endogenous migration in the sample. Moreover, we were able to track the same
individual in different years, given that once an individual is include in the survey, receives a unique individual indicator
that stays constant throughout the different survey rounds allowing us to match individual information throughout the
various rounds.
Homicide Data
Data on homicides in Mexico comes from the Mexican Statistic Authority (INEGI), this data provides information on all
official reports of intentional homicides in Mexico. These reports are available from 1990 to 2011, which allows us to fully
exploit the temporal variation in homicide rates in Mexico and the panel nature of the MxFLS. Moreover, to calculate the
homicide rate per 100.000, we also obtain the population of each municipality in Mexico by year during the time frame
of this study. In that sense to get the monthly homicide rate per 100.000, we assumed a constant population during the
whole year.
Cocaine Seizures Data
The data on Cocaine Seizures and interdiction efforts against the production and commercialization of drugs in Colombia,
comes from the Defense Department of Colombia or Ministerio de Defensa Nacional.
i.1 Additional Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
Variables Definition and Calculation
The employment status was define based on the question "What was your main activity last week" on MxFLS, which
ask for the labor status at the interview time. The labor market participation variable is a dummy variable indicating 1
whether the individual answered "worked" or "looking for a Job" or were in "Vacations" but have a job and 0 otherwise.
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The variable Employed, is a dummy variable indicating 1, whether the individual answered "worked" and 0 otherwise. It
does not refer to any specific type of employment.
The variable lMonthly_earnings_mw: is log transformation of deflated monthly earnings from main work. It’s
available just for employees classified as dependent worker.
The variable lannual_income_business: is log transformation of the deflated annual income from main and secondary
business. Was obtained by combining the net and gross annual business income. Specifically in this case was calculated
based on the annual gross business income, for instance in that that individual i did not reported his or her annual
business gross income, but reported his or her annual business net income, we consider this latter observation to complete
the annual income business variable. This is possible given the marginal difference between net and gross income
resulting from relative low wage-income taxes contributions. To give an idea in 2015, the mandatory contribution to the
medical insurance, the retirement fund and others, were 1.25%, 0.037% and 0.85%, respectively.
The variable lmonthly_income_business: is log transformation of the deflated month income from main and sec-
ondary business. Was obtained by combining the net and gross month business income. Specifically in this case was
calculated based on the month gross business income.
The variable lmonthly_income : is log transformation of monthly income for those individuals who are either
working as a dependent employees or whose income is derived from a business activity. Was obtained by combining the
monthly business income and the monthly earnings at main work.
Figure 2: Monthly variation of Cocaine Seizures in Colombia.
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from Defense Department of Colombia
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Figure 4: Homicide Rate across Drug-war Affected and Non-affected Municipalities in Mexico
Note: Author’s own calculation. we defined a municipality as affected or Non-affected, by comparing the average homicide rate five years before and after of the inflexion year
2007. Similar to, Coscia & Rios (2012). Such definition covers the 100 most violent municipalities. 90% of the municipalities with the highest homicide rates. 80% of the
municipalities with greatest increases in homicide rates between the periods of 2002- 2005 and 2006-2010.
Table 16: Mexican Municipalities features
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total Population 312060.769 404691.455 409 1820888 120163
Proportion Males/Females 96.03 4.981 79.2 125 120163
Energy Supply 0.971 0.031 0.751 0.998 120163
Drinkable Water 0.91 0.104 0.358 0.999 120163
Educational Establishments 344.125 385.929 2 2449 87825
Number of Workers 72921.460 108330.813 10 733557 120163
Economic Units 12355.865 17431.446 5 90533 120163
Gross Output per worker 348.943 498.886 7 10509 116548
Data on Mexican Municipalities comes from INEGI. Energy supply and drinkable water, represents the share of households with access to these services at home.
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Table 17: Distribution of Households across States in MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3
MxFLS-2 MxFLS-3
State Code States Obs. Households Obs. Households
02 Baja California 0 0 59 12
03 Baja California Sur 1552 366 1775 395
04 Campeche 0 0 3 1
05 Coahuila de Zaragoza 1929 444 2396 500
06 Colima 0 0 3 1
07 Chiapas 2 2 8 2
09 Distrito Federal 826 197 920 207
10 Durango 2370 534 3121 635
11 Guanajuato 2596 529 3444 665
12 Guerrero 0 0 5 1
13 Hidalgo 0 0 14 4
14 Jalisco 2098 491 2370 516
15 Mexico 2934 618 3670 712
16 Michoacan de Ocampo 3138 668 3905 770
17 Morelos 1690 395 2012 406
18 Nayarit 0 0 10 2
19 Nuevo Leon 3040 709 3673 812
20 Oaxaca 2641 545 3124 610
21 Puebla 1955 417 2373 459
22 Queretaro 6 1 12 3
23 Quintana Roo 0 0 1 1
25 Sinaloa 3100 665 3703 734
26 Sonora 2976 674 3458 728
28 Tamaulipas 24 17 50 11
29 Tlaxcala 0 0 5 1
30 Veracruz de Ignacio 3379 790 4004 848
31 Yucatan 1595 358 1796 370
32 Zacatecas 0 0 6 2
Note: Author’s own calculation. data on households comes from Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS).
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Chapter 2.
The Effect of Chinese Import Competition
on Manufacturing plants Performance
Victor Zapata∗
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of Chinese import competition on manufacturing plants in
developing economies. By employing a rich plant-level data for Colombian manufacturing
plants covering the period 2000-2012, that enables to compare the performance for the same
plant before and during incresing intensity of Chinese import competition. By exploiting the
exogenous acceleration of Chinese imports in conjunction with the WTO accession of China,
the empirical analysis reveals significants and disproportionated effects of intensified Chinese
competition across heterogeneous plants. In particular, competition from China has negative
and significant impact on employment, sales, value added and plant output. The employment
losses that take place within labor-intensive plants, are mainly driven by the negative impact
of Chinese import on employment among relative more skilled-intensive plants, rather than in
unskilled-intensive plants. Aditionally, increasing Chinese competitive pressure, encourages
plant exit and discourages entry, whereas, skill upgrading only occurrs in more productive and
more capital-intensive plants. These finding are robust to taking into account the endogeneity
of Colombian imports demand from China.
JEL Classification: F14 F61, L25, L60
Keywords: Import Competition, Manufacturing Plants, Import Penetration Rate, Trade
Policy, Market Share, Industry Output.
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I. Introduction
Certainly one of the striking changes in the world trade in the last decades has beenthe emerging of China as a new big player. Specifically, China’s export surge is the
outcome of economic reforms in the 80’s and 90’s, which were fueled by the country’s
accession to the WTO in 2001 and nowadays it categorize China as the world leading
exporter, above from the entire European Union and United States. Between 1990 and
2011, the share of world manufacturing exports originating in China increased from 2%
to 16% (Hanson, 2012). This rapid evolution of world imports from China has motived
an increasing literature from both trade economists and labor economists focusing on
study the its impacts on domestic labor-market outcomes and industry evolution in the
manufacturing sector. Especially in labor-intensive industries where China is believed
to concentrate its comparative advantage. Such studies are especially important since
developed economies, have evidenced employment downturn, greater income inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers and languish performance in the manufacturing
sector. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2016) argued that after staying relatively constant
during the 1990s, US manufacturing employment declined by 18.7% between 2000 and
2007, coinciding with a significant increase in import competition from China and others
low-wage economies.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of import competition from China
on the performance of Manufacturing plants in developing economies, using plant-level
data for Colombia. Moreover, empirical studies of firm units within sectors have reported
a massive amount of heterogeneity in various performance measures (most notably, size,
productivity and age). This heterogeneity, within sectors, matters for theoretical and
empirical models of trade. Therefore, our results are analyzed by different types of
plants, regarding market share within its specific industry, workers size, productivity,
capital-intensity, relative age and relative skill-intensity. Using plant-level data to analyze
Chinese import competition effects, represents some advantages over those studies using
industry-level data, since studies employing aggregate level data have some shortcomings.
First, the exact mechanisms of the role of imports in domestic productivity growth
2
Chapter 2 • Import Competition and Manufacturing Plants Performance
could be hidden by using aggregated or country level data (Brambilla et al., 2010). Firm
heterogeneity may affect firm productivity and competition response, but with plant-level
data can be addressed. (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008). Furthermore, Halpern et al. (2005)
showed that the studies at macro-level may suffer from the problems of omitted variables
and reverse causality biases.
An increasing interest in examining the effect of Chinese import penetration on firm
performance is observed in some developed countries.1 However, the impact of low-wage
imports –as in the case of China– on firm’s behavior and performance in developed
countries may not hold for the developing economies, where firms are typically less
technologically advanced, have a low level of development, and lack the capacity and
resources to innovate and compete with imports. Moreover, insufficient work has been
carried out in developing countries, where even among this category of economies the
heterogeneity of the structure of manufacturing industries, might result in additional and
new findings. Specifically, the existing literature in this regard, have mainly focused on
the effect of increasing Chinese import competition for Mexican maquiladoras competing
in the U.S market. Utar and Ruiz (2013) argued that Competition from China has negative
and significant impact on employment and plant growth, both through the intensive and
the extensive margin, on the most unskilled labor intensive sectors, leading to sectoral
reallocation. Furthermore, Iacovone et al. (2013), Chinese import penetration reduces sales
of smaller Mexican plants and more marginal products and they are more likely to cease.
This paper contributes to this stream of literature exploring the plant-level effects
of Chinese import competition, specially because it represents the first study for the
case of Colombian manufacturing plants analyzing this issue. The Colombian case, it
pretty interesting given the almost 30 years of trade reforms, that changed the protection
structure and reflected the country’s commitment to economy-wide reforms that reduced
1Bernard et al. (2006), American plant survival and growth are negatively correlated with industry
exposure to imports from low wage countries. Mion and Zhu (2013) using Belgian firms data, found that
industry-level import competition from China reduces firm employment growth and induce skill upgrading
in low-tech manufacturing industries. Bugamelli et al. (2010) increased import competition from China has
affected Italian firms’ pricing strategies causing a reduction in the dynamics of prices and markups. Among
others.
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tariff, and set tariff rates to levels comparable to those in developed countries. Since these
rates were negotiated with the WTO, Industry representatives had less opportunity to
pursue special lobby interests and therefore, from an individual industry’s perspective,
the final tariff rates were exogenously predetermined. (Attanasio et al., 2004). In that
sense, Colombia was fully integrated to the world economy –specially with low tariffs for
industry related imports– when the China accession to the WTO took place in December
2001.
In order to identify the impact of heightened Chinese import competition on manu-
facturing plants in Colombia, the identification strategy rely on an instrumental variable
approach to deal with the reverse causality problem that arises, due to factors such as
demand or technology shocks for particular products or industries in the domestic market
can be correlated with the firm performance and the industry-level of Chinese imports.
The identification strategy exploits the exogenous intensification of Chinese imports in
the rest of the world and the fact that not all plants are exposed to the competition in the
same extent. This procedure allow to identify the causal of Chinese import competition on
manufacturing plants performance and industrial evolution. First, we show the "first order
effects" of Chinese competition on plants’ output, sales, value added, employment and
wages. Then analysis move to the evolution manufacturing plants in finely disaggregated
industries with respect to plants’ entry, exit, productivity and possible skill upgrading.
We employ data from a plant-level survey that is representative of all manufacturing
plants in Colombia with more than 10 employees. The richness of this plant-level data,
allows to identify valuable plant characteristics as: plant specify productivity, capital-labor
ratio, relative age, market share and employment skill composition. The sample starts in
2000 where Chinese import share in Colombian total imports 3% and covers until 2012
where China’s import share became 16.5%.
The findings are marked by the differential effect of import competition across het-
erogeneous plants, presenting a disproportionated effect of Chinese competition among
different types of plants. Specifically, bigger plants in terms of market share and employ-
ment are more able to mitigate the negative effects of Chinese import competition compare
to the small plants. Moreover, as the standard theory predict, we find that productivity is
4
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a key determinant of the impact of import competition for each manufacturing plant. One
contribution of this paper, is to present the fact that in developing economies as Colombia,
intensified Chinese import competition have reduced the employment in labor-intensive
manufacturing plants compared to the capital-intensive ones, we argue that employment
losses within labor-intensive plants, are mainly driven by the negative impact of Chinese
import competition on the number of total workers in relative more skilled-intensive
plants, rather than in unskilled-intensive plants, as the standard evidence suggest in the
case of developed economies, such effect is due to the rapid technology advanced of
China compare to Colombia and the fact that labor reforms in Colombia during 2000s,
granted the possibility to Colombian firms to outsource domestically unskilled employ-
ment. Additionally, whereas, increasing Chinese competitive pressure, have a significant
effect on plant’s probability of exit, specially among relative younger and less productive
plants, it discourages entry of new manufacturing plants, these effects might cause more
concentration and aggregate productivity growth at industry level. Finally, the analysis
of the impact of Chinese import competition on skill intensity among different types
of plants, shows that there is not evidence of existing skill upgrading in response to
import competition from China, regardless size or relative age of manufacturing plants.
However, we find that import competition from China triggers skill upgrading only in
more productive and more capital-intensive plants.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section presents a key aspect of bilateral
trade between China and Colombia. Section III, introduced the theoretical considerations
to understand the direction of the impact of Chinese imports on manufacturing industry.
Section IV, contain a detail description of the data and its characteristics. Finally sections
V and VI, present the methodological approach and the results analysis, followed by
concluding remarks in section VII.
II. Bilateral trade Colombia-China: key aspects
In Colombia, the poor performance of the manufacturing sector has been seen as a key
factor explaining slow growth and high unemployment. Given the Colombian economy
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dependency to primary goods, accentuated by the oil prices boom, many concerns have
been expressed over the ’de-industrialization’ of the economy, expressed in falling shares
of manufacturing in total GDP and employment. (Echavarría et al., 2007; Clavijo et al.,
2012; Goda and García, 2015). While it is true that the share of manufacturing industry
in total GDP in Colombia has been falling during the years 1975 from around 24% to
15% in 2012. likewise, employment industry accounted 25% of total employment in late
80’s has decrease up to 13% in 2012. Such phenomenon over the past decade, has been
accentuated by the rapid growth of imports from China as figure 1 shows, causing further
difficulties or even setting extra impediments for the manufacturing sector in Colombia. 2
Since China joined the (WTO), bilateral trade between Colombia and China has grown
rapidly, specially in the case of imports, figure 4 shows that China has become the second
largest trade partner. Moreover, since the China surge, the share of import of products
originating from U.S has dropped, from 37% to 25% in the period 2000-2012. Additionally,
the rise of China seems to hampering the Mexican and Brazilian exports to Colombia,
which gravity theory will suggest as more natural destination, in presence of relative
similar exports baskets as the Chinese.
2Although the languished performance of Colombian industry sector may be explain by structural
determinants or additional problems.
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Figure 1: Share of Imports from China over Total Imports (left scale), and Share of Manufacturing Industry
GDP over total GDP (right scale) in Colombia.
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE
According to the trade theory, we consider that the effect of Chinese import com-
petition on Colombian manufacturing plants will depend on: Whether imports from
China compete primarily with other Colombian exporters or with local producers. In
this study we assume that the import competition effect on local producers dominates
over the competition of Colombian exporters, since row materials, minerals, agriculture
products and crude represents more than the 85% of Colombian exports,3 whereas, the
manufacturing products only are a 5% of the total export basket in this country.
Second, whether the affected industries in Colombia are import competing industries,
in which case they are likely to face falling profit margins and a reduced market share, or
import-using industries, in which case cheaper Chinese inputs or capital goods would lead
to higher profitability and expanded output. In this regard there is a extensive evidence
3 According to the OCDE, in 2015 the top exports of Colombia were Crude Petroleum (25%), Coal
Briquettes (16.5%), Coffee (7.8%), Refined Petroleum (5.9%) and Gold (4.2%)
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suggesting that a positive effect of a increasing trade liberalization on firms’ total factor
productivity, due to the access to new input varieties, specifically importing intermediates
inputs from high technology advanced countries. (Pavcnik, 2002; Khandelwal, 2010;
Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Goldberg et al., 2010) among others. We consider that,
contrary to the import of intermediaries inputs from developed economies, that might
embedded technology and cause spill-over effects. The Colombian imports from China
represent mainly final goods rather than high quality intermediate inputs. Therefore, we
assume that is more likely that affected industries in Colombia by Chinese competition are
import competing industries rather than input using. Third, how domestic manufacturers
respond to increased competition in terms of lowering mark-ups, defensive innovation, or
upgrading skill and quality.
III. Theoretical Considerations.
Being a populous country, China will exert a large impact on international markets with
its labor-intensive goods. There is not other country in the world with a higher absolute
quantity of labor. Moreover, a population of 1.38 billion and a labor force of roughly 640
millions, gives to China a high comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods. Therefore
as the HOV theory suggest, countries tend to export goods that uses its abundant factor
intensively.
Although, both China and Colombia have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive
products. China has a comparative advantage in unskilled labor in comparison to
Colombia. In 1999, approximately 13% of the Latin American population had post-
secondary education, compared to 3% in China (Devlin et al., 2006). Factor content theory
suggests that as trade liberalizes in China, industries that disproportionately employ
unskilled workers will shrink in Colombia and the opposite will occur in China. This
through the intensive margin evidence in a output shrink for manufacturing firms in
Colombia. It might also happen through the extensive margin caused by firm exits as a
result of the competition and/or that heightened competition discourages entry of new
plants in those sectors where China’s comparative advantage is greater.
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Moreover, recent theoretical frameworks suggest that, assuming the labor demand
curve is upward sloping, an increase in import competition in a product reduces the
wages of the workers used to produce that product (Bernard et al., 2011). Since Chinese
imports are primarily products produced with low-skilled labor, the theory predicts
that low skilled workers’ wages will fall in those firms facing higher Chinese import
competition.
Even though labor abundant is clearly the main driver of China’s competitive and
comparative advantages, it does not mean that other sort of goods are ruled out as
competition for developing economies as Colombia. Devlin et al. (2006), argue, given
the uneven distribution of factors among its regions, China bound to have a very broad
spectrum of comparative advantages. The combination of regions such as Shanghai with
a per-capita income of US$ 19.800 and Gansu with a per-capita income of US$ 4.300 has
the potential to challenge countries like Colombia in the competition of both skilled and
unskilled intense goods as well as in low and relative high technology embedded goods.
Even though China is not yet a high income economy, it seems to conform to almost
all definitions of large country as population, area, economy size, trade volume. Apart
form the standard large country advantages, it scale effect give to China an important
point in capital and technology intensive industries, because the possibility of: first,
translating high fixed cost into low unitary cost. Second, benefiting form the increasing
returns associated with learning an the creation of knowledge and third is able to
overcome externalities associated with increasing return technology (Murphy et al.,
1989). The advantage of size, which are maximized by the country’s exceptional growth,
have attracted an important stream of foreign direct investment, which boost overall
investment, bring technology and thus has reduced the barriers to China entering in
capital and technology industries.
Therefore, it should also be noted that it is no longer the case that China only poses
a threat in labor-intensive or low-tech products. Indeed, the share of high technology
products in Chinese exports has increased significantly since 1990 suggesting that China
is now internationally competitive in a wide range of products. In that sense, industries
which are threatened by China in countries like Colombia, include not only the well
9
Chapter 2 • Import Competition and Manufacturing Plants Performance
known cases of relatively labor-intensive industries such as clothing, textiles, leather and
footwear and furniture, but also capital-intensive and relative skill-intensive ones such
as iron and steel, aluminum and basic electronics. (Jenkins and de Freitas Barbosa, 2012;
Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2008).
According to Hanson (2012) by 2008, the export shares of footwear and toys had
declined to 2.4 and 3.5 percent, respectively. Joining shoes and toys among China’s top
exports are completed computers, with 4.5 percent of total shipments in 2008. Cellphones,
TVs, and radio transmitters, were 3 percent of total shipments in 2008, making this cate-
gory China’s third largest. Over time, China is both manufacturing more technologically
advanced goods and accounting for a larger share of value added technologically in their
production.
China’s rapid transition from low-technology to high-technology products represent a
challenge in high-income economies that see their competitive advantages in high-tech
goods crumble and in developing economies concerned about fall behind in China’s
technology development.
IV. Data
In this section we describe our data sources and show how the trade between China
and Colombia has evolved. We then define and calculate a measure of Chinese import
competition that Colombian Plants face at home.
In order to study the impact of Chinese import competition on Colombian Plants
performance, we match the trade data with the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey
or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera, EAM. The EAM is conducted by the Colombian Bureau
of Statistics Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE. The EAM, is an
unbalanced panel that registers information on all manufacturing establishments with
10 or more employees. Its records include information on output value, number of
employees, value of inputs used, energy consumed, value of the stock of capital, value of
domestic and export sales and purchases of capital. Given the data availability we are
able to cover the period from 2000 to 2012, which covers the scarce trade between China
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and Colombia in 2000, 2001 and 2002, follow by the Chinese imports expansion after the
China accession to the WTO in late 2001, until 2012 as a strategy to ruled out the effect of
the free trade agreement between Colombia and United States in force since June of 2012.
Once a plant is included in the survey, it is followed over time until it goes out of
business. The data set is an unbalanced panel data of approximately 14,024 plants for the
period between 2000 and 2012, which amounts to a total of 103.683 observations. These
plants are located in 27 of 32 states in Colombia. Given that each plant belongs to a just
one industry category, classified according to the economic activity that they carry out
following the International Standard Industrial Classification, ISIC Rev.3.4 We are able to
match each plant with the corresponding industry imports data. The trade data used to
compute the import competition measure were taken from the UNCOMTRADE database,
initially the trade data was downloaded as six-digit Harmonized System (HS) which is
product-level data and then was converted into its ISIC rev.3 version, which is 4 digit
disaggregated industry-level data, by using the official correspondence table from HS96
to ISIC rev.3 available at the United Nations website.5
V. Empirical Strategy, Identifying causal effects
i. Chinese Import Penetration in Colombian Industry
A measure of Chinese import competition for Colombian firms was built as the Chinese
share of the import penetration for the matched industry, following Bernard et al. (2006):
IMPCHjt =
Mchjt
Mj00 + Qj00 − Xj00 (1)
Where, Mchjt denotes the value of imports of industry j coming from China to Colombia at
period t. M, Q and X denote total Colombian imports, production and exports, respectively
at the initial year 2000.
4 DANE Colombia has modified the original ISIC Rev.3 into a Colombian version, therefore in order to
match properly each plant with the imports data of its corresponding industry, we first fixed the ISIC Rev.3
with the ISIC Rev.3 adjusted for Colombia, by following the correspondence table at DANE website.
5 We proceed in this way, because UNCOMTRADE database is the only source of disaggregate trade data
for Colombia, specifically was the only way to get four-digit disaggregated trade industry level data.
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Figure 2: Chinese Import Penetration Rate among Selected Colombian Industries
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE and DANE.
Figure 2 and shows the evolution of the Chinese import penetration rate for some
manufacturing industries in Colombia for the period 2000-2012. Import penetration
rate indicate to what degree domestic demand is satisfied by imports from China. The
beginning of 2000s, imports of Colombia from China were relative scare accounting just
in Furniture and other industry a modest roughly 10%. However the domestic demand
12
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supplied by imports from China exhibited a dynamic increase since 2002, scaling up to
almost dominated as a source of imports in the traditional labor-intensive sectors such as
clothing, footwear and other manufactures (toys), but also in 2012 its dominance had also
shifted to high-technology sectors as electronic and machinery, where Chinese imports
accounts almost for the 40% of the Colombian demand for products within this industries.
ii. Methodological Approach
Our identification strategy is based on the fact that some of the manufacturing industries
are not affected by intensified Chinese imports associated with its accession to WTO as
much as sectors with a strong Chinese comparative advantage. Across sector variation in
the degree of Chinese competition can be due to structural reasons such as transportation
costs, or relative skill-intensity of the production processes. Various reasons for the
variation in the Chinese comparative advantage will be reflected in the Chinese import
penetration rate. Based on the first and last quartiles of the Chinese share of import
penetration in the Colombian market before China’s WTO accession as in the initial
year 2000, to identify low threat industries where minimum Chinese presence and threat
is expected, and high threat industries where a high degree of Chinese competition is
expected.
As result, the low threat industries in Colombia at four-digit ISIC Rev.3 disaggregation,
are mainly: food products and beverages. Manufacture of builders’ carpentry and joinery,
sawmilling and planing of wood. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard and
corrugated paper, paperboard and of containers of paper. Manufacture of structural metal
products, tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal, and steam generators. Manufacture
of motor vehicles. Manufacture of other transport equipment. Whereas as high threat
industries are Apparel, Footwear, luggage, handbags and the like saddlery and harness.
Manufacture of machine-tools, machinery for textile, apparel and leather production.
Manufacture of domestic appliances and Manufacture of electricity distribution, electric
lamps and lighting equipment. Manufacture of musical instruments, of sports goods,
games and toys.6
6The first quartile of the Chinese of the import penetration rate in 2000 is 0.006. The third quartile of the
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Figure 3: Chinese Import Penetration Rate in Colombia
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average Chinese import competition rate for High
and low threat industries, as well as the Overall manufacturing sector average in Colombia.
We exploit both the sectoral variation and the variation across time in the slope, as the
figure shows to identify the Chinese competition effect on Colombian Manufacturing
firms.
Our empirical model, can be generalized as follows:
lnYijst = β0 + β1 IMPCHjt + β2Xijst + β3 Indjt + dt + Statest + ci + eijst (2)
where, lnYijt refers to the plant performance measure (output, employment, average
wages, skill intensity) at plant i in industry j at year t.
Chinese import penetration rate in 2000 is 0.071. The sectors that do not belong to any of these groups can
then be said to be intermediately exposed to Chinese competition
14
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Vector X includes relevant time varying firm-level controls, these are basically multi-
plant and age dummies.7 Vector Indjt accounts time varying industry-wide controls. in
general these are industry aggregate variables for the matched industries that may affect
the demand for a particular manufacturing sector, specifically we included here, the world
import penetration rate of the corresponding Colombian industry calculated without the
imports from China. dt and Statest are year and state fixed effects added to control for
aggregate shocks that may affect the variable of interest across all sectors and states. The
standard errors are clustered by each industry in each year to account for correlation of
shocks within each industry-year. Given the panel aspect of the data we consider ci as the
unobserved heterogeneity.
A potential concern that arise is the reverse causality problem: Because some factors
such as demand or technology shocks for particular products or industries in the domestic
market can be correlated with the firm performance and the industry-level Chinese
imports. This type of endogeneity bias might work against finding any impact of Chinese
competition, because both Colombian and Chinese imports are expected to react to these
types of unobservable shocks in the same direction, hence it might cancel the competition
effect. Therefore, is reasonable to think that eijst is correlated with IMPCHjt, leading to
E[IMPCH, e] 6= 0. The correlation between the independent variables with unobserved
factors would bias our results.
To identify causal effects, we need to address the potential reverse causality issue. To
address this problem, we use Chinese world export supplies or the worldwide imports
from China, as an instrument that is correlated with Colombian imports from China but
uncorrelated with the firms outcomes. The instrument IVjt takes the form:
IVjt = (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) (3)
Accounting for the China’s total supply of products in industry j to the entire world
-The worldwide Chinese imports-, minus the Chinese exports to Colombia -Chinese
imports of Colombia- in period t.
7Since EAM does not report the year when the plant was established, we calculated an age variable according to the
number of years that firms have been in the sample since 2000 to have a notion of firm’s age.
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To be valid our instrument must satisfy two requirements: first, the instrument must
be uncorrelated with the error term, Cov[z, u] = 0, in other words the instrument must be
exogenous. The worldwide Chinese imports must be exogenous from the perspective of
Colombia firms as it is expected to be driven by rest of the world and China itself. Second
the instrumental variable must be relevant, it must explain our endogenous variable, in
our application this requires that our measure of Chinese import competition will partially
correlated with the worldwide Chinese imports. Therefore, the instrument should capture
the supply side driven growth component of Chinese imports independent from the
Colombia demand factors, given that the causal relationship between the instrument and
import penetration measure arises from the correlation between Colombia’s imports for
product of industry j and China’s comparative advantage in that industry.
Formally, if the excludability and relevance conditions are met, then the instrumental
variable estimator is a consistent estimator and it will indicate that neither endogeneity
nor unobserved variable are driving our results and we will able to identify the causal
effect of Chinese import competition on the Colombian plants performance.
VI. Results
We begin by examining the first-stage relationship between our instrument and the
endogenous variable, the Chinese Import penetration rate. Table 1 contains the result
from three models, the first one, a model with the completed controls set that we use
to get our main results, the second model including a less substantive control set.8 The
results indicate that the Chinese worldwide imports is a good instrument for the Chinese
import penetration rate in Colombia.
All two coefficients measuring the relationship between these two variables are sig-
nificant at p < 0.01 level. Regarding to the relevance and validity of instruments, The
underidentification test, Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, testing whether the excluded in-
strument is relevant and the equation is identified, rejected the null hypothesis, indicating
that the matrix is full column rank and the model is identified. The weak identification
8We consider the following plant and industry controls. Rest of the world import penetration rate. A dummy variable
referring the case whether the firm is a multi-plant and the age dummies young and old.
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test provide by the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, in both models was larger enough to
suggest that the instrument performs well. Moreover, the weak-instrument test9 checking
the significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural
equation are jointly equal to zero, and, in addition, the orthogonality conditions are valid.
All the followings tables presents the second-stage results for the IV model in equation
(2) as well as some extensions that explore the heterogeneity effect of Chinese import com-
petition on Colombian manufacturing plants performance. Such heterogeneity analysis
include interactions between the Chinese import penetration rate and two age dummies
are constructed according to the number of years that plants have been in the sample
since 2000. The plant i belongs to the young group, if has been in the sample for less than
6 years. The firm i, belongs to the old group if it has been in the sample for more than 6
years.
Moreover, for the heterogeneity analysis we considered different plant size groups
defined by total workforce and by market share within the same 4 digit ISIC industry. In
order to define these groups we proceed as following: we considered the total workforce
and the market share distribution of plants for the initial year 2000, then we calculated the
quantiles for each distribution in that year. We defined the categories Big, for those plants
at the top 20% of the total workforce distribution at the year 2000 and small, for those
plants at the first and second quantile of the same total workforce distribution. Similarly,
in the case of the market share, we defined a High group for plants at the top 20% of the
market share distribution for its specify industry in the initial year and a Low group for
those plants at the first and second quantiles of this market share distribution.
Furthermore, the Chinese competition measure is also interacted with several variables
of interests at firm level such as: productivity, skilled, unskilled ratio and capital-labor
ratio, to see if trade between the Colombia and China has a disproportionate effect on
any particular type of manufacturing plants in Colombia.
9 The Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S statistic.
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i. First Order Effects
We first start analyzing the effects Chinese import competition on the followings Colom-
bian manufacturing plants: output, sales, value added, employment, and wages. Subse-
quently, the analysis will focus on the dynamic effects of the competition on the evolution
of manufacturing firms in Colombia, identifying its impact on productivity, skill intensity,
entry and exit.
i.1 Firms Output
The effects of Chinese import competition on Colombian manufacturing plants output
are presented in table 2. Given the richness of our data we are able to analysis industrial
output and gross output, for each plant in our sample. In panel A, the dependent
variable is the logarithm of gross output, whereas in panel the dependent variable is the
logarithm of industrial output. In column 1, the coefficients of the Chinese share of import
penetration rate are negative and significant at 1 percent level for both panels, suggesting
that for an average manufacturing plant, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese
share of import penetration rate (11 percentage point increase) is associated with: a 5.44
percentage point decrease in log gross output and a 5.36 percentage points decrease in the
of industrial output. Such findings suggest, that Chinese imports are reducing demand in
the domestic market for goods produced in Colombia and therefore, displacing domestic
production of manufacturing plants.
Columns 2 and 3, are referring to the heterogeneity that might exist between man-
ufacturing plants regarding to the number of years that they have been active in the
market. The results indicate that young firms are more negative affected by Chinese
import competition comparing to the relative older ones, indicating the age of the plant
may influence the way in which plants’ output are affected by international import com-
petition. Moreover, the results in column 4, shows that firm with higher productivity are
able to mitigate the negative impacts on output derived from increasing Chinese import
competition.
Regarding to the differences across big and small plants measuring by the total number
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of workers. We find that, differentiated effect of Chinese import competition on big and
small firms. For the small plants group (plants in the first and second quantile of the total
workers distribution at the initial year) the Chinese import competition have a negative
affected both, the industrial and gross output. One standard deviation increase in the
Chinese import penetration rate, is associated with a 19 and 20 percentage points decrease
in the log of gross and industrial output, respectively. Whereas, for the big plants group
(plants at the top 20% of the total workers distribution at the initial year) the effect of
Chinese import competition on output is positive, one standard deviation in our measure
of the penetration rate, will increase the gross and the industrial output of this type of
plants by 56 percentage points compared with others. Similar results are suggested, when
we analyze the heterogeneity of manufacturing plants by market share within its active
disaggregated industry. Plants at the higher quantile of the market share distribution
within its industry, were capable to increase their output, whereas, for plants at the lower
quantiles of the market share, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import
penetration rate, is associated with a decrease of 31 percentage points in the log of its
gross and industrial output.
i.2 Sales and Value Added
The table 3 contains the estimated impact of Chinese import competition on total sales
(panel A) and value added (panel B) in manufacturing plants. The results, in column
1 of both panels, suggest that, for an average plant, there not a significant impact of
increasing Chinese competition on sales, but a negative effect of China competition is
found in the case of value added. A 10 % increase in the Chinese import penetration rate,
reduce 5% the log of value added of an average plant. The heterogeneity analysis shows
a disproportionated effect of Chinese import competition between small and big plants,
measure by both number employees and industry market share. In particular, while,
top Big plants still increase their sales and value added even in presence of intensified
import competition, smaller plants display a significant decrease in sales and value added.
Among small plants, the decline in sales is estimated around 18-28 percentage points. On
the other hand, the decline in valued added falls between 18 and 23 percentage points,
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for this type of plants; both effects in response to a 10% increase in the Chinese import
penetration rate. Furthermore, the results evidence that higher productivity reduces the
negative effects of Chinese import competition on plants’ sales and value added. These
findings are similar to those estimated by Utar and Ruiz (2013) in the Mexican case.
To complete the analysis regarding the effect of China competition on sales and value
added, we consider different types of plants regarding their exporting or importing
behavior. The exporter category is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the plant reported positive sales abroad, and 0 otherwise in a specify year. Likewise,
importer category was take the value of 1 if plant reported positive share of foreign
origin in their output. Columns 2 and 3, show the interaction effect of Chinese import
competition among exporter and importer plants. The results indicate that rising import
competition have negative affected the sales and value added among exporters. The
coefficients indicates that, a 10 percentage points increase in Chinese competition proxy
by Chinese import penetration rate, is associated with a 4 percentage points decrease
of in the log of total sales for a exporting plant, compare to no exporters and with a 8
percentage decrease in the log of value added of exporting plants. These results indicate
evidence to suggest that Chinese import competition might represent a challenge for
Colombian non-traditional exporting manufacturing plants in international markets.
i.3 Plants Employment
Table 4 presents the estimation results of impact of Chinese import competition on both
direct (panel A) and total employment (panel B) in manufacturing plants in Colombia.
Column 2 and 3, suggest that both direct workers and total employment10 in younger
plants has been more negative affected by Chinese import competition relative to the older
ones. Moreover, workers in plants exhibiting higher productivity tend to be less exposed
to lose their job due to import competition, but it does not guarantee that productive
plants have experience employment cuts. On the other hand, the estimation results in
10This variable is originally reported by EAM, it considers all type of hired workers that a plant has. In
addition to the part and full time direct workers, this category includes: Temporal employees who have a
permanent contract of employment with a temporary agency, interns and apprentices.
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column 5, indicate that in capital-intensive plants, the employment has increase and
subsequently, the employment for labor-intensive plants have decrease under intensified
Chinese import competition proxy by the Chinese import penetration rate in Colombia.
Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate,
translate in 5.6 and 2 percentage points increase in the log of direct and total workforce,
respectively, among capital-intensive plants.
The heterogeneous results among different types of plants size by both market share
and workers size, evidence a disproportionate effect of Chinese import competition on
manufacturing plants in Colombia. In the case of big plants defined by the employment
size, the results suggests that, a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import
penetration rate, will increase the log of direct and total workforce by 39 and 46 percentage
points, respectively. Moreover, plants at the top 20% of the market share within its
industry, facing the same change in the Chinese import competition will increase indicate,
an increase in the log of direct and total workforce of 22 and 27 percentage points,
respectively. Contrary, to the big size plants, employment in small plants relative the
number of employees and their market share, is found to be negatively affected by import
competition. The results suggests that among small firms in terms of industry market
share, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate is associated
with a 15 and 17 percentage points decline in the log of direct and total workers for this
type of manufacturing plants. Moreover, the magnitude of employment losses among
small plants defined by number of employees, rises to a 17.6 and 23.1 percentage points
decrease in the log of direct and total workers employment, respectively.
In order to deepen the analysis of the effects on Chinese import competition on
manufacturing plants employment, we interact our import competition measure with
the share of skilled and unskilled workers over total direct workforce. By doing this we
are able to identify, whether employment losses are happening among skill-intensive or
unskilled-intensive manufacturing plants. Columns 10 and 11, in table 4 containing the
results of this interaction term. The estimations for direct workers in panel A, suggest that
intensified the Chinese import competition, slightly reduced the employment of direct
workers in more skilled-intensive plants and it has marginally increased the employment
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of direct workers in relative unskilled-intensive plants. Specifically, one standard deviation
in the Chinese import penetration rate, reduce the log of direct workers by 9 percentage
points, in relative more skilled-intensive plants, compared to the less skilled-intensive ones.
Moreover, the same effect of increasing Chinese import competition, slightly increase the
employment of direct workers among more unskilled-intensive plants by 2.2 percentage
points in the log of this variable. On the other hand, in the case of total workforce, we find
that the same pattern holds, in the sense that, Chinese import competition have mixed
effects on total employment for different skill-using manufacturing plants. The results
are suggesting that Chinese import competition negatively affects the total employment
in relative more skilled-intense plants, whereas, for the relative unskilled-intensive ones,
intensified import competition increase the total number of workers. However, the
magnitude of this effect rises for the case of total workers. We find, that for skilled-
intensive plants, one standard deviation increase in Chinese import penetration rate,
reduces the log of total workforce by 41 percentage points, while, the same 11 percentage
points increase in the Chinese import penetration rate, increment 22 percentage points the
log of total workers among relative more unskilled-intensive plants. Such phenomenon
might be explained, given the 2002 Labor Reform in Colombia.11 Plants were able to
reduce labor cost by hiring low-skill workers through new hiring modalities as through
an outsourcing agency, meaning given the labor reform, manufacturing plants started to
outsourced domestically unskilled workers, as a strategy to reduce labor cost in presence
of increasing import competition.
Since, our results suggest that intensified Chinese import competition have reduce the
employment in labor-intensive manufacturing plants compared to the capital-intensive
ones and considering the previous analysis, we argue that employment losses within labor-
intensive plants, is mainly driven by the negative impact of Chinese import competition
on the number of total workers in relative more skilled-intensive plants, rather than
in unskilled-intensive plants. Such phenomenon is explained by the fact that China
productive structure rapidly moves up the value chain, evidenced by the increasing
11 The aim fo this reform was: first, reduce and increasing the flexibility of non-wage costs. Second,
increasing wages’ flexibility. Third, introduce a wider variety of hiring modalities.
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technological sophistication of China’s exports (Chandra et al., 2013). Emerging Chinese
competition respect to skill and relative more technology-intensive production, is expected
to produce negative effects on employment and output in Colombian plants active
in more skilled-intensive industries, since these plants may face more difficulties in
maintaining and expanding their export markets and may also experience increasing
import penetration in the domestic market.
i.4 Average Wage
The table 5 contains the results measuring the impact of rising Chinese import compe-
tition on Colombian manufacturing plants. The results indicate that, for the average
manufacturing plant, one standard deviation increase in Chinese the import penetration
rate, reduced the log of average wage by roughly 2 percentage points. The negative effect
of import competition on average wage is statistically significant regardless of plants
relative age. Moreover, higher productivity and higher capital-intensity, seems to soften
the negative impact of Chinese import competition on average wages of workers in this
types of plants, although these characteristics are not enough to overcome the entire
negative impact magnitude.
In columns 5, 6, 7 and 8, we find a heterogeneous effect of increasing Chinese import
competition on average wages among small and big plants, defined by both market share
and number of employees. Big plants at the top 20% of the workers and market share
distribution in the initial year, have increased the average wage. Contrary, small plants
at the first and second quantile of these distributions have reduce average wage due to
heightened Chinese import competition. Specially in the case of big and small plants
defined by the number of employees, we find that one standard deviation increase in
the Chinese import penetration rate is associated with a increase of 12 percentage points
in the log of average wages for Big plants, compared with a decline of 5 percentage
points among the smalls. The same difference holds for the case of big and small plants
categorized by industry market share.
This analysis shows that, whereas for big plants the positive effect of firm-size on
workers’ wages holds, despite of Chinese import competition. Workers’ wages in small
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manufacturing plants have been negatively impacted by increasing import competition
from China.
Furthermore, columns 10 and 11, present a disproportioned effect of Chinese import
competition on average wages in relative skilled and unskilled using plants. The results
indicate that average wages in relative more skilled-intensive plants are positive affected
by increasing import competition. Whereas, heightened Chinese import competition
negatively affect the average wage in relative more unskilled-intensive plants. The
coefficients indicate that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration
rate, increase in 12 percentage points the log of average wage among relative skilled-
intensive plants. While the same increase in the Chinese import competition measure,
decrease in 10.5 percentage points the log of average wages fur relative unskilled-intensive
Colombian manufacturing plants, such finding is mainly marked by big size plants. These
results are related to those found by Ebenstein et al. (2014) who examined the impact of
import penetration on wages both within the manufacturing sector and across sectors and
occupations. They found that workers in occupations most exposed to import penetration
experience slower wage growth.
According to the literature, one line of explanation for the increase in the skill premium,
focuses on the pattern of protection prior to trade liberalization –and therefore prior to
import competition– in many developing countries, and the skill intensity of the sectors
that were impacted the most by trade opening reforms. Several studies argued that,
prior to trade reform, the unskilled labor-intensive sectors were the most protected. Such
protection pattern has been documented in Mexico (Robertson, 2004), Morocco (Currie
and Harrison, 1997), and Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2004).12 These studies showed that it
was the wage in unskilled-intensive sectors that were impacted the most by tariff cuts.
Given this evidence, the increase in the skill premium is explained by the prediction
derive from Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Since, trade liberalization was concentrated in
12 However, the reason why Governments in developing economies abundant in unskilled labor, decided
to protect unskilled-intensive sectors, when the pattern of comparative advantage would have suggested
otherwise, is not clear. One potential answer is that the protection patterns reflected political economy
considerations, rather than related to comparative advantage .
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unskilled-intensive sectors, the economy wide return to unskilled labor should decrease.
Therefore, in the spirit of Stolper-Samuelson forces, plants substitute away from skilled
labor with the rising skill premium, as it was observed in the previous employment section,
while the number of direct and total workers were decreasing in relative skilled-intensive
plants due to higher Chinese import competition. Direct and total employment have
increased among relative unskilled-intensive plants.
ii. Dynamic Effects
ii.1 Productivity
Before to analyze the effects of Chinese import competition on plants’ productivity. We
explain, how the plants’ productivity was estimated.13
Considering the following Cobb Douglas production function for plant i at time t:
yit = α+ witβ+ kitγ+ωit + eit (4)
where yit is the log of value added , w it is a 1J vector of log free variables (labor)
distinguished between skill and unskilled labor and k it is a 1K vector of log state
variables (capital). The random component ω it is the unobservable productivity or
technical efficiency and e it is an idiosyncratic output shock distributed as white noise.
According to Olley and Pakes (1996), we assume that productivity evolves according to a
first-order Markov process. We deflected nominal values using its corresponding available
deflector. In that sense, the variables: value added was deflected by the manufacturing
sector PPI. In the case of the capital variable: total fixed assets was deflected using the
capital goods PPI.
Transforming the above production function into logarithms allows linear estimation.
However, OLS estimation is biased, by the problems of endogenity of the input demand
and by the self-selection induced by exit behavior. The endogenity problem arises because
current input choices are determined in some extent by the firms’ belief about likely
13Although, the plant level productivity estimation implemented here is quite standard, we wanted to clarified how
we got the dependent variable in this section the log TFP. The TFP estimation is explained in detail in the appendix.
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productivity level when those inputs will used; then profit maximization of the firm
implies that the realization of the error term of the production function is expected to
influence the choice of factor inputs. This means that the regressors and the error term
are correlated. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) offer an estimation technique that is very
close in spirit to the Olley and Pakes approach. Instead of investment, they suggest the
use of intermediate inputs as a proxy rather than investment. Typically, many datasets
will contain significantly less zero-observations in materials than in firm-level investment.
Moreover, the variable intermediate consumption was deflected using the intermediate
consumption PPI.
Most available plant-level data do not contain plant-level physical quantities and
prices, as happening in this case. This gives rise to the concern that markups may be
captured by the productivity measure as they are also expected to respond to heightened
competition. In this case, however, markups should go down as competition intensifies
more so for those plants facing the toughest competition, causing downward bias in the
estimates.
Productivity results are presented in Table 6. The coefficient in column 1 indicates
that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate, is associate
with a decrease of 3 percentage points, in the log of TFP, for an average manufacturing
plant. Among, relative younger plants, the magnitude of this effect might represent a 7.7
decrease in the log of TFP, comparing to the relative older plants. Moreover, columns
5-8, present evidence to suggest a heterogeneous impact of Chinese import competition
on plants’ productivity regarding the size. The results, shows that whereas for big size
plants, there exist a positive effect of increasing Chinese import competition on plants
productivity (measure between 20-22 percentage points increase in the log of TFP, in case
that the Chinese import penetration ratio increase one standard deviation) this effect fades
out for small size plants, even it might exhibit a not significant negative effect.
We want to point out that, this study analyzed specifically the effect of recent increasing
Chinese import competition on Colombian manufacturing plants productivity. Contrary,
to previous studies, related to the effect of trade reforms in Colombia on manufacturing
plants productivity, as for instance, Eslava et al. (2004), who using a panel of Colombian
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manufacturing firms in the period 1982-1998, argued that the trade reforms appears to
increase average plant productivity by both forcing to exit less productive plants and by
increasing productivity among continuing plants.
ii.2 Plant Exit
A probit model with instrumental variable is used to analyze the impact of Chinese
competition on plants exit. The exit variable, xit is a dummy variable that takes 1 if plant i
exits at period t + 1.14 In these regressions aggregate shocks and industry specific factors
are controlled for using the full set of state by year and industry fixed effects. The results,
presented in Table 7, shows significant effect of Chinese competition on manufacturing
plants exit. Column 1, indicate that an increase of 6 percentage points in the Chinese
import penetration rate, increases 9 percentage points the exit probability for an average
plant.
On the other hand, we find that relative younger plants are more likely to shutdown,
due to tougher Chinese import competition, compare to relative older plants. Among,
younger plants an increase of 6 % leads to 28 % increase in the probability of plant exit.
This results is explained by theoretical models in which firms learn about its efficiency
(Jovanovic, 1982). In such a case, older firms have more accumulated knowledge and are
more likely to survive.
The interaction between Chinese import penetration rate and plant productivity, in
column 4, reveals that increasing imports from China are associated with a higher exit
probability for low productivity plants. In other words, plants with higher productivity
are more likely to survive and do not exit the market in the wave of heightened Chinese
import competition.
Furthermore, columns 5-8, present the heterogeneous analysis of the effects of Chinese
import competition on different plant sizes. The results suggest a significant negative
effect of Chinese import competition on exit among big plants, measured by both market
share and number of workers. We find that, big plants, are less likely to exit the market
in presence of Chinese import competition. The results are consistent, with previous
14For details see Appendix.
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studies analyzing the impact of Chinese import competition on domestic manufacturing
plants shutdown. For instance, Utar and Ruiz (2013) studied the effect Chinese import
competition in the U.S market that Mexican Maquiladoras are facing, finding a significant
and negative relationship between exit and size as well as between exit and productiv-
ity. Moreover, for U.S. manufacturing industry, Bernard et al. (2006) find evidence that
low-wage countries’ import penetration increases plants’ death in the U.S. manufacturing
industry. Our findings are fairly consistent with previous empirical evidence for produc-
tivity, age and size. In the sense that, plant exit is negatively associated to plant size, age
and total factor productivity.
ii.3 New Plants
To properly analyzed whether the Chinese import competition have affected the potential
entry decision that a specific plant might take. We aggregate the plant-level data into a
broad 4 digit ISIC.Rev.3 industry-level dataset. As a way provide much insight about the
number of realized entries within an specif manufacturing industry. Therefore, in this
section the following the equation is estimate:
Entryjt = β0 + β1 IMPCHjt +WIMPCHjt +∑
t
δ
y
t + ejt (5)
Where Entryjt is the total number of entrants in industry j at period t. The year
dummies in this regression will control for aggregate shocks, such as exchange rate, that
may affect the entry decision of manufacturing plants in the same way across sectors as
it affects the relative production costs between Colombia and China. To aisle the effect
of intensified Chinese import competition we also control for WIMPCHjt the rest of the
world import competition.
If intensified Chinese competition discourages entry of new manufacturing plants in
Colombia, we expect β1 to be negative. Since our dependent variable denotes the number
of total new entries in the industry j for a given year. We consider the Poisson regression
as a the natural method to estimate equation 5. The estimation results are shown in
table 8. A negative and significant effect of the Chinese import penetration is found on
manufacturing plants market entry. When the import penetration rate is added in column
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2, enables us to suggest that this effect is especially true for Chinese import competition.
The results suggest that intensified Chinese import competition is found to discourage
manufacturing plants entry in Colombia.
ii.4 Skill Intensity
In this section we analyze, the evolution of the skill intensity in manufacturing plants
in Colombia. The average skill intensity is defined as the ratio of administrators and
technicians to unskilled workers. This definition of skill intensity is similar to the one
used by others authors, and it assumes basically, that non-production workers are more
qualified than production workers.
Looking at the average skill intensity of entrants, we identify that average skill intensity
slightly decrease, from 0.38 in 2001 to 0.37 in 2012. Since the mean size of entrants is
unchanged in the 2001-2012 period, this small decrease among entering Plants is not
driven by size changes. On the other hand, for continuing plants, we find that average
skill intensity, presents a moderate increase from 0.36 to 0.39 for the period of 2000-2012.
Thoenig and Verdier (2003) and Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) both show theoretically
that increased competition can lead to a change in within firm organization that biases
towards skilled labor. Moreover, Utar (2014) shows that employment of Danish Textile
firms decline significantly in response to the MFA quota abolishment for Chinese products.
Finding that the decline in employment happens mostly among low-skilled workers,
leading to compositional changes in the organization of the Danish firms towards higher
skill intensity. Recently, Mion and Zhu (2013) argued that import competition from China
accounts for 42% of the within firm increase in the share of skilled workers in Belgian
manufacturing firm. Additionally, Utar and Ruiz (2013) find that Chinese competition for
the U.S market triggers an increase in skill intensities for the Mexican maquiladoras case.
Table 9, present the estimation results of the effect of Chinese import competition
on skill upgrading in manufacturing plants in Colombia. The results suggest, that for
an average plant there is not effect of skill intensity derived from increasing Chinese
import competition. In contrast to previous plant-level evidence, for manufacturing plants
in Unites States, Mexico, Belgium, Denmark among others, we do not find evidence
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to suggest that manufacturing plants in Colombia have increase the skill intensity in
response to import competition from China. However, such no skill bias effect, was also
found by Álvarez and Claro (2009) for the Chilean manufacturing firms. Although, the
recent work of Fieler et al. (2018), find that trade liberalization in the decade of 90’s in
Colombia have induced to skill upgrading in manufacturing firms, we suggest that this
overall trade openness effect, is not evidenced in the particular case of increasing import
competition after China’s accession to the WTO, in the last decade.
Furthermore, the heterogeneous analysis of the impact of Chinese import competition
on skill intensity among deferent types of plants, shows that the evidence of not existing
skill upgrading in response to import competition from China, holds regardless size or
relative age of manufacturing plants. However, column 4 and 7, indicate that Chinese
import competition triggers skill upgrading only in more productive and more capital-
intensive plants. Specifically, we find that one standard deviation increase (11 percentage
points) in the Chinese import penetration rate, increases 6.6 percentage points the log of
skill intensity among more productive plants. On the other hand, the same change in the
Chinese import competition, increases 8.3 percentage points the log of skill intensity in
more capital-intensive plants, compare to the less capital-intensive ones. This is explained,
since plants with relatively less sophisticated technologies and less productive are more
exposed to competition from China and probably produce products that are more likely
to be replaced by Chinese products, while others plants with already higher productivity
and relative capital-intensive, are more likely to upgrade their production with more
emphasis on skilled-intensive goods, in order to cope with increasing Chinese import
competition.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Using plant-level data, this paper analyze the impact of competition import from China
on the performance and evolution of manufacturing plants in developing economies as
Colombia. We exploit the exogenous intensification of the import penetration by China
around the time of its accession to WTO and the fact that not all plants are exposed to
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the competition to the same degree, as identification strategy. Moreover, using a valid
instrumental approach, we are able to present unbiased results.
We find that manufacturing plants in Colombia are negatively affected by Chinese
import competition. Plant output, employment entry and survival probabilities are found
to be responding negatively to increasing Chinese competition. While there is no evidence
found that Chinese competition cause skill upgrading among manufacturing plants. More
productivity and relative capital-intensive plants, are more likely to upgrade their skill
production structure to face increasing Chinese import competition. Furthermore, Chinese
import competition negatively affects the total employment in relative more skilled-intense
plants, whereas, for the relative unskilled-intensive ones, intensified import competition
increase the total number of workers, meaning that domestically, manufacturing plants in
Colombia are outsourcing unskilled workers.
Since plant have different competitive capacity to compete with imports. The results of
the heterogeneity analysis indicate that smaller and less productive plants are in greater
extent negative affected by Chinese import competition. On the other hand, we find
evidence to suggest that more productive and larger domestic firms may handle better
the impact of increasing imports competition, due to their generally more sophisticated
technologies and business processes.
The analysis presented in this paper, goes beyond the effect on individual companies
and industries to raise concerns over the broader systemic effects of the rise of China on
countries like Colombia. Since the negative impact of Chinese competition can be related
to the following aspects. First, the possible "de-industrialization" of the economies as
local industrial production is displaced by Chinese imports. Second, the rapid movement
of China up the technological ladder from labor intensive low tech products such as
shoes, textile and toys to more sophisticated products such as electronics and machinery,
makes it more difficult for countries like Colombia to upgrade their own industries
and tends to trap them in less dynamic industrial sectors. Finally, the combined effect
of surging Chinese demand for commodities and intense competition from Chinese
manufactured goods in export markets might contributed to a concentration of the basket
exports towards primary products as for instance, crude or precious metals, increasing
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the country dependence on primary commodities revenues, deepen the existing problems
associated with dependence on primary products.
Although increasing Chinese import competition present a negative impact for man-
ufacturing plants performance in Colombia, it seems that for policy markers and rent
seeking governments, these negative impacts are outweighed by the gains from trading
commodities with China and the benefits for consumers, who can have access to Chinese
products of increasing quality and technology with relative good prices. We consider
that such dynamics might trigger growth in others sectors as commerce, in developing
economies like Colombia.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: First Stage IV Results
(1) (2)
Variables CH Import Competition CH Import Competition
Instrument 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects !
Firm and Industry Controls !
Firm Fixed Effects ! !
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (p-value) 1301.3 (0.00) 1338.8 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2581.2*** 2672.6***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Plants Gross and Industrial Output
Panel A. Dependent variable: log Gross Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IMPCH -0.496*** -0.156 -1.791*** -22.88*** 0.857*** -0.708*** 1.318*** -0.896*** 1.646***
(0.138) (0.170) (0.250) (.508) (0.162) (0.153) (0.438) (0.165) (0.376)
IMPCH*I(young) -1.635***
(0.288)
IMPCH*I(Old) 1.635***
(0.288)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 4.665***
(.099)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -1.101***
(0.0426)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 5.864***
(1.405)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.098***
(0 .724)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share top 20%) 4.384***
(0.843)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -4.505***
(0.696)
Observations 89,774 78,212 89,465 89,465 77,939 89,465 89,465 89,465 89,465
Number of firm_ID 12,111 10,939 12,099 12,099 10,924 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 1971*** 813.3*** 813.3*** 911.2*** 725*** 254.5*** 253.9** 164.3*** 162.2***
Panel B. Dependent variable: Log Industrial Output
IMPCH -0.489*** -0.154 -1.772*** -22.28*** 0.858*** -0.697*** 1.311*** -0.883*** 1.625***
(0.138) (0.170) (0.249) (0.498) (0.162) (0.153) (0.438) (0.165) (0.377)
IMPCH*I(young) -1.618***
(0.287)
IMPCH*I(Old) 1.618***
(0.287)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 4.540***
(0.0972)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -1.101***
(0.0426)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 5.685***
(1.399)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.157***
(0.723)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share top 20%) 4.298***
(0.843)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -4.543***
(0.698)
Number of Observations 89,774 89,461 89,461 83,607 77,935 89,461 31,160 89,461 31,156
Number of Individuals 12,111 12,098 12,098 11,987 10,923 12,098 6,208 12,098 6,207
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 206.1*** 102.9*** 103.1*** 60.9*** 60.2*** 60*** 67.9*** 68.2*** 103.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the Wald
Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV bias. All estimations include by year state fixed effects
and firm fixed effects. By state by year fixed effects are partial led out. 37
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Table 3: The Impact of Chinese import Competition on Manufacturing Plants Sales and Value Added
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IMPCH -0.218 -0.0652 -0.068 -20.05*** 1.167*** -0.398*** 1.543*** -0.535*** 1.791***
(0.139) (0.146) (0.206) (0.470) (0.164) (0.153) (0.438) (0.164) (0.388)
IMPCH*I(Exporter) -0.392**
(0.191)
IMPCH*I(Importer) -0.080
(0.141)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 4.106***
(0.0916)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -1.109***
(0.0426)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 5.405***
(1.388)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.375***
(0.713)
IMPCH interacted by Industry Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share top 20%) 3.597***
(0.818)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -4.660***
(0.723)
Observations 88,274 88,274 88,274 82,797 77,085 88,274 30,961 88,274 30,958
Number of firm_ID 12,009 12,009 12,009 11,904 10,843 12,009 6,188 12,009 6,187
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2142.3*** 342.8*** 346.2*** 135.9*** 165.7*** 78.2*** 84.1*** 97.4*** 77.3***
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Log Value Added
IMPCH -0.527*** -0.371** -0.401** -46.95*** 0.920*** -0.761*** 1.320*** -0.963*** 1.199***
(0.162) (0.173) (0.177) (0.894) (0.189) (0.180) (0.486) (0.192) (0.443)
IMPCH*I(Exporter) -0.441***
(0.209)
IMPCH*I(Importer) 0.052
(0.359)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 9.675***
(0.179)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -1.194***
(0.0478)
IMPCH interacted by total workers size Groups
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 6.328***
(1.636)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.188***
(0.763)
IMPCH interacted by Industry Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share top 20%) 4.717***
(0.938)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -3.517***
(0.813)
Observations 89,772 89,463 89,463 83,611 77,938 89,463 31,158 89,463 31,154
Number of firm_ID 12,111 12,099 12,099 11,988 10,924 12,099 6,208 12,099 6,207
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2289*** 545.2*** 524.1*** 97.1*** 102.5** 88.6*** 92.7*** 121.9*** 156.4***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All models
included Firm Fixed Effects and by State-Year fixed effects.For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05
less than 20% IV bias
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Table 4: The Impact of Chinese Import Competition on Employment
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log Direct Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
IMPCH -0.111 0.0657 -0.762*** -4.150*** 4.354*** -0.234* 1.476*** -0.302** 0.946*** 0.207 -0.672***
(0.136) (0.157) (0.221) (0.284) (0.199) (0.141) (0.383) (0.149) (0.355) (0.180) (0.223)
IMPCH*I(young) -0.828***
(0.259)
IMPCH*I(Old) 0.828***
(0.259)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 0.831***
(0.051)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -3.844***
(0.101)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 3.794***
(1.147)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.575***
(0.652)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share) 2.306***
(0.692)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -2.328***
(0.618)
IMPCH*I(Skilled Workers) -0.879***
(0.293)
IMPCH*I(Unskilled Workers) 0.880***
(0.293)
Observations 78688 78,688 78,688 73,746 77,939 78,688 25,956 78,688 25,952 74,341 74,341
Number of firm_ID 10,982 10,982 10,982 10,889 10,924 10,982 5,366 10,982 5,365 10,936 10,936
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 4007*** 765*** 739.2** 87.5*** 98.4*** 374.2*** 77.1*** 73.8*** 127.7*** 143.4*** 156.8***
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Log Total Workforce
IMPCH -0.093 0.107 -1.026*** -3.114*** 1.300*** -0.226** 1.462*** -0.329*** 1.051*** 2.222*** -3.783***
(0.101) (0.126) (0.180) (0.230) (0.121) (0.111) (0.328) (0.121) (0.295) (0.146) (0.185)
IMPCH*I(young) -1.219***
(0.210)
IMPCH*I(Old) 1.219***
(0.210)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 0.631***
(0.042)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -1.119***
(0.0415)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 4.452***
(1.019)
IMPCH*I(Small) -3.067***
(0.505)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share ) 2.843***
(0.660)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -2.657***
(0.536)
IMPCH*I(Skilled Workers) -6.004***
(0.249)
IMPCH*I(Unskilled Workers) 6.005***
(0.249)
Observations 84,485 84,485 84,485 83,611 73,747 84,485 30,163 84,485 30,159 84,208 84,208
Number of firm_ID 12,057 12,057 12,057 11,988 10,889 12,057 6,161 12,057 6,160 12,030 12,030
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 1273.3*** 57.8*** 57.8*** 89.4*** 91.7*** 298*** 265.6*** 234.8*** 64.9*** 57.2** 65.9***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All models
included Firm Fixed Effects and by State-Year fixed effects.For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05
less than 20% IV bias
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Table 5: The Impact of Chinese Import Competition on Average Wages
Dependent variable: Log Average Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
IMPCH -0.165*** -0.142** -0.302*** -3.359*** -0.720*** -0.221*** 0.207 -0.259*** 0.424*** -0.957*** 1.082***
(0.053) (0.066) (0.095) (0.141) (0.065) (0.059) (0.149) (0.062) (0.158) (0.078) (0.098)
IMPCH*I(Young) -0.159
(0.111)
IMPCH*I(Old) 0.159
(0.111)
IMPCH*I(logTFP) 0.658***
(0.027)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) 0.459***
(0.023)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 1.390***
(0.419)
IMPCH*I(Small) -0.670***
(0.258)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share ) 0.999***
(0.283)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -1.171***
(0.284)
IMPCH*I(Skilled Workers) 2.039***
(0.131)
IMPCH*I(Unskilled Workers) -2.039***
(0.131)
Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
By year-state fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 78,675 78,675 78,675 73,733 77,926 78,675 25,951 78,675 25,947 74,329 74,329
Number of firm_ID 10,982 10,982 10,982 10,889 10,924 10,982 5,366 10,982 5,365 10,936 10,936
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2347*** 245*** 278.1*** 65.9*** 99.8*** 562.9*** 587.2*** 355.3** 371.7*** 92.4*** 105.6***
Robust standard errors in parentheses,clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All models
included Firm Fixed Effects and by State-Year fixed effects. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05
less than 20% IV bias
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Table 6: The Impact of Chinese Import Competition on Plant Productivity
Dependent Variable: Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IMPCH -0.264** -0.125 -0.831*** 0.016 -0.361*** -0.121 -0.479*** 0.066
(0.115) (0.138) (0.229) (0.131) (0.127) (0.331) (0.133) (0.308)
IMPCH*I(young) -0.706***
(0.259)
IMPCH*I(Old) 0.706***
(0.259)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) -0.242***
(0.028)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) 2.379**
(1.064)
IMPCH*I(Small) -0.064
(0.498)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share ) 2.298***
(0.595)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -0.524
(0.551)
Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
By year-state fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 83,917 83,611 83,611 73,746 83,611 29,794 83,611 29,790
Number of firm_ID 12,000 11,988 11,988 10,889 11,988 6,110 11,988 6,109
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2164.2*** 82.2*** 74.9*** 234.2*** 213.9*** 93.5*** 125.8*** 176.8***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By state by
year fixed effects are partial led out. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV bias
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Table 7: The Impact of Chinese Import Competition on Plants Exit
Dependent Variable: Plant Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IMPCH 0.761*** -0.615*** 2.358*** 1.115*** 0.132*** -0.003 0.224*** -0.126
(0.222) (0.036) (0.141) (0.079) (0.035) (0.143) (0.042) (0.138)
IMPCH*I(young) 2.973***
(0.149)
IMPCH*I(Old) -2.973***
(0.149)
IMPCH*I(lTFP) -0.217***
(0.015)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) -2.064***
(0.465)
IMPCH*I(Small) -0.007
(0.283)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share top 20%) -1.859***
(0.315)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) 0.289
(0.325)
Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
By year-state fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 83,174 66,711 66,711 66,130 58,642 66,711 22,789 66,711
Number of firm_ID 11,248 10,930 10,930 10,853 9,790 10,930 5,411 10,930
The dependent exit variable, is a dummy variable that takes 1 if plant i exits the market at period t + 1. The coefficients are obtained using a probit model with
instrumental variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By state by year fixed
effects are partial led out.
42
Chapter 2 • Import Competition and Manufacturing Plants Performance
Table 8: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Entry to Manufacturing Industry
Dependent Variable: Total 4 digit ISIC Industry Entrants
(1) (2) (3)
IMPCH -0.603*** -0.681*** -0.674***
(0.099) (0.094) (0.062)
IMP -0.727*** -0.719***
(0.051) (0.040)
Real Wage -0.305**
(0.147)
Real Exchange Rate 0.216***
(0.014)
Industry Fixed Effects ! ! !
Year Fixed Effects ! ! !
Observations 1,318 1,318 1,318
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4 digit ISIC industries.
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: The Impact of Chinese Import Competition on Skill Intensity
Dependent Variable: log Skill intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IMPCH -0.086 -0.056 -0.188 -0.021 -0.059 -0.612** 0.484** -0.071 -0.393
(0.455) (0.134) (0.178) (0.122) (0.117) (0.286) (0.222) (0.123) (0.250)
IMPCH*I(young) -0.132
(0.211)
IMPCH*I(Old) 0.132
(0.211)
IMPCH*I(Capital-Labor Ratio) 0.083***
(0.024)
IMPCH interacted by workers size
IMPCH*I(Big top 20%) -0.884
(0.657)
IMPCH*I(Small) 0.365
(0.451)
IMPCH*I(TFP) 0.117***
(0.039)
IMPCH interacted by Market Share
IMPCH*I(High Market Share ) -0.174
(0.451)
IMPCH*I(Low Market Share) -0.102
(0.423)
Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
By year-state fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 80,180 80,180 80,180 70,573 80,180 27,746 79,475 80,180 27,742
Number of firm_ID 11,583 11,583 11,583 10,510 11,583 5,801 11,529 11,583 5,800
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2368.9*** 86.9*** 112.5*** 273.6*** 215.1** 234.6*** 129.8*** 142.7*** 156.3***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By state by
year fixed effects are partial led out. For the Wald Statistic: *** = p < .05 less than 10% IV bias, ** = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias, *= p < .05 less than 20% IV bias
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A. Appendix
i. Data
Firm-level Data
In order to study the impact of Chinese import competition on Colombian plants performance, we match the trade data
with the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS). The (AMS), is an unbalanced panel that registers information
on all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more employees. The goal of AMS is to obtain basic information from
the industrial sector, which would provide facts about its structure, characteristics and evolution. The AMS provides
the annual information about the behavior, changes and evolution of the manufacturing industry in Colombia. This
information is obtained through a number of establishments, employed personnel, accrued remunerations (wages, salaries
and social contributions), gross and industrial output, intermediate consumption, value added, gross and net investment,
electricity consumed, fixed assets values, amongst others. The (AMS) is conducted by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica or DANE). For the purpose of this study, we have data covering
the 2000-2012 period, at an annual frequency. Even though the data on firms is available until the 2016, the reason to
carry out the analysis of this paper until 2012, is to avoid potential contamination in the import competition rate caused
by the entrance in force of the free trade agreement between Colombia and U.S.
Trade Data
The trade data used to compute the import competition measure were taken from the UNCOMTRADE database, initially
the trade data was downloaded as six-digit Harmonized System (HS) which is product-level data and then was converted
into its ISIC rev.3 version, which is 4 digit disaggregated industry-level data, by using the official correspondence table
from HS96 to ISIC rev.3 available at the United Nations website. We proceed in this way, because UNCOMTRADE
database is the only source of disaggregate trade data for Colombia, specifically was the only way to get four-digit
disaggregated trade industry level data.
ii. Additional Robustness Checks
Given that the main aim of this paper is to identify the casual effect of Chinese import competition on the performance of
manufacturing firms in a developing economy as Colombia, this objective of obtain such unbiased estimation is jeopardize
by the potential endogenity problem involved in our analysis. As we argue in the methodological section, is reasonable
to think that the Chinese Import competition measure is correlated to unobservable technology and demand shocks.
Moreover, such correlation may be stronger for products where both China’s and Colombia’s comparative advantages are
high, hence it might soften the competition effect.
As robustness check this paper also considers an additional instrumental variable (IV) strategy based on China
joining the WTO and the initial conditions. Since we are interested in capturing accelerating Chinese imports following
from the WTO accession, the instruments should capture this ’China’ driven component unrelated to the Colombian
imports demand factors. Moreover, since sectors in which China was already exporting in 1999 such as textiles, furniture
and toys are likely to be those where China had a comparative advantage and are also the sectors which experienced
much more rapid increase in import penetration in the subsequent years. Consequently, high exposure to Chinese imports
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prior to the China accession to the WTO as for instance in 1999 can be used as a potential instrument for subsequent
Chinese import growth. Moreover, this measure is interacted with the exogenous overall growth of Chinese imports,
calculated excluding the Colombian imports.
Therefore, the new instrument considered for the Chinese share of import penetration rate is the worldwide Chi-
nese imports interacted with the 1999 Chinese import share in the corresponding 4 digit ISIC industry in Colombia.
IV2 = (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) ∗ IMCHj99. By doing so, we get the cross-industry variation in the degree of Chinese import
competition.
Table 10: First Stage IV-2 Results
(1) (2)
Variables CH Import Competition CH Import Competition
IV2 = IMCHj99 ∗ (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) 0.075*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.011)
Year Fixed Effects !
Firm and Industry Controls !
Firm Fixed Effects ! !
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (p-value) 635.2 (0.00) 589.5 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 467.8*** 365.1***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by each industry and year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firms controls are: Age dummies and multiplant. Industry control: Import penetration No-China
To be a good instrument this new variable must meet the exogenity and relevance conditions. We argue that, the
worldwide Chinese imports must be exogenous from the perspective of Colombian manufacturing plants as it is driven
just by China. Furthermore the instrument is intuitively relevant given the correlation of China’s export expansion in
industries where it has already a comparative advantage, as is suggested by Amiti and Freund (2008)15.
Table 10, show the first stage results of the new instrument, all the coefficients are significant, all show a strong
correlation between the independent variable the Chinese import competition rate and the new instrument. Moreover,
regarding to the relevance and validity of instruments, the underidentification test, Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, rejected
the null hypothesis, indicating that the matrix is full column rank and the model is identified and the Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistic, in both models is larger indicating that IV2 = IMCHj99 ∗ (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) is a good instrument for the
Chinese import penetration rate.
Moreover, the results in table 11, allows to argue that the main results of this paper are robust to the several
instruments used to solve the intrinsic endogenity problem of Chinese import competition measure. Columns 1 and 2, as
in the main regression, suggest a negative impact of increasing Chinese import competition on the gross and industrial
outputs for an average manufacturing plant in Colombia. On the other hand, the coefficient in column 7, estimating
the effect of Chinese import competition on sales , confirm the previous insights about the no evidence of Chinese
15They argued that three quarters of the aggregate growth of Chinese imports was from the expansion of existing
products rather than from adding new products.
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competition affecting manufacturing sales. Putting together these two results regarding outputs and sales, this paper
suggest a possible change of profit strategy among plants, moving from producing to resell activities decreasing in turn
its value added as is shown in column 6.
Regarding to employment, the results do not find evidence to suggest a negative affect of Chinese competition for
an average plant. Furthermore, skill upgrading is not a response of an average manufacturing plant in Colombia to
increasing Chinese competition. Finally, the finding of a negative effect of Chinese import competition on a average
plant’s productivity is robust to considering a different instrument.
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iii. Additional Descriptive Statistics, Variables Definition and Calculations
Table 12: Distribution of Plants by 4 digit ISIC.Rev.3 Industries
ISIC.Rev.3 Freq. Percent ISIC.Rev.3 Freq. Percent ISIC.Rev.3 Freq. Percent ISIC.Rev.3 Freq. Percent
1511 2,081 2.01 1926 542 0.52 2430 37 0.04 2926 80 0.08
1512 168 0.16 1929 124 0.12 2511 74 0.07 2927 2 0.00
1521 666 0.64 1931 531 0.51 2512 185 0.18 2929 1,280 1.23
1522 660 0.64 1932 122 0.12 2513 57 0.05 2930 281 0.27
1530 1,681 1.62 1939 75 0.07 2519 647 0.62 3000 9 0.01
1541 1,649 1.59 2010 612 0.59 2521 1,491 1.44 3110 427 0.41
1542 150 0.14 2020 186 0.18 2529 4,452 4.29 3120 415 0.40
1543 740 0.71 2030 286 0.28 2610 757 0.73 3130 36 0.03
1551 6,109 5.89 2040 233 0.22 2691 82 0.08 3140 68 0.07
1552 241 0.23 2090 466 0.45 2692 123 0.12 3150 425 0.41
1561 681 0.66 2101 424 0.41 2693 1,211 1.17 3190 330 0.32
1562 23 0.02 2102 1,184 1.14 2694 285 0.27 3210 112 0.11
1563 293 0.28 2109 1,324 1.28 2695 1,425 1.37 3220 2 0.00
1564 238 0.23 2211 753 0.73 2696 339 0.33 3230 48 0.05
1571 137 0.13 2212 414 0.40 2699 975 0.94 3311 1,117 1.08
1572 122 0.12 2213 50 0.05 2710 1,302 1.26 3312 234 0.23
1581 693 0.67 2219 421 0.41 2721 58 0.06 3313 2 0.00
1589 2,834 2.73 2220 3,231 3.12 2729 426 0.41 3320 88 0.08
1591 269 0.26 2231 164 0.16 2731 64 0.06 3330 1 0.00
1592 195 0.19 2232 180 0.17 2732 145 0.14 3410 130 0.13
1593 25 0.02 2233 452 0.44 2811 2,197 2.12 3420 742 0.72
1594 870 0.84 2234 80 0.08 2812 153 0.15 3430 1,134 1.09
1600 30 0.03 2239 1 0.00 2813 88 0.08 3511 2 0.00
1710 192 0.19 2240 1 0.00 2891 3 0.00 3512 38 0.04
1720 497 0.48 2310 25 0.02 2892 625 0.60 3520 1 0.00
1730 1,137 1.10 2321 45 0.04 2893 512 0.49 3530 63 0.06
1741 803 0.77 2322 313 0.30 2899 2,823 2.72 3591 156 0.15
1742 119 0.11 2323 50 0.05 2911 1 0.00 3592 71 0.07
1743 137 0.13 2330 209 0.20 2912 399 0.38 3599 207 0.20
1749 716 0.69 2411 984 0.95 2913 192 0.19 3611 1,669 1.61
1750 1,168 1.13 2412 361 0.35 2914 130 0.13 3612 1,364 1.32
1810 10,254 9.89 2413 278 0.27 2915 204 0.20 3613 568 0.55
1820 52 0.05 2414 27 0.03 2919 1,599 1.54 3614 686 0.66
1910 453 0.44 2421 334 0.32 2921 374 0.36 3619 467 0.45
1921 1,701 1.64 2422 742 0.72 2922 329 0.32 3691 135 0.13
1922 133 0.13 2423 1,914 1.85 2923 2 0.00 3693 768 0.74
1923 3 0.00 2424 1,840 1.77 2924 181 0.17 3694 221 0.21
1924 214 0.21 2429 1,158 1.12 2925 371 0.36 3699 7,425 7.16
1925 291 0.28 Total 103,683 100.00
Note: Author own calculations. Each plant was matched to its unique industry category, classified following the International Standard Industrial Classification,
ISIC Rev.3. Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM), conducted by the Colombian
Bureau of Statistics, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE.
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Table 13: Distribution of Plants by Two Digit ISIC Industries
Industry ISIC 2 digit Code Number of Plants Percent
Manufacture of food and beverage 15 20,525 19.80
Manufacture of tobacco products 16 30 0.03
Manufacture of textiles 17 4,769 4.60
Manufacture of wearing apparel 18 10,306 9.94
Tanning and dressing of leather 19 4,189 4.04
Manufacture of wood and of products 20 1,783 1.72
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 2,932 2.83
Publishing, printing and reproduction 22 5,747 5.54
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 23 642 0.62
Manufacture of chemicals 24 7,675 7.40
Manufacture of rubber and plastics 25 6,906 6.66
Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 26 5,197 5.01
Manufacture of basic metals 27 1,995 1.92
Manufacture of fabricated metal prod. 28 6,401 6.17
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 5,425 5.23
Manufacture of office and computing 30 9 0.01
Manufacture of electrical machinery 31 1,701 1.64
Manufacture of radio, television 32 162 0.16
Manufacture of medical instruments 33 1,442 1.39
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 2,006 1.93
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 538 0.52
Furniture and Others 36 13,303 12.83
Total 103,683 100.00
Note: Author own calculations. Each plant was matched to its unique industry category, classified following the International Standard Industrial Classification,
ISIC Rev.3. Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM), conducted by the Colombian
Bureau of Statistics, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE.
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Table 14: Evolution of Chinese Import Penetration Rate for each 2 Digit Industries
Industry 2 Digit Code 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Manufacture of food products and bevera 15 .00004 .00048 .00140 .02446 .01791 .02892 .04255
Manufacture of tobacco products 16 . . . . 3.51e-06 . .
Manufacture of textiles 17 .00779 .01667 .03026 .02996 .07368 .11349 .26803
Manufacture of wearing apparel 18 .00139 .02858 .04381 .06454 .09632 .12678 .29905
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufa 19 .00009 .02858 .04381 .06454 .09632 .12678 .00399
Manufacture of wood and of products of 20 .00026 .00110 .00198 .01109 .01711 .01268 .01312
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 .00018 .00062 .00333 .00225 .00444 .00503 .00875
Publishing, printing and reproduction o 22 .00130 .00288 .00832 .00579 .00647 .01163 .01815
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 23 0 .00304 .01032 .00654 .00569 0 0
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical p 24 .00433 .00768 .01573 .02075 .04414 .03841 .06145
Manufacture of rubber and plastics prod 25 .02855 .02040 .04267 .07973 .08922 .13838 .17824
Manufacture of other non-metallic miner 26 .00304 .00370 .02204 .06220 .08568 .09779 .12706
Manufacture of basic metals 27 .00189 .00312 .00726 .04127 .17265 .13120 .19890
Manufacture of fabricated metal product 28 .00836 .01461 .04251 .05496 .09190 .08983 .13536
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 .00942 .02035 .08222 .10304 .21550 .26073 .35509
Manufacture of office and computing mac 30 .07647 . . . . . .
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 31 .03965 .08706 .12779 .17350 .24537 .27314 .38037
Manufacture of radio, television and co 32 .09125 .11437 .31162 .36033 .33135 .26233 .22179
Manufacture of medical and optical inst 33 .00748 .02974 .07561 .12179 .13004 .17428 .22055
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 .00148 .00389 .01403 .05828 .07582 .07884 .
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 .02716 .06521 .05233 .26422 .17995 .18530 .06345
Furniture and Others 36 .11268 .13742 .18339 .23728 .31049 .32573 .69474
Note: Author own calculations. The values correspond to the simple industry average of Chinese Import Penetration Rate, calculated as in section V equation 1.
Each plant was matched to its unique industry category, classified following the International Standard Industrial Classification, ISIC Rev.3. Data on plants
comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM) and trade data comes from UNCONTRADE.
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iii.1 Import Competition Measures for Colombian Industries
Chinese Import Penetration Rate
A measure of Chinese import competition for Colombian firms was built as the Chinese share of the import penetration
for the matched industry, following Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006):
IMPCHjt =
Mchjt
Mj00 + Qj00 − Xj00 (6)
Where, Mchjt denotes the value of imports of industry j coming from China to Colombia at period t. M, Q and X denote
total Colombian imports, production and exports, respectively at the initial year 2000.
Import Competition Rate Excluding China
Another measure of import competition for Colombian firms was built, as following:
IMPNCHjt =
Mwjt −Mchjt
Mj00 + Qj00 − Xj00 (7)
Where, the numerator denotes the value of total Colombian imports of industry j at period t, excluding those coming from
China, for the respective industry. M, Q and X denote total Colombian imports, production and exports, respectively at
the initial year 2000.
Total Import Competition Rate
Finally, we also might use the following total import competition measure:
IMPWjt =
Mwjt
Mj00 + Qj00 − Xj00 (8)
Where, Mwjt denotes the value of total imports of industry j at period t. M, Q and X denote total Colombian imports,
production and exports, respectively at the initial year 2000.
Colombia’s Top Trading Partners and Exporting Markets
According to the OCDE, Colombia is the 55th largest export economy in the world. In 2016, Colombia exported $32.9B
and imported $43.2B, resulting in a negative trade balance of $10.3B. In 2016 the GDP of Colombia was $282B and its
GDP per capita was $14.2k.
The top exports of Colombia are Crude Petroleum (25%), Coal Briquettes (16.5%), Coffee (7.8%), Refined Petroleum
(5.9%) and Gold (4.2%), using the 1992 revision of the HS (Harmonized System) classification. Its top imports are Refined
Petroleum (7.6%), Cars (4.2%), Packaged Medicaments (2.89%), Broadcasting Equipment (2.8%) and Computers (2.56%).
The top export destinations of Colombia are the United States (31.9%), Panama (5.8%), the Netherlands (4.6%),
Ecuador (3.7%) and Spain (3.6%). The top import origins are the United States (26.8%), China (19.6%), Mexico (7.8%), Brazil
(5%) and Germany (3.88%).
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Figure 4: Evolution of Colombian top Importers
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE
53
Chapter 2 • Import Competition and Manufacturing Plants Performance
Figure 5: Evolution of Colombian top Exports Destination
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE. The European Union includes the followings Countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and United Kingdom. Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cost Rica, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Table 15: Trade Agreements of Colombia
Multilateral Agreements
Agreement-Partner(s) Date of Signature
WTO members 30 April 1995Âa˘
Customs Unions
Agreement-Partner(s) Date of Signature
Andean Community 26 May 1969
Free Trade Agreements
Agreement-Partner(s) Date of Signature Date of Entry into Force
Pacific Alliance 10 February 2014 01 May 2016
Costa Rica 05 May 2013 01 August 2016
Republic of Korea 21 February 2013 15 July 2016
European Union 26 June 2012
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 25 November 2008 01 July 2011
Canada 21 November 2008 15 August 2011
Northem Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) 09 August 2007
Chile 27 November 2006 08 May 2009
United States of America 22 November 2006 15 May 2012
Mexico 13 June 1994
Preferential Trade Agreements
Agreement-Partner(s) Date of Signature Date of Entry into Force
Venezuela (AAP.C N. 28) 28 November 2011 19 October 2012
Colombia - Ecuador - Venezuela - MERCOSUR (AAP.CE N. 59) 18 October 2004
CARICOM (AAP.A25TM N.31) 24 July 1994 01 January 1995
Panama (AAP.AT25TM N. 29) 09 July 1993 18 January 1995
Nicaragua (AAP.AT25TM N. 6) 02 March 1984
Costa Rica (AAP.A25TM N. 7) 02 March 1984
Economic Association Agreements
Agreement-Partner(s) Date of Signature
MERCOSUR AAP.CE N. 72 21 July 2017
Free Trade Agreements signed but not in force
Agreement-Partner(s) Âa˘ Date of Signature
Israel 30 September 2013
Panama 20 September 2013
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Table 16: Plants Characteristics 2000-2012
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Energy (kwh) 82,537 1.645e+06 1.141e+07 0 5.301e+08
Gross Output 82,537 1.584e+07 9.343e+07 1,932 5.839e+09
Industrial Output 82,537 1.580e+07 9.344e+07 0 5.875e+09
Intermediate Consumption 82,537 9.202e+06 5.322e+07 0 3.765e+09
Wages 82,537 657,189 1.826e+06 0 5.083e+07
Gross Investment 82,537 608,580 7.911e+06 -1.110e+09 6.569e+08
Fixed Assets 82,537 9.841e+06 5.885e+07 0 3.308e+09
Total Workforce 96,806 76.92 149.3 0 2,949
Direct Workers 104,036 44.17 88.35 0 1,754
Value Added 82,537 6.635e+06 4.445e+07 36 2.537e+09
Input Value 75,307 8.595e+06 5.324e+07 0 3.650e+09
Sales 82,537 1.592e+07 9.253e+07 0 6.030e+09
Export 104,036 0.327 0.469 0 1
Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (AMS), conducted by the Colombian Bureau of
Statistics, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE. Monetary values are expressed in thousand COP and deflated using its corresponding
price index.
Plant Entry and Exit within the Annual Manufacturing Survey 2000-2012
In order to identify the plants that exit or entry from our dataset, during the 2000-2012 period, we proceed as follows.
First, we balanced the dataset, using the fillin command, in order to Rectangularize the panel data set, running the
command: fillin firm_ID year. Giving that, _fillin is 1 for observations created by using fillin and 0 for previously
existing observations. we can defined an operate variable as:
bys firm_ID: gen operate=1 if _fillin==0
bys firm_ID: replace operate=0 if _fillin==1
Then we defined, as Entry and Exit, respectively:
bys firm_ID: gen entry=0
bys firm_ID: replace entry=1 if operate[_n-1]==0 & operate[_n]==1 & year!=2000
bys firm_ID: gen exit=0
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bys firm_ID: replace exit=1 if operate[_n]==1 & operate[_n+1]==0
Table 17: Percentage of Plants that Entered and Exited. AMS 2000-2012
Exit and Entrants
Year % of Entrants % Exited
2000 0 4.01
2001 1.95 3.49
2002 2.93 2.87
2003 5.36 3.01
2004 3.14 2.35
2005 4.31 3.10
2006 2.00 3.24
2007 2.47 2.92
2008 7.73 3.36
2009 11.88 3.67
2010 9.46 3.67
2011 2.70 4.06
2012 1.40 0
Estimating Production Function for Plants at AMS 2000-2012
Before estimating production function for plants at AMS 2000-2012, we deflected nominal values using its corresponding
available deflector. In that sense, the variables: gross_output ind_output value_added sales, were deflected by the
manufacturing sector PPI. In the case of the variables: gross_investment fixed_assets were deflected using the capital
goods PPI. Moreover, the variables val_inputs interm_consump were deflected using the intermediate consumption PPI.
Finally, for the wages variable we used the CPI deflector.
We estimate the following Cobb Douglas production function for plant i at time t:
yit = α+ witβ+ kitγ+ωit + eit (9)
where yit is the log value added , w it is a 1 ∗ J vector of log free variables (labor) and k it is a 1 ∗ K vector of log
state variables (capital). The random component ω it is the unobservable productivity or technical efficiency and e it is
an idiosyncratic output shock distributed as white noise. According to Olley and Pakes, we assume that productivity
evolves according to a first-order Markov process.
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Stata Estimation
We implemented an slightly different version of the Olley and Pakes approach to estimate a Cobb Douglas production
function with the Stata command prodest, using the method O.P. but instead of use the investments as proxy, we used
the intermediate consumption variable, which accounts for the total intermediate materials employed by the firms to
produce their goods. Moreover, in some specifications we control for firm exit and whether the firm exports. The baseline
command is showed below.
prodest lvalue_added_df, free(ltot_workforce) state(lactivfi_df)
proxy(linterm_consump_df) va met(op) reps(40) id(firm_ID) t(year) attrition
Table 18: Production Function Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables lvalue_added lvalue_added lvalue_added lvalue_added
ltot_workforce 0.500*** 0.486***
(0.011) (0.010)
lworkers 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.007) (0.006)
lfixed_assets 0.387*** 0.388*** 0.370*** 0.388***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
export ! !
exit ! ! ! !
Observations 66,043 74,440 66,043 74,440
Number of groups 12,892 13,812 12,892 13,812
Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimating Productivity (TFP) for Plants at AMS 2000-2012
We now use our production function estimates to construct the plant specific productivity level, which can be calculated
as:
t f pit = exp(yit − βˆl lit − βˆkkit) (10)
Where the parameter estimates βˆl and βˆk , are taken from columm (3) in table 18. Moreover, an aggregated 4 digit ISIC
manufacturing industry productivity, was calculated annually as the mean weighted average of each plant belonging to
such industry, using plant output share over total industry output as weights. Proceeding in the same way, we calculated
the mean weighted average for each two digit ISIC manufacturing industry. The below graphs shows the productivity
evolution of some selected two digit industries.
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Table 19: Average 2 Digit Industry TFP in 2000 and 2012
2000 2012
Industry 2 Digit Code Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Manufacture of food products and beverage 15 1,631 4.953 .9046 1,796 4.927 .9738
Manufacture of tobacco products 16 3 5.383 0 0
Manufacture of textiles 17 351 4.862 .9094 801 4.730 .8030
Manufacture of wearing apparel 18 58 5.192 .8546 976 4.971 .9520
Tanning and dressing of leather 19 293 4.793 .7562 309 4.657 .9142
Manufacture of wood and of products of 20 100 4.549 .8629 189 4.729 .8262
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 151 4.968 .7286 578 4.794 .7944
Publishing, printing and reproduction o 22 428 4.882 .9680 206 5.352 1.056
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 23 5 6.050 .7542 252 5.536 1.067
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical p 24 379 5.322 .9294 461 5.321 .9188
Manufacture of rubber and plastics prod 25 97 4.735 .8089 200 4.731 .8006
Manufacture of other non-metallic miner 26 288 4.668 .8607 517 4.847 .9674
Manufacture of basic metals 27 248 4.836 .8471 164 4.937 1.019
Manufacture of fabricated metal product 28 316 4.759 .7296 394 4.835 .8855
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 424 4.782 .7778 412 4.847 .9137
Manufacture of office and computing mac 30 3 4.945 .478 0
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 31 19 5.002 .6051 153 4.965 .9638
Manufacture of radio, television and co 32 17 4.849 .8395 0
Manufacture of medical and optical inst 33 288 4.780 .7740 575 4.968 1.073
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 27 4.717 .8540 183 4.881 .8538
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 21 5.139 .5018 76 4.969 1.033
Furniture and Others 36 1,984 4.896 .9180 916 4.699 .916
Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM). Specify plant productivity calculated
according to equation (10). The variable reported here for the years 2000 and 2012, correspond to the log transformation of TFP.
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Table 21: Frequency Distribution of the Data across all States in Colombia
State Total Obs Share %
Antioquia 20,680 19.89
Atlantico 4,740 4.56
Bogota 37,578 36.14
Bolivar 1,608 1.55
Boyaca 787 0.76
Caldas 2208 2.12
Cauca 1,343 1.29
Cesar 413 0.40
Cordoba 372 0.36
Cundinamarca 4,908 4.72
Huila 690 0.66
Magdalena 670 0.64
Meta 660 0.63
Narino 744 0.72
Norte de Santander 1,887 1.81
Quindio 810 0.78
Risaralda 2463 2.37
Santander 4,895 4.71
Sucre 182 0.18
Tolima 1,546 1.49
Valle del Cauca 14,496 13.94
Casanare 91 0.09
Vichada 212 0.20
Total 103,983 100
Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (AMS), conducted by the Colombian Bureau of
Statistics, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE.
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Table 22: Local Labor Markets in States of Colombia in 2000
State Total Employment Number of firms Firm Av. Size
Antioquia 128305 273 84.97
Atlantico 35827 101 90.24
Bogota 157201 402 69.58
Bolivar 11610 29 87.29
Boyaca 5766 8 115.32
Caldas 13423 32 69.54
Cauca 6813 13 72.47
Cesar 2769 4 89.32
Cordoba 2227 5 71.83
Cundinamarca 31498 42 111.30
Huila 1821 7 36.42
Magdalena 2084 14 39.32
Meta 3245 6 67.60
Narino 2553 16 43.27
Norte de Santander 4962 40 28.51
Quindio 1920 16 25.26
Risaralda 15652 42 74.53
Santander 640 78 38.10
Sucre 7575 4 40
Tolima 80418 34 50.83
Valle del Cauca 81865 215 80.74
Casanare 482 10 82.60
Vichada 303 7 14.42
Author’s own calculation. Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM).
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Table 23: Employment, Firm size and number of Firms across Industries in 2000
Two digit Industry Industry Code Total Employment Num. firms Firm Av. Size
Manufacture of food products and beverage 15 122701 288 78.50
Manufacture of tobacco products 16 60 3 20
Manufacture of textiles 17 42450 66 133.91
Manufacture of wearing apparel 18 67853 126 86.65
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture 19 15266 89 46.26
Manufacture of wood and of products of 20 4108 15 39.5
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 18486 40 77.34
Publishing, printing and reproduction o 22 20923 70 60.82
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 23 2000 8 74.07
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical p 24 48718 74 100.65
Manufacture of rubber and plastics prod 25 32812 64 71.33
Manufacture of other non-metallic miner 26 25615 61 70.56
Manufacture of basic metals 27 11484 29 90.42
Manufacture of fabricated metal product 28 20216 70 50.03
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 18143 78 51.54
Manufacture of office and computing mac 30 29 1 29
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 31 8175 19 62.88
Manufacture of radio, television and co 32 1853 3 115.81
Manufacture of medical and optical inst 33 2519 24 42.69
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 8425 17 65.82
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 3436 8 88.10
Furniture and Others 36 59134 291 60.40
Data on plants comes from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM) and trade data comes from UNCONTRADE.
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Does Import Competition Discourages Innovation
Efforts of Manufacturing Firms? Evidence for a
Developing Economy.
Victor Zapata∗
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of intensified Chinese import competition on the innovation
inputs and outputs of a developing economy, using a novel and rich data for Colombian
manufacturing firms. Finding that, on average heightened Chinese import competition triggers
a negative effect on the innovation inputs and outputs of manufacturing firms. Considering
several dimensions of heterogenity across firms, we find that, while initially less productive
and less profitable firms significantly reduced in greater extent their R&D spending, training
investments, and the number of workers devoted to R&D activities. More productive firms
are more likely to innovate in response to Chinese import competition, specially by increasing
the registers of intellectual property rights. Moreover, for relative bigger firms the training
and R&D investments are more negative affected by Chinese import competition. Whereas, for
initially smaller firms, the production of intellectual property rights is more negative affected
when facing increasing Chinese import competition. These results are robust after addressing
the simultaneity bias between imports demand or technology shocks and innovation activities
as well as after controlling for the within industries differences in innovation patterns.
JEL Classification: F14 F6, O3, O54
Keywords: Innovation Output, R&D Investment, Intellectual Property Right, Import
Penetration Rate, Trade Policy, Innovation Input, R&D activities.
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I. Introduction
The accession of China to the WTO in 2001, represents one of the most important
phenomenon in international trade. Just ten year later, by 2011 China overtook Germany
to become the world’s largest manufacturing exporter, having increased its share in world
exports to almost 16% up from around 3% in 1999, exerting a tremendous competitive
pressures on the rest of world economies. (Hanson, 2012).
Substantial evidence now suggests that an exposure to Chinese import competition
may have adverse effects on several dimensions of manufacturing firms in developed
countries, including the survival rate of manufacturing plants (Bernard et al., 2006), large
contraction in manufacturing employment (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Pierce and Schott,
2016), depressing wages and the employment prospects for occupations and skills which
can be substituted from Chinese goods (David et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Utar,
2014; Autor et al., 2016). Similarly, there is an other stream of literature that studies
the effect of Chinese import competition on the performance of manufacturing firms in
developing economics. However, this growing literature, have mainly focused on the
effect of increasing Chinese import competition for Mexican maquiladoras competing in
the U.S market. For instance, Utar and Ruiz (2013) argued that Competition from China
has negative and significant impact on employment and plant growth, both through the
intensive and the extensive margin, on the most unskilled labor intensive sectors, leading
to sectoral reallocation. Furthermore, Iacovone et al. (2013), Chinese import penetration
reduces sales of smaller Mexican plants and more marginal products and they are more
likely to cease. Moreover, in the case of Colombian firms, the only reference on the
implications of international competition on manufacturing firm performance, has been
presented by Zapata (2018) finding that competition from China has negative impact on
employment, sales and value added. Additionally, encourages plant exit and discourages
entry, whereas, skill upgrading only occurs in more productive and more capital-intensive
plants.
However, the impact of import competition from China on innovation has far compa-
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rably received less attention. Just until very recent years this topic began to be considered.
The awareness of the importance of analyzing the effect of import competition on inno-
vation is crucial, since manufacturing still generates the majority of R&D spending and
innovation, the relationship between international competition and the creation of new
or improvement of products and production processes, is thus one of most important
strategies to cope with international import competition for the rest of economies. In this
regard, have emerged a debated derived from mixed evidence on the effects of Chinese
import competition on innovation of two prominent papers. Collecting data for a large
sample of European firms, Bloom et al. (2016) find that innovating firms have actively
responded to the intensified Chinese import competition by increasing a wider range
of innovative activities including patenting, research and development expenditures,
computer usage, and TFP growth. The contradictory evidence is presented in the study
of Dorn et al. (2016) arguing that Chinese import competition does actually lead to not
only a decline in patenting by U.S. firms but also the profitability and R&D investment in
the affected industries.
Contrary to the existing works on import competition and innovation, the aim of this
paper, is to investigate the impact of import competition from China on the innovation
inputs and outputs of Manufacturing firm in developing economies, specifically using
firm-level data for manufacturing firms in Colombia. We construct a rich database
that gather information for each single firm about, trade at performing industry level,
innovation indicators at firm specific level and firms characteristics. As identification
strategy, this study exploits the exogenous intensification of Chinese import competition
and the fact that not all firms in its determined industry are not exposed to import
competition in the same degree, this setting yields an unparalleled opportunity to examine
the innovative behavior of firms under the threat of import competition. Moreover, using
a valid instrumental approach, we are able to present results that allow us to inference a
causal effect of competition from China on manufacturing firms’ innovation indicators.
Additional to the previous mentioned two papers, this study is closely related to an
emerging literature on the impacts of import competition on innovation related outcomes
for manufacturing firms. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) argued that industry leaders
3
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invest and innovate more in response to exogenous changes in Chinese competition.
Moreover, Xu and Gong (2017) find that import competition induces R&D expenditures
to be reallocated towards more productive and more profitable firms within each industry.
Such reallocation effect has the potential to offset the average drop in firm-level R&D.
Lastly, Kueng et al. (2016) find that firms in industries more affected by Chinese import
competition experience a strong decline in innovation outcomes, especially in process
innovations.
The contribution of this paper to the stream of literature analyzing the effect of Chinese
import competition on innovation, is threefold: first, this study extended the analysis
on the effect of import competition on innovation by considering a broad dimension of
innovation indicators that accounts for both inputs and outputs such specialized training
investment, workers engaged in R&D activities, and intellectual property rights different
to patenting that are also, outcomes of innovation efforts carried out by the firms. The
broad definition of property rights include the development of new Softwares, Industrial
Designs, Copyrights, Patent and Utility Models. Moreover, by consider these broad
category of innovation outputs, we are able to have a more comprehensive measure
of innovations that is intuitively more accurate for the case of manufacturing firms
in developing economies as Colombia. In addition to analyze the effect of Chinese
competition on innovation inputs and outputs, this paper –in contrast to the existing
literature– also considers particular innovation inputs as the training investment and
the number of workers engaged in the R&D sector within firm, as main complementary
strategies to R&D investments that are fundamental for the innovation process.
Second, in order to identify the impact of heightened Chinese import competition on
innovation of manufacturing firms in Colombia1, the identification strategy rely on an
instrumental variable approach to deal with the endogenity problem that arises, due to
factors such as demand or technology shocks for particular products or industries in the
domestic market can be correlated with the firm innovation indicators. In that sense this
1One potential advantage of using data for Colombian manufacturing firms is derived from the fact that final tariff
rates were exogenously predetermined (Attanasio et al., 2004) and the country was fully integrated to the world economy
when the China accession to the WTO took place in December 2001.
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study is able to identify the causal effect of Chinese import competition on innovation
indicators of manufacturings firms.
Third, this paper represent the first attempt to understand the effect of increasing Chi-
nese import competition on the innovation efforts in developing economies approximated
by the results obtained using data on Colombian firms, in that sense it contributes to fill
the gap in the literature about this topic by analyzing the impact of intensified Chinese
competition on innovation inputs and outputs of manufacturing firms performing in
a different environment other than to the high income economies case. Although, the
R&D spending as a share of GDP is quiet low among this category of countries, is pretty
interesting to analyze whether and in which magnitude the competition from China may
discourage moderate innovation inputs and outputs among developing countries, where
financial depth, the protection of intellectual property rights, the government capacity to
mobilize resources and the quality of research institutions are weaknesses that potentially
may become innovative firms more vulnerable to trade-shocks as the China-shock.
This study finds that excepting for the case of R&D workers, the average effect
of Chinese import competition on the innovation inputs and outputs of Colombian
manufacturing is negative and statistically significant. Suggesting that increasing import
competition form China is discouraging innovation efforts of manufacturing firms in
Colombia. However, these on average results conceal very heterogeneous responses for
different types of firms with diverse initial characteristics. In this respect, the innovation
indicators of initially less productive and less profitable firms, are more negative affected
by Chinese imports competition, firms in these groups significantly reduced in greater
extent their R&D and training investments, as well as the number of workers devoted
to R&D activities. In terms of size, the results suggest that among relative bigger
firms innovations inputs such as, specialized training and R&D investments are more
negative affected by Chinese import competition. However, regarding to production of
intellectual property rights are the initially smaller firms more negative affected when
facing increasing Chinese import competition.
Furthermore, regarding to firms with different productivity level, we find that, while
Chinese import competition specially affects innovation inputs among initially less pro-
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ductive firms rather than innovation outputs, since these types of firms in presence of
import competition reduce their R&D investment, cut the number of workers in R&D
activities and scaled back the specialized training investment. More productive firms
innovate more in response to the China trade shock, specially by increasing the broad
categories of intellectual property rights (when considering not only patents).
The results presented in this paper complement the findings of the previous study
about the effect of Chinese import competition on Colombian manufacturing firms. It
allows to argue that greater Chinese import competition for manufacturing firms triggers
a more general decline in their profitability, thereby reducing incentives to innovate and
invest in R&D. The contraction along all margins of firm’s innovation suggest that the
primary response of firms to greater import competition from China is to cut back their
innovation related investments.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section presents the economic theory about
the relationship between competition and the innovation process. Section II, presents the
theoretical consideration to address the impact of Chinese competition on innovation.
Section III, contain a detail description of the data used in this paper and it explains how
the dataset was built. Additionally, it also present a review on the innovation dynamics
of manufacturing firms in Colombia. Section IV, introduces the methodological approach
and the identification strategy. Finally sections V, present the results analysis, followed by
concluding remarks and discussion in section VI.
II. Economic Theory of Competition and Innovation
The incentive to innovate is the difference in profit that a firm can earn if it invests in
R&D compared to what it would earn if it did not invest. These incentives depend upon
many factors including: the characteristics of the invention, the strength of intellectual
property protection, the extent of competition before and after innovation, barriers to
entry in production, R&D investments and the dynamics of R&D sector. The incentive to
innovate clearly depends on the nature of rights to successful innovation. If an innovator
can not exclude imitators or prevent independent discovery of similar ideas, this reduces
6
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the benefit from innovating, holding constant any spillover effects from others’ innovation
efforts. Economic theory does not offer a prediction about the effects of competition on
innovation that is robust to all of these different market and technological conditions.
Therefore, the study of how import competition and innovation and how these relationship
may differ across countries, competitive structures and firms heterogeneity is relevant in
actual understanding of the "gains" of trade.
The pioneer paper of Schumpeter (1942) claim that high competition can decrease
innovation by significantly reducing a firm’s post-innovation rents. In standard oligopoly
models, a more competitive product market tends to generate lower investment in innova-
tive activity (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). The underlying mechanism is straightforward:
more competition means lower profits and reduced incentives to invest. The competition-
innovation relationship becomes more complex once allowing for firm heterogeneity.
According to Aghion et al. (2005) the relationship between competition and innovation
follows an inverted U shape. Innovation is relatively low when firms are either too dissim-
ilar, such that laggards are unable to overtake leaders, or at the opposite extreme where
competition is close to perfect competition, there is almost no room for rent capture. At
intermediate levels of competition, post-innovation rents may exceed rents pre-innovation,
resulting in relatively high levels of investment in R&D in these market segments.
Bloom et al. (2013) introduced a theoretical model of international competition and
innovation. They argued that, before to the China-shock, there are "trapped" factors of
production protected by trade barriers, employed by firms in developed economies in the
production of old goods. When import barriers are lowered, China starts exporting and
the profitability of making old goods falls. Causing in turn, a decrease of the opportunity
cost of the trapped factors, meaning that the cost of producing new goods with these
production factors also falls and therefore the combination of both mechanism result
in reducing the costs of innovation and increases the profitability of innovation. An
similar mechanism operates in Bloom et al. (2014), who consider incumbent firms facing
an exogenous increase in import penetration. If moving costs temporarily "trap" some
productive factors inside firms, then an increase in product-market competition lowers the
cost of using these factors from production to innovation. Consequently, greater import
7
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competition may lead to accelerated productivity growth.
On the other hand, in a different modeling framework, Thoenig and Verdier (2003) pos-
tulates that firms in developed countries innovate more by upgrading their technologies
when they are more exposed to low-cost import competitions. Moreover, high competition
can decrease innovation by lowering firm’s internal resources for innovation (Hall and
Lerner, 2010), by encourage a competitive entrant to innovate without displacing its
own profits (Arrow, 1972), and by enabling a firm to become a technological leader via
innovation and thus escape from competition (Aghion et al., 2001).
Given these mixed predictions of the impact of competition on firm innovation
resulting in the absence of a clear theoretical guidance, the effects of Chinese import
competition is an intrinsically empirical question, specially in the case of developing
economies.
III. Data
The dataset was built by first matching the industry level trade data to Colombian
manufacturing industries in order to create measures of Chinese import penetration.
The second step was, to match this industry trade data with The Development and
Technological Innovation Industrial Survey of Colombian manufacturing firms, using
the firms industry affiliation, in order to obtain detailed information on innovation and
technological change activities conducted by manufacturing firms in Colombia. Jointly, the
resulting data allows to analyze the impact of industry-level Chinese import competition
shock on firm-level innovation related activities and indicators.
i. Trade Data
The trade data used to compute the import competition measure was taken from the UN-
COMTRADE database, initially the trade data was downloaded as six-digit Harmonized
System (HS) which is product-level data and then was converted into its ISIC rev.3 version,
which is 4 digit disaggregated industry-level data, by using the official correspondence
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table from HS96 to ISIC rev.3 available at the United Nations website.2
A measure of Chinese import competition for Colombian firms was built as the
Chinese share of the import penetration for the matched industry, following Bernard et al.
(2006):
IMPCHjt =
Mchjt
Mj04 + Qj04 − Xj04 (1)
Where, Mchjt denotes the value of imports of industry j coming from China to Colombia
at period t. M, Q and X denote total Colombian imports, production and exports,
respectively at the initial year 2004.
Import penetration rate indicate to what degree domestic demand is satisfied by
imports from China. As the previous study of Zapata (2018), analyzing the effect of
Chinese competition on the performance of manufacturing firms in Colombia. Domestic
demand supplied by imports from China exhibited a dynamic increase since 2003, scaling
up to almost dominated as a source of imports in the traditional labor-intensive sectors
such as clothing, footwear and other manufactures. By 2012 China extended its penetration
to relative high-technology sectors as electronic and machinery, where Chinese imports
accounts almost for the 40% of the Colombian demand for products within this industries.
ii. Firm-level data and Innovation indicators
The data about innovation inputs and outputs comes from the Survey of Development and
Technological Innovation for Colombian Manufacturing Firms. EDITH. The aim of EDITH
is to establish a statistical framework to identify the technical features and dynamics of
the technological development of Colombian manufacturing firms. By reporting variables
that directly and indirectly affect the creation of new products, processes, marketing
techniques and forms of organization, or their substantial improvement, as well as, its
impact on the economy. The innovation survey for the manufacturing industry is carried
out every two years and includes detailed information on innovation outputs and inputs,
types of innovation, objectives when investing and developing innovations, investment on
2We proceed in this way, because UNCOMTRADE database is the only source of disaggregate trade data for Colombia,
specifically was the only way to get four-digit disaggregated trade industry level data.
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innovation activities, sources of ideas, obstacles to innovation, financial sources, access to
public funding, relations to other actors of the innovation system and intellectual property.
The survey began to be carried out consistently by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE in 2005, taking 2003 and 2004
as reference period. During 2009, the DANE carried out an improvement in the data
capturing instrument, through the redesign of the collection questionnaire, in accordance
with the standards found in the international manuals on measurement of Science,
Technology and Health indicators. The result is a significantly improved form, oriented
to guarantee, a decrease in the attrition of the source during the filling process, and on
the other hand, an increase in the quality of the data.
In order to obtain very detailed firm-level database that gathers information on
innovation and technological activities developed by manufacturing firms in Colombia,
as well as the main characteristics of these firms within its specific industry, we matched
the EDITH to Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey or Encuesta Anual Manufacturera,
EAM, which is an unbalanced panel that registers information on all manufacturing
establishments with 10 or more employees, recording information on output value,
number of employees, value of inputs used, total investment, value of the stock of capital,
value of domestic and export sales and purchases of capital. These firms are located in 27
of 32 states in Colombia.
Given that each firm belongs to a just one industry category, classified according to
the economic activity that they carry out following the International Standard Industrial
Classification, ISIC Rev.3.3 We are able to match each firm with the corresponding industry
Chinese import penetration rate data.
The resulting dataset contains 37.582 observation, for 8.549 firms performing their
economy activity in one of the 115 different 4 digit manufacturing industries. Table 1
shows the distribution of these firms among 22 two digit manufacturing sectors, giving a
representative picture of the manufacturing sector in Colombia, which is very typical for
3DANE Colombia has modified the original ISIC Rev.3 into a Colombian version, therefore in order to match properly
each plant with the imports data of its corresponding industry, we first fixed the ISIC Rev.3 with the ISIC Rev.3 adjusted
for Colombia, by following the correspondence table at DANE website.
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developing economies. The majority of firms are performing in: manufacture food and
beverage, manufacture wearing apparel, manufacture rubber and plastic products, and
furniture and others. Such manufacturing industries can be classified as labor-intensive
and relative low technology industries. This representative structure of the manufacturing
sector in Colombia, not only is very similar to other Latin American and developing
economies, but also it strongly differs to the developed economy case, where the man-
ufacturing sector is oriented to more high-technology and skilled-intensive industries
as the manufacture of machinery and equipment, Manufacture of office and computing
machinery, Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus and Manufacture of motor
vehicles.
iii. Innovation efforts across Manufacturing firms in Colombia
In Colombia, according to the Colombian Observatory for Science and Technology, OCYT,
the combination of both, national investments in scientific, technological and innovation
Activities and the expenditure in R&D, have increased from 0.59% to 0.86% as a percentage
of the GDP, between 2004 and 2012. It should be highlighted that, while in 2004, the
private sector financed 61.2% of all the science and technology activities in the country
and the public sector financed 37.8%. By 2013, the proportion shifted, being the public
sector the greater financing sector of innovation activities in Colombia accounting for the
51% of total spending in innovation activities. Regarding to the specific case of firms,
it important to notice that the share of expenditure in science and technology activities
financed by firms, has decreased from 41% in 2004 to 31.2% in 2013 (Lucio et al., 2014).
Traditionally, manufacturing firms are far more likely than non-manufacturing firms to
introduce new products and new production or business processes, in all manufacturing
industries, including such reputedly "low technology" ones. Although all manufacturing
industries surpass the non-manufacturing averages innovation indicators, some are more
likely than others to be product or process innovators. It is well known that among the
most innovative manufacturing industries worldwide, measured by either product or
process introductions, are several computer and communications industries and the phar-
maceutical industry. Chemicals and the majority of durable goods industries, including
11
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motor vehicles, aerospace, and machinery, also equaled or exceeded the averages for all of
manufacturing. The typical manufacturing industries in which both product and process
introductions are less than the manufacturing averages are wood products, nonmetallic
mineral products, furniture, primary metals, food, and textiles and apparel. In order to
identify the causal effect of Chinese import competition on innovation process, is very
important to adequately account for these sectoral differences.
In order to investigate the effect of increasing Chinese import competition on innova-
tion efforts of manufacturing firms in Colombia, we examine the followings indicators of
innovation and technological change: holding a patent, R&D investment, total number of
intellectual property rights, total number of workers devoted to R&D activities and invest-
ment in specialized training. All the innovation inputs (R&D and training investments,
workers devoted to R&D ) are directly reported by the firms and taken from EDITH.
On the other hand, innovation outputs were calculated as follows: Holding a patent is
a dummy variable, that takes value of 1 if the firm hold at last one patent register and
0 otherwise. Whereas, intellectual property rights variable, accounts for the number of
intellectual property rights that a firm holds regardless of its nature, these rights can be
in the form of Software right, Industrial Designs, Copyright, Patent and Utility Model.
However, in this category trademark rights are excluded.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics about the innovation inputs and outputs in
our sample. It is noted that the 2.2 percentage of all surveyed firms in 2004 hold a
patent register. The leaders industries on innovation in Colombia manufacturing sector
are: Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (6%), Publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media (3.9%), Manufacture of medical and optical instruments,
watches (4.8%) and Manufacture of other transport equipment (3%). Since the percentage
of firms within these sectors holding a patent register is above manufacturing average
in 2004. Moreover, firms in industries such as: Manufacture of chemicals and chemical
products, Manufacture of tobacco products, Manufacture of electrical machinery and
apparatus and Manufacture of rubber and plastics products; are the most active ones
in R&D investment. Additionally, the industries where the average number of workers
engage in R&D is larger are: Manufacture of tobacco products, Manufacture of chemicals
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and chemical products and Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus.
Furthermore, figures 2, 3 and 4 plots the average 4 digit industry innovation indicators
–R&D workers, training Investment and R&D investment, respectively– against the Chinese
import penetration rate in a specific year. All graphs shown that as the Chinese import
penetration rate increases, firms performing in most affected industries exhibit consistently
low innovation indicators. Additionally, the raw correlation between Chinese import
competition and innovation efforts and outcomes is negative for Colombian manufacturing
firms. Moreover graph 5, show that the predicted probability of holding a patent is
decreasing across industries facing more Chinese import competition.
IV. Methodological Approach
To investigate the effect of increasing Chinese import competition on innovation efforts of
manufacturing firms in Colombia, the baseline regression specification is:
lnYijt = β0 + β1 IMPCHjt + β2Xijt + β3 Indjt + dt + ci + eijt (2)
where, lnYijt refers to the firm indicators of innovation and technological change (holding
a patent, R&D investment, among others) at firm i in industry j at year t. IMPCHjt is the
Chinese import competition measure for industry j at time t as defined in equation (1).
Vector X includes relevant time varying firm-level controls, these are basically multi-plant,
exporter, importer and age proxy.4 Vector Indjt accounts time varying industry-wide
controls, in general these are industry aggregate variables for the matched industries that
may affect the demand for a particular manufacturing sector, specifically we included here,
the world import penetration rate of the corresponding Colombian industry calculated
without the imports from China. dt are year fixed effects added to control for aggregate
shocks that may affect the variable of interest across all sectors. Given the panel aspect
of the data we consider ci as the unobserved heterogeneity. The standard errors are
clustered by each industry in each year to account for correlation of shocks within each
industry-year.
4Since EAM does not report the year when the plant was established, we calculated an age variable according to the
number of years that firms have been in the sample since 2000 to have a notion of firm’s age.
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We exploit both the sectoral variation and the variation across time in the slope in
the evolution of the average Chinese import competition rate for High and low threat
industries, as well as the Overall manufacturing sector average in Colombia (as is shown in
figure 1) to identify the Chinese competition effect on Innovations indicators of Colombian
Manufacturing firms. 5
There are several concerns about estimating equation (2) in OLS and interpreting
the coefficient on β1 as causal. First, observed changes in the import penetration ratio
may in part reflect domestic shocks to Colombian industries that determine both import
demand and innovative activity. Even if the dominant factors driving China’s export
growth are internal supply shocks, the import demand shocks may still affecting bilateral
trade flows. This type of endogeneity bias might work against finding any impact of
Chinese competition, because both Colombian and Chinese imports are expected to react
to these types of unobservable shocks in the same direction, hence it might cancel the
competition effect. Therefore, is reasonable to think that eijst is correlated with IMPCHjt,
leading to E[IMPCH, e] 6= 0. The correlation between the independent variables with
unobserved factors would bias our results. While we do not have a strong prior on the
direction of bias in OLS estimates, because for instance, in the case that domestic firms’
profits rise with greater demand, they allocate more resources for innovation activities,
but it might also be the case that, a rise in demand may signaling reducing needs for
innovation. Therefore, we rely on the IV approach because the source of variation is well
understood.
To address this problem, we use Chinese world export supplies or the worldwide
imports from China, as an instrument that is correlated with Colombian imports from
5The low threat Chinese competition industries in Colombia are mainly: food products and beverages. Manufacture
of builders’ carpentry and joinery, sawmilling and planing of wood. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard and
corrugated paper, paperboard and of containers of paper. Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and
containers of metal, and steam generators. Manufacture of motor vehicles. Manufacture of other transport equipment.
Whereas as high threat industries are Apparel, Footwear, luggage, handbags and the like saddlery and harness. Manu-
facture of machine-tools, machinery for textile, apparel and leather production. Manufacture of domestic appliances and
Manufacture of electricity distribution, electric lamps and lighting equipment. Manufacture of musical instruments, of
sports goods, games and toys. The sectors that do not belong to any of these groups can then be said to be intermediately
exposed to Chinese competition (Zapata, 2018).
14
Chapter 3 • Import Competition and Innovation
China but uncorrelated with the firms outcomes. The instrument IVjt takes the form:
IVjt = (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) (3)
Accounting for the China’s total supply of products in industry j to the entire world
-The worldwide Chinese imports-, minus the Chinese exports to Colombia -Chinese
imports of Colombia- in period t.
To be valid our instrument must satisfy two requirements: first, the instrument must
be uncorrelated with the error term, Cov[z, u] = 0, in other words the instrument must be
exogenous. The worldwide Chinese imports must be exogenous from the perspective of
Colombia firms as it is expected to be driven by rest of the world and China itself. Second
the instrumental variable must be relevant, it must explain our endogenous variable, in
our application this requires that our measure of Chinese import competition will partially
correlated with the worldwide Chinese imports. Therefore, the instrument should capture
the supply side driven growth component of Chinese imports independent from the
Colombia demand factors, given that the causal relationship between the instrument and
import penetration measure arises from the correlation between Colombia’s imports for
product of industry j and China’s comparative advantage in that industry.
Formally, if the excludability and relevance conditions are met, then the instrumental
variable estimator is a consistent estimator and it will indicate that neither endogeneity
nor unobserved variable are driving our results and we will able to identify the causal
effect of Chinese import competition on the Colombian manufacturing firms innovation
activities.
Another empirical concern is the presence of industry pre-trends in innovation in-
dicators. Figures mentioned above offers suggestive evidence as why it is crucial, to
control for trends in the major innovation active industries as chemicals and electrical
machinery and apparatus . Furthermore, characteristics such as industry factors intensity,
and propensity to invest in information technology could all drive systematic differences
across firms and industries in the potential for successful innovation. We account for
these potentially factors by including an extensive set of controls consisting of dummy
variables for the 11 manufacturing sectors shown in Table 2, and controls for industry
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factors at the initial period.
V. Results
In this section, the effects of Chinese import competition on the innovation of manufac-
turing firms in Colombia are presented and analyzed. In addition to standard model
in the equation (2), we consider some extensions that explore who the effect of Chinese
import competition on the innovation indicators of Colombian manufacturing firms might
vary for different types of firm base on their initial conditions. Specifically, to investigate
whether the impact of import competition on firm innovation is particularly negative for
firms that were smaller, low skilled intensive, less productive and less profitable prior to
the Chinese import competition surge.
For the purpose of such heterogeneity analysis we considered, first: different plant size
groups High and Low measured by total workers and total sales. In order to define these
groups we proceed as following: we considered the workers and the sales distribution of
firms for the initial year 2004, then we calculated the quantiles for each distribution in
that year. Defining the categories High, for those firms at fifth quantile, of the workers
distribution and small, for those firms at the first and second quantile of the same total
workers distribution. Likewise, in the case of sales, we defined a High group for firms at
the top 20% of the sales distribution in the initial year and a Low group for those firms at
the first and second quantiles.
Similarly, given the richness of our dataset we calculated a proxy for the profitability
of each firm at the initial year, as the ratio of total sales over total workers, additionally
we consider the separation of firms based on their initial skill intensity and productivity.
The skill intensity measured as the share of skilled workers over total workers. In
the other hand, the productivity of each firm was estimated following the Olley and
Pakes approach adapting the variant recommended by Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003. The
heterogeneity analysis include interactions between the Chinese import penetration rate
and two subgroups dummies (High and Low) for each of these measures, that were
identified and constructed according to quintiles distribution of the respective variable
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at the initial year. Therefore, the firm i belongs to the High group, if is located at the
fifth quintile of the respective (skill intensity or profitability ) distribution. Subsequently,
the firm i, belongs to the low group if is located at the first and second quintile of the
determined distribution.
i. Specialized Training
Table 3 contains the estimation results for the specialized training investment. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of firm investment in specialized training. In column
3, the coefficient of the Chinese share of import penetration rate is negative and statistically
significant at 1 percent level, indicating that for an average manufacturing firm, one
standard deviation increase in the Chinese share of import penetration rate (11 percentage
point increase) is associated with a 25 percentage point decrease in log specialized
training investment. The instrumental variable results are presented in columns 4-6. The
instrument for the Chinese share is the worldwide Chinese imports. The instrument
is strongly correlated with IMPCH as reported at the first stage panel. Moreover, the
weak identification test provide by the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, in both models was
larger enough to suggest that the instrument performs well. The results indicate that the
Chinese worldwide imports is a good instrument for the Chinese import penetration rate
in Colombia. Furthermore, the IV coefficients are larger in magnitude suggesting that
unobservable shocks bias the OLS coefficients downward.
In Table 4 the Chinese competition measure is interacted with firm’s skill intensity,
size and profitability at the initial year prior to the intensive expansion of the Chinese
imports shock. The total number of firms in the sample was divided in two categories
high and low. The results indicate that intensified Chinese import competition measure
by the Chinese import penetration rate in Colombia causes a disproportionate decrease
in training investment, especially in firms with higher initial training investments, as
the group of big size firms, high-skill intensive firms and low profitable firms within an
industry.
Specifically, we find that for big size firms measure by both sales and workers, the
estimated coefficients in column 1-4 indicates that one standard deviation increase in
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the Chinese import penetration rate, reduces between 37 and 45 percentage points the
specialized training investment among initially big size firms, while producing a 13
percentage points decrease for initially smaller firms. The negative effect of Chinese
import competition on training investment is also larger among relative more skilled
intensive firms compared to their low skilled intensive counterparts, where among the
latter ones, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import competition measure,
produces a 15 percentage points decrease in the training investment, in contrast to 26
percentage points reduction in the high skilled intensive group.
On the other hand, the negative effect of heightened Chinese import competition
on specialized training investment accrues more among low profitable firms relate to
the high profitable ones. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese
import penetration rate, reduces the training investment by 37 and 16 percentage points,
respectively.
ii. R&D Investment
One of the main questions in the study of firm innovation behavior is whether international
import competition pressure increases or decreases firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. The
answer to this question has important implications for business strategies and competition
policies. Existing studies provide diverse and conflicting results, predicting that import
competition can have either a negative or a positive effect on firms’ incentives to invest
in R&D. Scherer and Huh (1992). Moreover, recent studies analyzing argued that the
effect of import competition on firm performance varies with firms’ stock of R&D capital.
Showing that firms that have accumulated a higher stock of R&D capital are significantly
less affected by import competition. Hombert and Matray (2018)
The estimation results of the effect of Chinese import competition on R&D investment
of Colombian manufacturing firms are presented in Table 5. We control for whether a
firm is located or not in the capital and economy hub Bogota, a firms’ age proxy (based on
the number of periods that a firm has been surveyed). We also include two-digit industry
fixed effects which capture broader industry trends. The estimation methods are OLS
and IV, with p-values based on robust and clustered 4-digit ISIC industries and standard
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errors reported in parentheses.
The coefficients of Chinese import penetration are found to be negative and significant
in every specification. Indicating that heightened Chinese import competition discourages
R&D expenditure of manufacturing firms. Specifically, the magnitude in column 3
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate (11
percentage point increase) is associated with a decrease in firm R&D investment of 16.9
percentage points. These results suggest that as Chinese import competition gets tougher,
manufacturing firms in Colombia reduce their R&D investments. Instrumental variable
regression results presented in columns 4 to 6 confirm the finding that Chinese imports
competition lead to lower R&D spending of manufacturing firms.
However, the estimated negative average effect veil the heterogeneity among firms
within the same industry. Chinese import competition may have a differential impact on
a firm R&D investment, and thus can lead to the reallocation of R&D resources across
firms in the same industry. Therefore, we test the effect of Chinese competition on R&D
across three dimensions: size (measured by both sales and workers), profitability and skill
intensity. Using the baseline equation, we empirically estimate the differential effect of
Chinese import competition on firms relative big and small firms, with higher and low
profitability, and firms with relative higher and low skill intensity. As usual, controls for
the same firm characteristics and fixed effects are included.
The estimation results are presented in Table 6. In terms of size, columns 2 and
4 the coefficients on the interaction term are statistically significant, suggesting that
smaller firms were responded to import competition from China by increasing their R&D
investment. However, these coefficients are not so large enough to reverse the negative
average effect of Chinese competition on R&D investment. Putting together with the
results in column 1 and 3, we suggest that R&D spending is more negative affected by
import competition among relative bigger firms.
Furthermore, regarding to the profitability dimension, we find that the negative effect
of Chinese import competition on R&D investment is larger for firms with relative smaller
profit margins, where one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration
rate produces a 23 percentage points decrease in the R&D investment. Last, columns 7 and
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8 in table 6 explore what happens when skill intensity levels are interacted with Chinese
import competition. Specifically, the coefficient in Column 8 is significant and positive,
meaning that firms that were relative less skilled-intensive at the initial period, increased
the R&D investment in the presence of import competition, however such effect is not
larger enough to overcome the negative average effect of Chinese import competition on
firms R&D spending.
These results are similar to those found by Holmes and Stevens (2010) introducing a
structural trade model, to explain why import competition affect large-scale firms more
than the small-scale ones. They argued that, large firms are more associated with mass
production of standardized products, whereas small firms generally engages in the craft
production of specialty products.
iii. Workers devoted to R&D Activities
In this section we analyze the effect of Chinese import competition on the number of
workers devoted to R&D activities. This variable is directly reported by the firm to the
EDITH survey. Specifically, in this category are included researchers, technicians, interns
and assistants involved in scientific, technological and innovation activities related to the
development of new or existing products and process. External consultants are excluded.
Table 7 contains the estimation results of the impact of Chinese import competition
proxy by the Chinese import penetration rate, on the number of workers in positions
related to R&D activities. The columns 1-3, shows the OLS results, in all model specifica-
tion we get negative and significant coefficient of import competition on these category of
high skilled workers,the increasing of Chinese import penetration rate and the decreasing
in the number of workers devoted to R&D. On the other hand the instrumental variable
approach showed in columns 4-6, the coefficients increase but lose their significance,
meaning that on average we do not find a causal effect of increasing Chinese import
competition on the demand for workers involve in R&D activities.
Furthermore, in table 8, we present the heterogeneous effects of Chinese import
competition on R&D workers, by different firm size, profitability and skill-intensity. The
results from column 1 to column 4, suggest that initially small size firms reacted to
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threatened Chinese import competition by increasing the number of worker in the R&D
department. Such increases were even larger to slightly overcome the average negative
effect of Chinese competition on R&D employment. Specifically, these coefficients indicate
that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate, increases
the log of R&D workers by 1.3 and 0.3 percentage points among small firms in the
initial period, measure by both sales and workforce, respectively. Furthermore, when
we compare the results between initially high and low skilled-intensive firms, we find
evidence to suggest that initially less skilled-intensive, slight increased (0.4 percentage
points) the number of workers involve in R&D activities in response to heightened
Chinese import competition. Contrary, the number of workers in R&D activities is
specially reduced among relative less profitable firms, in response to increasing Chinese
import competition. Where, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import
penetration rate, is associated with a 3.8 decline in the log of workers devoted to research
and development.
iv. Probability of Holding a Patent
A probit model with instrumental variable is used to analyze the impact of Chinese
competition on the holding a patent status of the firm. The patent variable, xit is a
dummy variable that takes 1 if firm i have a patent at time t. In these regressions
aggregate shocks and industry specific factors are controlled for using the full set of
industry fixed effects. The results, presented in Table 9, shows significant negative effect
of Chinese competition on the probability of holding a patent of a manufacturing firm.
The results highlight the importance of controlling for firm export behavior, size, relative
age, import penetration from the rest of world mainly positive spillover effects from
developed economies and the economic and scientific hub of in the country, in the firm’s
probability of holding a patent register. Specifically, exporting, older and bigger firms,
that are located in the capital and are performing in industries with intuitively positive
technology spillovers, are more likely to hold a patent register. Particularly Column
3, indicate that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate
reduces by 5.5 percentage points the firm’s probability of holding a patent register.
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The IV results in columns 4-6, confirm a negative and significant causal effect of
Chinese import competition on the probability of holding a patent for Colombian man-
ufacturing firms. Moreover, the instrument is strongly correlated with IMPCH and the
estimated coefficients of this relation obtained using the instrumental method, are larger
in magnitude than those in the OLS model, suggesting that unobservable shocks bias
the OLS coefficients downward. Our finding of a significant negative impact of Chinese
import competition on average patenting probability is similar to U.S case presented by
Dorn et al. (2016)
On the other hand, table 10 explores how the effect Chinese import competition is
distributed across different types of firms. We first analyze whether Chinese competition
has a disproportionate effect among different firm sizes. The results of Column 1, 3 and 7,
suggest that Chinese import competition is indeed increasing the probability of having
a patent register among larger firms and more skilled intensive firms, as a respond of
rising competition. Concretely, bigger firms measured by both sales and workers and
skilled-intensive firms, exhibit an increase in the probability of holding a patent, that
overcomes the average negative effect represented by the Chinese import competition. The
coefficients in these columns, indicate that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese
import penetration rate, increases around 0.5 and 4.5 percentage points, the probability
of having a patent register for bigger firms. Whereas, the same change in the Chinese
import competition rate, generates a 1.5 percentage points increase in the probability of
holding a patent register among initially relative more skilled-intensive firms. Diversely,
originally less profitable firms are more negative affect in the probability of patenting,
when facing heightened Chinese import competition.
According to so called "deep pocket effect" due to capital market imperfections, firms
mostly rely on their internal resources to undertake costly and risky innovative activities
that potentially might result in patenting or other sort of property rights registers. For
instance, Brown et al. (2009) present direct evidence that U.S. firms relied heavily on cash
reserves to smooth R&D spending during the 1982-2002 boom and bust in stock market
returns. Large firms are more likely to have such deep pockets capacity to navigate the
difficult times. This could be especially important when market competition is intense
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and firms suffer from declining sales and profits, while small firms in tough times tend to
be liquidity constrained.
v. Others Property Rights
In this section we extent the innovation outputs to include not only patents but rather any
other property rights that manufacturing firms might holds. Therefore here, we consider a
broad definition of property rights related to the development of new Softwares, Industrial
Designs, Copyrights, Patent and Utility Models that encompasses new developments
by the manufacturing firms that are industrially applicable to the technical solution or
improvement to a given product, process or technical problem. Moreover, by considering
these broad category of innovation outputs, we are able to have a more comprehensive
measure of innovations that by definitions is more accurate for the case of manufacturing
firms in a developing economic as Colombia. In that sense, the advantage for this study in
including these sort of intellectual property rights in contrasts to other studies analyzing
just the patent register are the followings: First, in a utility model register, the invention
which has mainly a novelty, but less or absents in inventive step can be protected. Second,
the cost to obtain and maintain the utility model and the software right are cheaper. Third,
contrary to patents the additional intellectual property rights that we are considering,
does not require substantive examination procedure, as it does not require the inventive
step. Lastly, by including Copyrights for manufacturing firms enables to account for
specific types of original creations, since Copyrights protects sound recording, literary
works (with no requirement for artistic merit) and computer programs, and may also
confer similar rights to protect databases. For instance, An instruction leaflet inside the
box of a electronic item will be a literary work, as well as any text that the firm creates to
guide their production process. Moreover, A picture or figure of a new prototype will be
an artistic work subject to Copyright. Finally, in this category we excluded the trademark
registers since this sort of property right are mainly related to the demand size.
Table 11 explore the effect of Chinese import competition on the production of
intellectual property rights as a whole by manufacturing firms in Colombia. All the
coefficients are negative and statistically significant across the OLS and IV estimations,
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suggesting a negative effect of Chinese import competition on manufacturing firms’
production of innovation outputs. As in the previous sections the magnitude of the
coefficients obtained using IV method are larger related to the OLS case, signaling that
unobservable shocks drive the bias downwards. According to the coefficient in column 3,
we suggest that one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration rate,
decreases in 2 percentage points the number of intellectual property right that an average
manufacturing firms holds.
Furthermore, in Table 12 we analyze whether the effect of Chinese import competition
on the production innovation outputs that are register by the firms as intellectual property
rights, is disproportionated among different type of firms regarding size, profitability and
skill intensity. We find that initially less profitable and smaller firms are more negative
affected in the number of intellectual property rights when facing increasing Chinese
import competition. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the Chinese import
penetration rate, translates in a reduction of around 3 percentage points in the number
of property rights registers among less profitable firms. Whereas the same increase
in the Chinese competition measure, decreases 1 and 1.3 percentage points the total
number of intellectual property rights among small size firms measured by both sales
and workforce, respectively. Finally, we do not find evidence of a heterogeneous effect
of Chinese import competition on firm intellectual property rights register regarding to
different skill intensity levels.
vi. Heterogeneity by Productivity level
In addition to the initial size, profitability and skill intensity dimensions of heterogeneous
firms in the manufacturing sector. This section analyze whether the effect of import
competition on innovation is different for firms who have higher or lower initial TFP.6
In this regard, we calculate the quintiles of the productivity distribution at the initial
year and then we categorized each firm at sample into the respective quintile creating a
indicator variable for each of them and subsequently interacted by the Chinese import
6 We estimated the firms specific productivity by using the following Olley and Pakes method adjusted by the Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) advice.
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penetration rate7.
Melitz (2003) model predicts that more productive firms are better positioned to first,
take advantage of opportunities created by international trade openness and second,
to face competition from other firms. In response to lower trade barriers, they will be
able to expand their operations both domestically and abroad. However, for their less
productive domestic peers, greater international competition makes them relatively likely
to shut down their operations and among those that remain in business to reduce their
production and market share. A similar argue is stated in the model of Aghion et al.
(2005), where greater competition discourage incentives to innovate in industries with
technological gaps.
Table 13 shows the estimation results exploring the impact of Chinese import competi-
tion on innovation inputs and outputs by different productivity levels. The panels A and
B correspond to the less productive firms, located at the first and second quintile of the
productivity distribution. We find that for initially less productive firms the innovation
process measure through the innovations inputs and outputs were more negative affected
by the increasing inside of Chinese import competition in comparison with their more
productive counterparts. Moreover, even when the impact of Chinese competition lowers
innovation for all firms, the magnitude of this effect is larger for low productivity than for
high productivity firms. The results suggest that Chinese import competition, specially
affects innovation inputs among initially less productive firms rather than innovation
outputs inputs, since these types of firms in presence of import competition reduce their
R&D investments, cut the number of workers in R&D activities and scaled back the
specialized training investment.
On the other hand, panel D and E in table 13, present the results for initially more
productive firms. We find that even though, more productive firms increased their
innovation inputs and outputs indicators to cope with rising Chinese import competition,
such efforts were not enough to overcome the average negative effect caused by tough
competition from China, specially in the dimensions of R&D investment, specialized
7These categories can be also defined as: Low productivity (Q1), Low-middle productivity (Q2), Middle productivity
(Q3), Middle-high productivity (Q4) and High Productivity (Q5)
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training and patenting. However, the estimation results in columns 3 of panel D, indicate
that middle-high productivity firms or those firms belonging to the Q4 group, responded
to Chinese import competition by increasing the number of workers devoted to R&D
activities. The coefficients of this relation suggest that one standard deviation increase in
the Chinese import penetration rate is associated with a 4.8 percentage increase in the
log of employees involve in the R&D activities. Moreover in column 5 of panel E, we
find that firms at the highest productivity level, reacted to Chinese import competition by
increasing the number of intellectual property right. In this sense, one standard deviation
increase in the Chinese import penetration rate, increases the number of property right
register by around 1 percentage points among highest productive manufacturing firms.
Overall the negative impact of the Chinese import shock on innovation is magnified for
low productivity firms, whereas it may positively affect innovation in high productivity
firms.
Given these results, we consider that the differentiated respond between low and
high productivity firms to import competition can only be explained by considering a
non-monotonic relationship between innovation and competition. As Aghion et al. (2001)
argued in their escape to competition effect modeled. In contrast, while a Schumpeterian
argument may explain why low productivity firms innovate less it is inconsistent with
high productivity firms innovating at the same time more. Subsequently the finding of
more negative effects of Chinese import competition on initially less productive and just
high productivity firms are able to slight respond to foreign competition are similar to
those found by Aghion et al. (2018), arguing that since increasing competition reduces
profits, discouraging innovation particularly for firms with low productivity. Moreover,
such finding is in line with the evidence of industry leaders invest and innovate more in
response to exogenous changes in Chinese competition. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017).
We conclude that the finding that more productive firms innovate more in response
to the China trade shock, specially by increasing the broad possibilities of intellectual
property rights (not only patents), while the innovation indicators among less productive
are more negative affected when facing Chinese competition. It means that import
competition may extent the difference between high and low productivity firms because it
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leads to divergent response on innovation that amplifies the initial difference. This finding
might suggest import competition triggers this heterogeneous and opposite response in
term of productivity, leading to positive dynamic selection.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effects of China’s growing import competition in on the innovation
of manufacturing firm in a developing economy. For this purpose, we used firm-level
data from surveys on Colombian firms, that allow us to distinguish two specific sort of
innovation indicators: Innovation inputs, such as R&D spending, specialized training
investment and workers engaged in R&D activities. And innovation outputs as the
probability of holding a patent and the number of property right registers.
We find that excepting for the case of R&D workers, the average effect of Chinese
import competition on the innovation inputs and outputs of Colombian manufacturing is
negative and statistically significant. Moreover, initially less productive and less profitable
firms, are more affected by Chinese imports competition, firm in these groups significantly
reduced in greater extent their R&D and training investments, as well as the number of
workers devoted to R&D activities.
Regarding to the difference in productivity levels, we find for all these innovation
indicators that initially more productive firms are more likely to increase them as a
response to the China import competition shock than the less productive firms where
the innovation process is indeed more negative affected, being this difference across firm
with diverse productivity, specially notable for R&D workers and Intellectual Property
Right registrations.
The results presented in this paper complement the findings of the previous study
about the effect of Chinese import competition on Colombian manufacturing firms. We
can argue that greater Chinese import competition for manufacturing firms triggers a
more general decline in their profitability, thereby reducing incentives to innovate and
invest in R&D. The contraction along all margins of firm’s innovation suggest that the
primary response of firms to greater import competition is to scale back their innovation
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efforts. A results that closely related to the profitability mechanism of Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980). Therefore to the question, Does Chinese import competition discourage
innovation of manufacturing firms in developing economy as Colombia? we find evidence
to answer yes it does, potentially trough the negative effect on firm’s profitability.
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A. Tables and Figures
Table 1: Distribution of Firms at EDITH and EAM by 2 Digit Industries
Industry\Year 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total Industry
Manufacture of food products and beverages 1,176 1,105 1,354 1,522 1,582 6739
Manufacture of tobacco products 4 3 4 6 4 21
Manufacture of textiles 302 294 327 374 401 1698
Manufacture of wearing apparel 706 613 763 939 1,004 4025
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 281 267 357 390 388 1682
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood 363 333 472 509 557 2234
Manufacture of paper and paper products 196 188 219 150 158 911
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 127 122 209 358 315 1131
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 25 28 29 35 55 172
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 483 519 656 734 765 3157
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 483 511 607 696 741 3038
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 276 282 339 388 430 1715
Manufacture of basic metals 114 114 130 164 174 696
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 389 396 542 665 731 2723
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 339 353 439 532 579 2,242
Manufacture of office and computing machinery 0 1 0 11 10 22
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 132 133 153 175 183 776
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 14 11 14 20 11 70
Manufacture of medical and optical instruments, watches 41 48 61 76 92 318
Manufacture of motor vehicles 143 163 189 191 206 892
Manufacture of other transport equipment 33 39 47 56 53 228
Furniture and Others 478 502 755 656 701 3092
Total 6105 6025 7665 8647 9140 37582
Authors’ own calculation, data comes from UNCOMTRADE. Survey of Development and Technological Innovation for Colombian Manufacturing firms. EDITH.
Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey, EAM. Both reported by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Innovation Inputs and Outputs. 2004-2012
2004 2012
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Max
Workers 5,898 43.65683 83.14919 1340 8,962 38.4801 79.9406 1160
Total Sales 5,898 1613939 7081426 2.58e+08 8,962 1561318 1.06e+07 6.19e+08
Invest Training 5,898 1420.736 9198.686 403301.4 8,962 165.384 1618.101 82084.95
R&D Investment 5,898 2151.583 23514.93 736980.7 8,962 4349.96 118506.5 6245981
R&D Workers 6,105 2.588698 12.65631 323 9,140 2.5533 10.1532 207
Property Rights 6,105 .4219492 1.43428 28 9,140 1.6950 69.9551 5122
Patents 6,105 .0214578 .1449166 1 9,140 .0076586 .0871827 1
IMPCH 6,104 .0480585 .087115 .648559 9,140 .1938207 .2007104 .985323
Note: Values are expressed in thousand 2005 Colombians peso. The variables: Investment in specialized training, R&D investments, Total number of workers
devoted to R&D activities, Total number of workers are directly reported by the firm to the EDITH survey. The variable property Rights included the total
number of intellectual property rights of any type. (Software, Industrial Designs, Copyright, Patent and Utility Models. Trademark are excluded). The patent
variable is an dummy related whether the firm hold a patent register or not. The source of the data is EDITH Survey (DANE). Authors’ calculation.
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Figure 1: Chinese Import Penetration Rate in Colombia
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE
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Table 3: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Specialized Training Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent Variable training training training training training training
IMPCH No controls -2.396*** -18.70***
(0.082) (1.479)
IMPCH -2.673*** -2.372*** -2.356*** -23.63*** -23.48*** -23.28***
(0.128) (0.124) (0.122) (2.212) (2.220) (2.248)
IMP. No China 0.571*** 0.517*** 0.437*** -5.145*** -5.115*** -5.069***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.065) (1.079) (1.077) (1.080)
Multi-plant 1.305*** 1.170*** 1.081*** -0.458 -0.441 -0.424
(0.180) (0.178) (0.176) (0.449) (0.465) (0.463)
Bogota -0.0240 0.048 0.071* 0.650** 0.644** 0.638**
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.321) (0.320) (0.320)
Log Gross Inv. 0.152*** 0.135*** 0.087*** -0.021 -0.021 -0.019
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Exit -0.134* -0.161** -0.160 -0.159
(0.077) (0.078) (0.209) (0.208)
Entry 0.371*** 0.341*** 0.349** 0.338**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.144) (0.144)
Age 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.030 0.028
(0.005) (0.004) (0.109) (0.108)
Export 0.180*** -0.199**
(0.043) (0.087)
Importer 0.783*** 0.127
(0.053) (0.091)
First Stage
log IV 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 141.5 140 137.3
Year and Firm Fixed Effect ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,488 21,488 21,488 18,734 18,734 18,734
Number of firm_ID 8,549 8,549 8,549 5,719 5,719 5,719
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry
by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3.
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Table 4: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Specialized Training Investment among Heteroge-
neous Firms at the Initial Period.
Sales Total Workers Profitability Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1)
IMPCH -1.912*** -2.976*** -1.848*** -3.005*** -2.614*** -1.732*** -2.351*** -2.903***
(0.116) (0.174) (0.118) (0.171) (0.160) (0.149) (0.130) (0.175)
High Sales*IMPCH -1.531***
(0.406)
Low Sales*IMPCH 1.809***
(0.209)
High Workers*IMPCH -2.359***
(0.352)
Low Workers*IMPCH 1.823***
(0.208)
High Profit*IMPCH 1.082***
(0.255)
Low Profit*IMPCH -1.641***
(0.272)
High Skill Intensity*IMPCH -0.0446
(0.319)
Low Skill Intensity*IMPCH 1.489***
(0.217)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,480 21,480 21,488 21,488 19,041 19,041 21,480 21,480
Number of firm ID 8,547 8,547 8,549 8,549 7,475 7,475 8,546 8,546
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry
by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3.
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Table 5: The Impact of Chinese Competition on R&D Investment of Manufacturing Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent Variable Log R&D Log R&D Log R&D Log R&D Log R&D Log R&D
IMPCH No controls -1.691*** -9.349***
(0.098) (1.512)
IMPCH -1.721*** -1.514*** -1.542*** -14.90*** -14.67*** -14.18***
(0.160) (0.159) (0.157) (2.535) (2.540) (2.571)
IMP. No China 0.635*** 0.601*** 0.533*** -3.271*** -3.213*** -3.135***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.078) (1.083) (1.081) (1.080)
Log Gross Inv. 0.162*** 0.149*** 0.105*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Exit -0.370*** -0.408*** -0.426** -0.430**
(0.096) (0.096) (0.213) (0.212)
Entry 0.333*** 0.300*** 0.295* 0.283*
(0.095) (0.095) (0.151) (0.150)
Age 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.130 0.117
(0.006) (0.006) (0.135) (0.135)
Importer 0.790*** 0.327***
(0.064) (0.102)
Export 0.263*** -0.061
(0.055) (0.096)
Log IV 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-test 141.5 140 137.3
Year and Firms Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 19,548 19,548 19,548 17,022 17,022 17,022
Number of firm_ID 7,816 7,816 7,816 5,218 5,218 5,218
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry
by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 6: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on R&D Investment among Heterogeneous Firms at the
Initial Period.
Sales Total Workers Profitability Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1)
IMPCH -1.338*** -1.881*** -1.289*** -1.919*** -1.620*** -1.085*** -1.493*** -1.824***
(0.128) (0.204) (0.131) (0.202) (0.186) (0.179) (0.155) (0.207)
High Sales*IMPCH -0.0130
(0.525)
Low Sales*IMPCH 1.273***
(0.248)
High Workers*IMPCH -0.989**
(0.446)
Low Workers*IMPCH 1.272***
(0.244)
High Profit*IMPCH 0.526
(0.321)
Low Profit*IMPCH -1.063***
(0.319)
High Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.0340
(0.375)
Low Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.977***
(0.253)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 18,727 18,727 18,734 18,734 16,702 16,702 18,727 18,727
Number of firm_ID 5,718 5,718 5,719 5,719 5,062 5,062 5,717 5,717
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By
Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 7: The Impact of Chinese import Competition on Number of Workers devoted to R&D Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent Variable lRD_workers lRD_workers lRD_workers lRD_workers lRD_workers lRD_workers
IMPCH No controls -0.365*** -0.287
(0.038) (0.478)
IMPCH -0.160*** -0.129*** -0.159*** -0.711 -0.601 -0.537
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.561) (0.573) (0.578)
IMP. No China 0.060** 0.049* 0.025 -0.146 -0.134 -0.125
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.298) (0.299) (0.300)
Multi-plant 0.860*** 0.825*** 0.797*** 0.281* 0.296* 0.300*
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.149) (0.159) (0.159)
Bogota -0.043** -0.026 -0.016 0.019 0.021 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
Exit -0.197*** -0.205*** -0.253*** -0.253***
(0.0329) (0.033) (0.057) (0.057)
Entry 0.027 0.021 -0.007 -0.002
(0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.045)
Age 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.008 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.029)
Export 0.127*** -0.041
(0.018) (0.029)
Importer 0.174*** 0.022
(0.021) (0.030)
First Stage
Log IV 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 141.5 140 137.3
Year and Firms Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,488 21,488 21,488 18,734 18,734 18,734
Number of firm_ID 8,549 8,549 8,549 5,719 5,719 5,719
The dependent variable is the logarithm of workers in R&D activities, directly reported by the firms. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4 digit
ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set
of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 8: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Worker Devoted to R&D Activities Among Hetero-
geneous Firms at The Initial Period.
Sales Total Workers Profitability Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1)
IMPCH 0.00424 -0.181** 0.0361 -0.164** -0.140** 0.0228 -0.0901 -0.166**
(0.0513) (0.0742) (0.0519) (0.0736) (0.0674) (0.0686) (0.0586) (0.0720)
High Sales*IMPCH -0.271
(0.182)
Low Sales*IMPCH 0.305***
(0.0945)
High Workers*IMPCH -0.681***
(0.160)
Low Workers*IMPCH 0.187**
(0.0937)
High Profit*IMPCH 0.122
(0.125)
Low Profit*IMPCH -0.344***
(0.117)
High Skill Intensity*IMPCH -0.0696
(0.135)
Low Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.201**
(0.0994)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 17,015 17,015 17,022 17,022 16,416 16,416 17,017 17,017
Number of firm_ID 5,217 5,217 5,218 5,218 5,003 5,003 5,216 5,216
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of workers in R&D activities, directly reported by the firms. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the
full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 9: The Impact of Chinese import Competition on Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification Probit Probit Probit IV(Probit) IV(Probit) IV(Probit)
Dependent Variable Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent
IMPCH No controls -0.873*** -1.359***
(0.172) (0.282)
IMPCH -0.795*** -0.418** -0.498** -1.137*** -1.401*** -1.756***
(0.190) (0.208) (0.215) (0.348) (0.417) (0.425)
IMP. No China 0.242*** 0.194*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.120* 0.085
(0.055) (0.066) (0.068) (0.062) (0.070) (0.072)
Bogota 0.076* 0.083* 0.0968* 0.083** 0.095* 0.114**
(0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.041) (0.049) (0.049)
Log Gross Inv. 0.0237* 0.0170 0.0225 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Average Wage 0.136*** 0.084 0.135*** 0.073
(0.050) (0.054) (0.049) (0.053)
Log Workers 0.086*** 0.057** 0.0812*** 0.048*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.0254) (0.026)
Exit -0.242 -0.241 -0.263 -0.265
(0.256) (0.256) (0.255) (0.254)
Entry 0.242* 0.226* 0.226* 0.202
(0.137) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134)
Age 0.024*** 0.021** 0.020** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Importer 0.109* 0.107*
(0.059) (0.058)
Export 0.154*** 0.197***
(0.057) (0.059)
Log IV 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Year and Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,488 21,488 21,488 18,734 18,734 18,734
Number of firm_ID 8,549 8,549 8,549 5,719 5,719 5,719
Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm holds a patent register or not. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4-digit
ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out.
41
Chapter 3 • Import Competition and Innovation
Table 10: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on The Probability of Holding a Patent Among
Heterogeneous Firms at The Initial Period.
Sales Total Workers Profitability Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1)
IMPCH -0.888*** -0.214 -0.685** -0.258 -0.346 -0.979*** -0.638*** -0.222
(0.301) (0.203) (0.280) (0.202) (0.214) (0.365) (0.240) (0.210)
High Sales*IMPCH 1.313***
(0.325)
Low Sales*IMPCH -0.938*
(0.548)
High Workers*IMPCH 0.727**
(0.310)
Low Workers*IMPCH -0.687
(0.499)
High Profit*IMPCH -1.275*
(0.751)
Low Profit*IMPCH 0.858**
(0.372)
High Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.783**
(0.318)
Low Skill Intensity*IMPCH -0.652
(0.397)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,480 21,480 21,488 21,488 19,041 19,041 21,480 21,480
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm holds a patent register or not. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4
digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the
full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 11: The Impact of Chinese import Competition on Number Property Rights Registration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent Variable Prop. Rights Prop. Rights Prop. Rights Prop. Rights Prop. Rights Prop. Rights
IMPCH No controls -0.167*** -0.629***
(0.015) (0.209)
IMPCH -0.191*** -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.790*** -0.789*** -0.770***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.259) (0.261) (0.264)
IMP. No China 0.0105 0.008 0.004 -0.118 -0.118 -0.114
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127)
multi-plant 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.135*** -0.042 -0.038 -0.037
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
Bogota 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.032 0.030 0.029
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0542) (0.054) (0.054)
Log Gross Inv. 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.006*** -0.0015 -4.27e-05 1.38e-06
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exit 0.006 0.005 0.039 0.039
(0.023) (0.023) (0.046) (0.045)
Entry 0.026 0.025 0.0299 0.029
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
Age 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
Export 0.0271*** -0.015
(0.008) (0.013)
Importer 0.033*** 0.013
(0.009) (0.013)
First Stage
Log IV 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 141.5 140 137.3
Year and Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 21,487 21,487 21,487 18,733 18,733 18,733
Number of firm_ID 8,549 8,549 8,549 5,719 5,719 5,719
The dependent variable is the logarithm of property rights, in this variable are included property rights related to: Softwares, Industrial Designs, Copyrights,
Patent and Utility Models. Trademark rights are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4 digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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Table 12: The Effect of Chinese Import Competition on The Number of Property Right Registrations among
Heterogeneous Firms at The Initial Period.
Sales Total Workers Profitability Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1) High (Q5) Low (Q2,Q1)
IMPCH -0.160*** -0.231*** -0.168*** -0.234*** -0.208*** -0.148*** -0.204*** -0.212***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.023) (0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.027) (0.032)
High Sales*IMPCH -0.110
(0.0723)
Low Sales*IMPCH 0.129***
(0.037)
High Workers*IMPCH -0.107
(0.066)
Low Workers*IMPCH 0.131***
(0.036)
High Profit*IMPCH 0.056
(0.039)
Low Profit*IMPCH -0.118**
(0.048)
High Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.043
(0.054)
Low Skill Intensity*IMPCH 0.054
(0.039)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 19,539 19,539 19,547 19,547 18,791 18,791 19,542 19,542
Number of plant_id 7,814 7,814 7,816 7,816 7,449 7,449 7,814 7,814
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of property rights, in this variable are included property rights related to: Softwares, Industrial Designs,
Copyrights, Patent and Utility Models. Trademark rights are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4 digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in
table 3
44
Chapter 3 • Import Competition and Innovation
Table 13: The Effects of Chinese Import Competition on Innovation Indicators, Considering Firms Hetero-
geneity by Initial Productivity level
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles R&D Inv. R&D Workers Training Inv. Prop. Right Patents
Panel A
IMPCH -1.331*** -0.072 -2.285*** -0.180*** -0.390*
(0.169) (0.063) (0.143) (0.026) (0.206)
Q1_TFP * IMPCH -0.675*** -0.400*** -0.283 0.005 -0.035
(0.237) (0.098) (0.197) (0.029) (0.477)
Panel B
IMPCH -1.357*** -0.092 -2.260*** -0.176*** -0.258
(0.170) (0.064) (0.144) (0.027) (0.205)
Q2_TFP * IMPCH -0.421 -0.225** -0.345* -0.0138 -1.058*
(0.258) (0.093) (0.207) (0.026) (0.548)
Panel C
IMPCH -1.420*** -0.124* -2.390*** -0.179*** -0.441**
(0.172) (0.064) (0.142) (0.027) (0.220)
Q3_TFP * IMPCH -0.109 -0.065 0.254 0.001 0.178
(0.245) (0.095) (0.215) (0.029) (0.357)
Panel D
IMPCH -1.710*** -0.292*** -2.485*** -0.208*** -0.552**
(0.160) (0.057) (0.130) (0.024) (0.251)
Q4_TFP * IMPCH 1.277*** 0.732*** 0.746*** 0.139*** 0.548*
(0.312) (0.122) (0.251) (0.043) (0.303)
Panel E
IMPCH -1.393*** -0.109* -2.195*** -0.137*** -0.386*
(0.172) (0.0636) (0.147) (0.024) (0.219)
Q5_TFP * IMPCH 0.265 0.156 0.720** 0.223*** 0.064
(0.387) (0.145) (0.323) (0.066) (0.377)
Year and Firm FE ! ! ! ! !
Observations 19,546 19,546 19,546 19,545 19,545
Number of firm ID 7,815 7,815 7,815 7,815 7,815
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 4-digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By
Industry by year fixed effects are partial led out. Includes the full set of controls from column 3 in table 3
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B. Appendix
i. Data
Innovation Firm-level Data
The source of the firms-level innovation related indicator is the Survey of Development and Technological Innovation
in the manufacturing sector (EDIT), conducted by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadistica, DANE). The aim of this survey is to characterize technological dynamics and the activities
related to innovation and technological development of manufacturing firms in Colombia. By reporting variables that
directly and indirectly affect the creation of new products, processes, marketing techniques and forms of organization,
or their substantial improvement, as well as, its impact on the economy, for Colombian manufacturing firms having
establishments with 10 or more employees and are included in the register of firms of the Manufacturing Annual Survey
(EAM). EDIT design preserves a basic international theoretical framework on the design, application and interpretation
of national surveys on innovation, it incorporates most of the methodological approach followed by the Organization of
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), in particular the Oslo Manual, and by the Latin American Network of
Indicators of Science and Technology (RICYT), compiled in the Bogota Manual.
Firm-level Data
The Development and Technological Innovation Industrial Survey (EDIT) was matched to The Annual Manufacturing Sur-
vey (AMS) to obtain detailed information on innovation and technological activities conducted by manufacturing firms in
Colombia, in order to study the impact of Chinese import competition on innovation inputs and outputs of manufacturing
firms. This process was possible due to fact that firm identifiers in both surveys are the same. The (AMS), is an unbal-
anced panel that registers information on all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more employees. The aim of AMS
is to obtain basic information from the industrial sector, which would provide facts about its structure, characteristics and
evolution. The AMS provides the annual information about the behavior, changes and evolution of the manufacturing
industry in Colombia. This information is obtained through a number of establishments, employed personnel, accrued
remunerations (wages, salaries and social contributions), gross and industrial output, intermediate consumption, value
added, gross and net investment, electricity consumed, fixed assets values, amongst others. The (AMS) is conducted by
the Colombian Bureau of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE).
Trade Data
The trade data used to compute the import competition measure were taken from the UNCOMTRADE database, initially
the trade data was downloaded as six-digit Harmonized System (HS) which is product-level data and then was converted
into its ISIC rev.3 version, which is 4 digit disaggregated industry-level data, by using the official correspondence table
from HS96 to ISIC rev.3 available at the United Nations website. We proceed in this way, because UNCOMTRADE
database is the only source of disaggregate trade data for Colombia, specifically was the only way to get four-digit
disaggregated trade industry level data.
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ii. Additional Robustness Checks
In this section, this study test whether the results describing the effect of Chinese import competition on innovation
inputs and outcomes of manufacturing firms, are sensible to using a different variable as instrument. Since the aim of
this paper is to find a casual effect of Chinese import competition on the innovation indicators of manufacturing firms, to
address the endogenity problem is a fundamental strategy to obtain such unbiased estimations of this effect. The type of
endogeneity presented in the main regression equation (2), is associate with Xijt being correlated with eijt. It is possible
that some of the explanatory variables may be correlated with the error term, as we argued in the methodological section,
is likely that the Chinese Import competition measure is correlated to unobservable technology and demand shocks.
Moreover, such correlation may be stronger for products where both China’s and Colombia’s comparative advantages are
high, hence it might bias the real competition effect.
To tackle this problem, we would need to find an instrumental variable Zjt, correlated with IMPCHjt and uncorre-
lated with eijt. The usual identification strategy is that an instrument must be a variable that does not appear directly as a
regressor in the model, but is highly correlated with the endogenous variables. Then, the instrumental variable estimator
is consistent, if is proved that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term.
In that sense the additional instrumental variable strategy based on China joining the WTO and the initial conditions.
Since we are interested in capturing accelerating Chinese imports triggered by the WTO accession, the instruments should
capture this ’China’ driven component unrelated to the Colombian imports demand factors. Moreover, since sectors in
which China was already exporting in 1999 such as textiles, furniture and toys are likely to be those where China had a
comparative advantage and are also the sectors which experienced much more rapid increase in import penetration in
the subsequent years. Consequently, high exposure to Chinese imports prior to the China accession to the WTO as for
instance in 1999 can be used as a potential instrument for subsequent Chinese import growth.
Therefore, the new instrument considered for the Chinese share of import penetration rate is the exogenous overall
growth of Chinese imports, calculated excluding the Colombian imports, interacted with the 1999 Chinese import share
in the corresponding 4 digit ISIC industry in Colombia. IV2 = (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) ∗ IMCHj99. By doing so, we get the
cross-industry variation in the degree of Chinese import competition.
To be a good instrument this new variable must meet the exogenity and relevance conditions. We argue that, the
worldwide Chinese imports must be exogenous from the perspective of Colombian manufacturing plants as it is driven
just by China. Furthermore the instrument is intuitively relevant given the correlation of China’s export expansion in
industries where it has already a comparative advantage, as is suggested by Amiti and Freund (2008)8.
According to the estimations for new instrument in table 14, the results obtained using this new identification
approach are similar to those found using the initial instrument, indicating the robustness of the findings of this paper
and the robustness of the data generating process, under different instruments. Moreover, regarding to the relevance and
validity of instruments, the underidentification test, Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, rejected the null hypothesis, indicating
that the matrix is full column rank and the model is identified. Moreover, all the coefficient at the first stage results are
significant suggesting a correlation between the new instrument and the measure of Chinese import competition.
8They argued that three quarters of the aggregate growth of Chinese imports was from the expansion of existing
products rather than from adding new products.
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Table 14: Robustness Check: Results with Alternative Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification IV IV IV IV IV(Probit)
Models R&D workers Training Inv. R&D Inv. Property Rights Patents
Panel A: Second Stage Results
IMPCH No controls -0.543 -15.45*** -8.356*** -0.582*** -1.895*
(0.444) (1.267) (1.375) (0.193) (0.0542)
Firms Controls -0.673 -21.82*** -12.413*** -0.752*** -1.211**
(0.643) (2.212) (2.049) (0.259) (0.0832)
Export and Importer Controls -0.570 -16.36*** -9.116*** -0.690** -1.978***
(0.679) (1.322) (2.048) (0.295) (0.0816)
Entry-Exit Controls -0.532 -16.74*** -9.710*** -0.589** -1.303***
(0.835) (2.318) (2.540) (0.365) (0.102)
Firm Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! !
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! !
Number of Firms 5,719 5,719 5,218 5,719 5,719
Number of Observations 18,734 18,734 17,022 18,733 18,734
Panel B: First Stage Results
Models IMPCH No controls Firms Controls (Export and Importer Controls ) Entry-Exit Controls
IV2 = IMCHj99 ∗ (CHxjt − CHCOLxjt) 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-test 115 108 117 .
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 4 digit ISIC industries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. By Industry
by year fixed effects are partial led out. In the model with Firm controls are included the variables: A dummy if the firms is multi plant, proxy for firms’ Age, a
dummy whether the firm is located in Bogota and firms’ gross investment. The model with export and importer refers includes in addition to the above
mentioned firms’ controls, a dummy variables whether the firms exports and imports, respectively. Finally, the Entry-Exit model includes in addition to the two
above mentioned models, two dummy variables to control for firms’ entry and exit in the market.
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iii. Additional Analysis, Descriptive Statistics and Calculations
Figure 2: Chinese Import Penetration Rate and R&D Workers by Industry
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Figure 3: Chinese Import Penetration Rate and Training Investment by Industry
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Figure 4: Chinese Import Penetration Rate and R&D Investment by Industry
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Figure 5: Chinese Import Penetration Rate and the Predicted Probability of Patenting
Industry Concentration in Colombia and Chinese Import Competition
Measure of Industry Concentration: HHI Index.
The Herfindhal-Hirschman index, was calculated as:
HHI =
∑ni=1(Si)
2 − 1n
1− 1n
Si =
xi
∑ni=1 xi
(4)
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Figure 6: Chinese Import Penetration rate 4 Digit Industrial Output Concentration Index in Colombia.
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data comes from UNCOMTRADE
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